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"Zwei Dinge erftillen das Gemtit mit immer neuer 
und zunehemender Bewunderung und Ehrfurchte 
[ ••. ]: der bestirnte Himmel iiber mir. und das 
moralische Gesetz in mir." 
("Two things fill the spirit with new and ever-
increasing wonder and awe: the starry heavens 
above my head and the moral law within me." 
(Kant: critique of Practical Reason) 
"There are [ ... ] three distinct powers (potestas 
leqislatoria, executoria, iudiciaria) which give 
the state (civitas) its autonomy, that is, which 
enable the state to establish and maintain itself 
in accordance with laws of freedom. The welfare 
of the state consists in the union of these 
powers (salus reipublicae suprema lex est). But 
this welfare must not be understood as synonymous 
with the well-being and happiness of the 
citizens, for it may well be possible to attain 
these in a more convenient and desirable way 
within a state of nature (as Rousseau declares), 
or even under a despotic regime. On the contrary, 
the welfare of the state should be seen as that 
condition in which the constitution approximates 
to the principles of right; and reason, £y ~ 
categorical imperative, obliges us to strive for 
its realisation." (1) 
1. KANT, Immanuel Das offentliche Recht, 
cited by REISS, Hans (ed.) -- Kant; 
Political writings, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991 (second edition), pp. 142-143 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses upon a significant body of contemporary 
French political thought which takes as its starting point 
a contention that both the monist and doctrinaire political 
precepts dating from the Revolution and the consequent 
Hegelian, Marxist and structuralist thinking linked to 
these precepts have become anachronistic and hence have 
little relevance in present-day France. 
The originality of this doctoral thesis lies in the 
analysis of the work of seven political thinkers. All of 
these thinkers, recognizing a break in the continuity of 
French political thought consequent upon the claim of 
Franc;:ois Furet that the "Revolution is complete", have 
sought to rationalize and reconcile the values of 
individualism, humanism 
France. In contrast to 
and modernity in contemporary 
the political thinkers of the 
Sartrean generation, whose work took little account of the 
actual practice of politics, 
relate the philosophical 
the seven thinkers seek to 
problems inherent in 
considerations of individual and communal rights and values 
to the present-day political environment. 
iii 
Each of the seven has sought to rationalize a political 
situation, novel in France, of an acceptance of the concept 
of agreeing to differ on matters of sUbstance and of a 
recognition that a modern democratic state is heteronomous 
and may contain a sUbstantial range of incommensurable 
values. 
This amounts to an acceptance of agonistic value pluralism, 
that is, of the idea of political conflict which is 
constructive (by contrast with the destructive conflict of 
revolutionary-inspired doctrines) and which leads to the 
evolution of arguments broadly acceptable to a majority in 
situations in which there is a clash of values. Thus the 
practice of politics has become a succession of endeavours 
to arrive at optimum solutions to conflictual problems, 
rather than a search after chimerical, maximalist answers. 
-------000-------
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OBJECTIVE AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the nature and 
importance of individualism and humanism in late twentieth 
century French political thought following the fundamental 
socio-economic transformation of the nation which began in 
1945. 
I consider seven contemporary French political thinkers 
whose work is characteristic of the new French thought 
described by Mark Lilla as representing (1) "the almost 
universal abandonment of the Hegelian, Marxist, and 
structuralist dogmas that nourished intellectual contempt 
for liberalism after the war." 
The selection of these seven scholars inevitably has an 
element of subjectivity; I have sought to introduce 
poli tical thinkers who are regarded by their peers as 
having made a sUbstantial contribution to thinking about 
the deeper political implications of the radically 
different socio-economic environment in late twentieth 
century France. 
1. LILLA, Mark New French 
Philosophy, Princeton 
1994, p. 15 
ix 
Thought: Political 
University Press, 
The originality of my thesis lies in the fact that it 
offers an examination and classification of a significant 
sample of new French political thought and locates this 
thought in the context of the contemporary French economic 
and social environment. This new thought, which has a 
strong focus on individualism and humanism with a tacit 
recognition of the fact that democratic 
incommensurable, represents a caesura 
values may be 
in what was, 
arguably, a two-centuries' long continuum in French 
political thought which had been underpinned by a 
widespread belief in the possibility of an ideal, absolute, 
determinist and universal political system embodied in the 
classical concept of "la Republique" which had given 
primacy to the community at the expense of the individual. 
My thesis is organized into three main Parts. Part I: 
Perspective contains two chapters. In the first of these 
I review some recent maj or studies of developments in 
French political philosophy since 1945 and introduce the 
seven thinkers. In the second, I set out the context of 
their contribution and discuss some of the more significant 
intellectual antecedents of contemporary thought. 
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In Part II I review the work of the seven selected scholars 
in chronological order of significant relevant work 
published, beginning with Louis DUMONT, (1911-1997), who 
is some two generations older than the other six. 
Dumont was an anthropologist who spent much of his 
professional career in India; he was appointed a Director 
of Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences 
sociales (EHESS) in 1955. He was initially influenced by 
the structuralism of his professional colleague, Claude 
Levi-Strauss. After a career spent studying the Indian 
caste system, in his later years, particularly and 
initially in his Homo aequalis I: Genese et epanouissement 
de l'ideologie economique, published in 1977, Dumont 
focused on the sociological implications of the 
individualism of contemporary occidental societies arising 
from the flowering of economic ideology. This flowering 
gave to occidental men and women in contemporary societies 
a hitherto unthought of range of choice. He contrasted this 
new, multi-faceted possibility of expressing individualism 
with what he calls traditional "holist" (the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts) societies on which he 
had focused in the earlier years of his career and which 
he described as being hierarchical. He followed this with 
significant contributions in the 1980s, stressing the 
novelty of the new individualism. 
xi 
Dumont pointed out the consequent importance of efficacy 
in economic management by contemporary French governments, 
given that French citizens, having a significantly wider 
range of personal choice, expected that their government 
should at least not impede this choice. 
Pierre MANENT (1949- is a Director of studies at the 
Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales (EHESS). In 
his Naissances de la pOlitique moderne, published in 1977, 
he distinguishes between two schools of political thinking 
which he terms "realist" (associated with the thought of 
Machiavelli) and "utopian" (Rousseau). 
In subsequent work he has developped thinking on what he 
calls the European theologico-political problem, 
specifically on the evolution of concepts of the basis of 
political power of governments. There has always been, and 
by implication, there will always be, tension in the 
relationship between "nature" and law, between rulers and 
ruled, between society and the state and between the 
represented and the representative. 
xii 
Manent suggests that contemporary citizens serve two 
masters, the market and the state, but that they are at the 
same time themselves masters in that they have both market 
and electoral choice. They look to the state to help ease 
any pain generated by the market but the ultimate market 
regulator is consumer choice. He contends that competition 
is also an important social regulator in contemporary 
occidental societies. 
Blandine KRIEGEL (1943- is Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Paris-X Nanterre and also editor of the 
journal Philosophie pOlitique. An early significant work 
was L'Etat et les esclaves, published in 1979. Her thought 
concentrates upon the imperative of the rule of law in 
regulating the relationship between society and the state. 
She thinks in terms of political theory having three 
essential elements: a doctrine of power, a doctrine of 
individual rights and a political morality of law. In a 
given state, the law should be transcendent. She argues 
that a belief in human rights is concomitant with the idea 
that these rights be rooted in natural law, but 
distinguishes between tiles droits de l'homme", "la 
citoyennete" and "le droit du peuple", important 
considerations in the acutely multi-ethnic contemporary 
France. 
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This implies a re-thinking of the French democratic and 
Republican tradition and specif ically the concepts of 
legislation and of citizenship following the general 
acceptance in France of the idea that the Republic has 
become an ethical rather than an ideological consideration. 
Pierre ROSANVALLON (1948- is a Director of Studies at 
the EHESS and has been active in the French Trades Union 
movement. Although his first published works date from the 
late 1970s (see my bibliography), I consider first in this 
study his Le moment Guizot, published in 1985. 
Rosanvallon's major themes include a history of the 
development of the modern French state ("l'Etat") and the 
problems of effective democratic participation in the 
contemporary political process. 
Concerning "l'Etat", Rosanvallon identifies its two prime 
functions: political and administrative. He argues that it 
is at once a solution and a problem: a solution in that it 
is an institution embodying accepted practices and rules, 
a problem in that its relationship to society is fluid. 
Individualism and statism have developed side by side in 
France over the last two centuries without finding a 
solution to this problem. It is this question which 
Rosanvallon addresses in his thinking about ensuring 
effective popular political participation. 
xiv 
Marcel GAUCHET (1946- ) is also a Director of Studies at 
the EHESS and is editor of the journal Le Debat. In his Le 
desenchantement du monde, published in 1985, he considers 
the implications of the evolution of the modern secular 
society in which economics tends to be of vital 
significance with the consequent abandonment of a political 
role for religion. In other works, he cons iders 
developments in popular sovereignty and representation. 
Gauchet argues that in the past the evolution of 
individualism in occidental societies had been matched by 
a parallel development of institutions and ideologies 
intended to curb this individualism. He cites Tocqueville' s 
"struggle of contrary principles" in modern democracy and 
argues that democracy is formed out of conflict. Modern 
democracy does not need, as Tocqueville suggested, an 
ultimate divine point of reference, but sustains itself 
though debating conflicting values. 
In addition, the emergence of free market economics as a 
prime social motive force in contemporary occidental 
societies means that the present is controlled and given 
legitimacy by the future, instead of the older concept of 
the present being in thrall to the myths of the past. 
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Finally, I consider the thought of Luc FERRY (1951- ) who 
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris-VII 
and Alain RENAUT (1948- ), Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Paris-IV Sorbonne, together in a single 
chapter. Although each has sUbstantial published work to 
his name, their joint work is more significant. 
Their professional reputation was launched with a 
refutation of the post-structuralist political thinking 
dominant in France in the 1960s and early 1970s, La pensee 
68, published in 1985. Neo-Kantians, both their joint and 
individual work embraces the philosophy of humanism, 
individualism and subjectivity and the implications for 
human rights in the French republican tradition. 
They distinguish between what they call "permissions" and 
"entitlements", or "political democracy" and "social 
democracy", or the liberal tradition of an insensitivity 
to popular demands for entitlements and a socialist 
tradition of a matching insensitivity to individual demands 
for permissions. This dichotomy is at the heart of 
political debate and has specific relevance to 
considerations of human rights. 
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In my conclusion (Part Ill), I discuss the contribution of 
each of the selected seven scholars to considerations of 
the relevance of individualism and humanism in late 
twentieth century French political thinking. In contrast 
to the political thinkers of the Sartrean generation, these 
contemporary political philosophers have sought to relate 
their thinking to the realities of the present-day 
political environment. 
For each of the seven, the thought of Rousseau (and 
specifically Du contrat social) and the Revolution together 
form major benchmarks. All seek to construct a new 
intellectual basis for the contemporary practice of 
politics, a basis which reflects the break with the monist 
and revolutionary past and which will reconcile modern 
individualism and humanism. Each has taken an historical 
approach: for Dumont, Kriegel and Gauchet, this is the 
history of occidental ideas, beginning in Classical Greece 
and early Christianity; for Manent, Rosanvallon, Ferry and 
Renaut, this is the more recent history of individualism 
and modernity dating from the Renaissance. 
xvii 
I introduce the concept of agonistic value pluralism, that 
is, the idea of constructive political conflict and 
dialogue in a heteronomous situation. In other words, a 
need has been perceived in the French polity of seeking to 
ensure that an argument broadly acceptable to a majority 
evolves from any clash of values catalysed by topical (and 
often unexpected) events and that irreconcilable 
differences do not lead to an enfeebling of government. 
There is consequently an implicit acceptance of the 
possibility of pluralism in finding optimum solutions to 
specific political crises arising from an 
incommensurability of values. This acceptance constitutes 
a novelty in French thought when contrasted with the 
previous two centuries of monist political thinking 
predicated upon a utopian belief in a perfect political 
system. Thus Raymond Aron, for example, was derided by many 
of his contemporaries for advocating political pluralism. 
The recognition of this caesura in the continuum of French 
political thought and a consequent analysis of seven 
leading exponents of pluralist thinking constitutes the 
originality of my thesis. 
xviii 
No attempt has been made in this thesis to offer a 
philosophical critique of the arguments advanced by the 
selected scholars. My concern has been to assess the weight 
they give to the values of individualism and humanism and 
to establish the extent to which there is a common thread 
in their arguments. Beyond this, I have sought to interpret 
the thought of these seven scholars and to establish to 
what extent their collective work might be considered a new 
and coherent philosophical current. 
-------000-------
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
PART I 
PERSPECTIVE 
OVERVIEW 
My objective in this chapter is twofold. First, recognizing 
the profound economic, political and social transformation 
of France in the decades from 1945 - a transformation which 
contributed to a general rejection of the revolutionary 
ethic which had, in one form or another, dominated French 
political thought since the Revolution - I examine recent 
significant literature which reviews mainstream 
contemporary French political thinking. I argue that this 
thinking is dominated by a concern with humanist values and 
with the importance of political pluralism in a dynamic 
social environment which is dominated by the imperatives 
of the global market economy and in which the tensions 
between concepts of individualism and community tend to 
engender intolerance. 
Second, I explain further my choice of seven exponents of 
this thinking. I have selected thinkers whose approach 
either begins with social values, or whose starting point 
is the values of the individual, or who give priority to 
the rule of law and the role of the French state (" l' Etat") 
as an arbiter and regulator. 
1 
Overall, I have sought to balance the exponents of an 
empirical approach with those of ontological thought, that 
is, a concern for et re or for devoir-etre. 
At this stage I deem it important to enter a caveat. The 
volume of the literature defining and describing 
contemporary French political thought is sUbstantial; a 
complete literature review would be of significant length 
and would risk a major distortion in this study. Hence I 
have chosen initially to concentrate my research on recent 
histories of French political thinking and its sources and 
on a sample of academic and professional periodicals 
devoted to a reconsideration of values in contemporary 
political thought. Inevitably there is an element of 
subjectivity in my selection of examples of the new thought 
and of its exponents. I have sought to offset this 
subjectivity by approaching this study as a political 
agnostic and hence have eschewed as far as reasonably 
possible the use of adjectival labels which might imply a 
pre-judgement. 
In a sentence, the transformation of France over the second 
half of the twentieth century was a result of, inter alia, 
successive governments leading the country into the 
European Union, encouraging the globalization of the French 
economy, and introducing fundamental constitutional change 
(in 1958) which had the effect· of giving primacy to the 
political executive at the expense of the legislature. 
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In addition, for Rene Remond (1): "Oans les annees 70 s'est 
operee une modification profonde du paysage des idees qui 
prepare la redistribution des forces qui se deploiera dans 
les annees 80." 
For Maurice Agulhon (2): "[ ... ] en un demi-siecle, les 
profondes transformations remettent tout en question et 
peuvent susciter des interrogations legitimes." 
As Remond indicates, beginning in the 1970s, the sum of 
this transformation engendered a wide range of thinking 
about new political, economic and social realities, 
thinking which challenged much then-accepted conventional 
wisdom. A major element in this new thinking was a debate 
on the legacy of the Revolution from which a broad 
consensus emerged: France succeeded in placing its 
revolutionary past in a less ideologically-informed 
historical perspective. 
1. REMOND, Rene 
p. 820. 
Notre siecle, Fayard, Paris, 1988, 
2. AGULHON, Maurice, et al. -- La France de 1940 a nos 
jours, Editions Nathan, Paris, 1995, p. 526 
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At the outset it is possible to identify two major 
institutional sources of this new political thinking, that 
emanating from the philosophy faculties of French 
universities, especially the University of Paris, and that 
which is the the product of les grandes Ecoles, 
specifically in this case l' Ecole des hautes etudes en 
sciences sociales (EHESS). The consequent difference in 
approach is epistemological: the university faculties tend 
to consider political thought from a philosophical 
perspective, whereas the EHESS tends to sees this thought 
broadly as a sociological discipline. Philippe Raynaud 
comments (1): "La philosophie politique s'occup[e] du 
devoir-etre ou encore de l'ontologie la OU les sciences 
sociales etudieraient ce qui est ou se fonderaient sur 
l' empirie." He warns against making too much of the 
different approaches, arguing that Aristotle, Montesquieu 
and Rousseau each succeeded in arguing from a sociological 
point of view. 
1. RAYNAUD, Philippe "Philosophie politique" in 
RAYNAUD and RIALS, (eds) Dictionnaire de 
philosophie politique, Presses universitaires de 
France, 1996, p. 468 
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A prime reference is the five-volume Histoire de la 
philosophie politique (1) (henceforth in this chapter 
Histoire), published at the end of 1999, and edited by 
Alain Renaut, who is Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Paris-IV (Sorbonne). 
In the foreword (Les philosophies pOlitiques 
contemporaines (depuis 1945»), Renaut argues (2) that, 
since 1945 in France, each intellectual generation has 
found itself confronted with an apparently new set of 
problems. He maintains that, following the immediate post-
war generation (that dominated by Sartre and by the debate 
between Marxism and Existentialism), the history of the two 
succeeding generations may be described as an account "des 
transformations quIa pu connaitre la relation a la 
democratie et a ses valeurs", a phrase which has supplied 
the impetus of this study. 
1. RENAUT, Alain (sous la direction de) -- Histoire de 
la philosophie politique: 
Vol. I: La liberte des anciens 
Vol. 11: Naissances de la modernite 
Vol. Ill: Lumieres et romantisme 
Vol. IV: Les critiques de la modernite 
politique 
Vol. V: Les philosophies politiques 
contemporaines (depuis 1945) ; 
Calmann-Levy, Paris 1999 
2 • RENAUT op. cit. Vol. V. p.7 
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An essential reference for understanding the political 
thinkers associated with the EHESS is provided by Une eco1e 
pour 1es sciences socia1es (1), published in 1996, although 
from the point of view of depth and scope the work cannot 
be compared to Histoire. In their introduction to the work, 
the authors signal an important fact which is to be borne 
in mind in assessing the thought of scholars associated 
with the EHESS, who tend to have a marked concern with 
history (2): 
"[ ... ] la France est l'un des rares pays ou l'histoire 
soit de plein droit consideree comme une science 
sociale; elle est probablement le seul ou les sciences 
sociales se soient, dans une large mesure, organisees 
autour de l'histoire." 
A third prime reference is the encyclopaedic Dictionnaire 
de phi1osophie po1itique (3) which includes essays by 
scholars on topical themes such as, inter alia, 
"Citoyennete" "Communaute et Communautarisme", "Egalite", 
"Etat et societe civile", "Democratie", "Individualisme", 
"Liberalisme" and "Subjectivite". I shall return to this 
work in Chapter 2 of this study where I seek to establish 
parameters for the reconsideration of the values of liberal 
humanism in contemporary France. 
1. 
2 . 
REVEL, Jacques and WACHTEL, Nathan 
1es sciences socia1es, Les 
Paris, 1996 
idem. p. 15 
Une eco1e pour 
Edi tions du Cerf, 
3. RAYNAUD, Philippe and RIALS, Stephane -- Dictionnaire 
de phi1osophie po1itique, Presses universitaires 
de France, 1996, Ope cit. 
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I contend that these (and other) sources (1), and 
especially Histoire (2), upon which I have drawn heavily, 
provide a reasoned overview of contemporary mainstream 
(that is, concerned with the impact of the transformation 
of the national ethos on the inter-relationship of the 
basic French political values: "democratie", "la 
Republique", "L'Etat", "liberte" and "egalite") French 
political thought which permits the identification of a 
representati ve sample of present day exponents of this 
thought. 
1. An important secondary series of sources in English is 
represented by the translations from 
original French works jointly edited by 
Thomas Pavel and Mark Lilla, published by 
Princeton University Press. This series 
includes: 
LILLA, Mark, (ed.) -- New French Thought: 
Political Philosophy (1994); 
LIPOVETSKY, Gilles The Empire of 
Fashion: Dressing Modern Democracy 
(1994) 
MANENT, Pierre An Intellectual History 
of Liberalism (1995) 
KRIEGEL, Blandine -- The state and the Rule 
of Law (1995) 
RENAUT, Alain -- The Era of the Individual: 
A contribution to a History of 
Subjectivity (1997) 
GAUCHET, Marcel -- The Disenchantment of 
the World: A Political History of 
Religion (1997) 
MANENT, Pierre -- The City of Man (1998) 
2. RENAUT (ed.) Histoire de la phi1osophie po1itique, 
Ope cit. 
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contemporary French Political Thought and its Exponents 
In an introductory essay ("Liminaire") to Vol. V of 
Histoire, under the rubric "L'humanisme en questions" in 
which he considers political thought in France since 1945, 
Lilla (1) contends that, seen from outside France, it is 
the relationship between individualism and modernity which 
has constituted the most important theme in the development 
of French political philosophy over the period. 
Lilla's liminaire represents an important summary of 
developments in French political thought since 1945. In the 
first paragraph, he makes a point of considerable 
significance (2): 
"Le langage de la philosophie franc:;:aise de l' apres-
guerre est un langage de negation et de refus; la 
renonciation est son credo. Et la philosophie 
politique fut la premiere chose a laquelle elle 
renonc:;:a. [... . .. ) Plus les intellectuels fran9ais 
devenaient 'politiques', moins ils s'interessaient au 
fait politique. On ne peut esperer comprendre la 
pensee politique dans la France de l'apres-guerre sans 
tacher de comprendre la logique de ce double 
mouvement." 
1. LILLA, Mark -- "L'humanisme en questions" in RENAUT 
(ed.) -- Histoire, op. cit. p. 28 
2. idem. p. 19 
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Lilla contends that the work of Fran90is Furet provides the 
most convincing explanation for this phenomenon (1): 
"Oans ses nombreux essais et ouvrages, Furet montrait 
comment, deja au XIXe siecle, les debats politiques en 
France s'etaient constitues en disputes autour de la 
question de l'heritage de la revolution qui ne 
laissaient guere de place a une reflexion sereine 
portant sur les visees et limi tes de la democratie 
liberale, comme cela se produisait alors en Angleterre 
et aux Etats-Unis." 
In the years immediately following 1945, French political 
thought tended to be dominated by Sartre. Lilla recalls 
sartre's influence and evokes his description in 1960 of 
Marxism as being "l'horizon indepassable de notre temps" 
(2). Of Sartre's general influence, Lilla writes (3): 
"L'importance de Sartre en tant que penseur politique 
tient m01ns a ses ecrits sur la politique, qui 
relevaient principalement du journalisme, qu'au style 
d'engagement politique qu'il contribua a populariser." 
In intellectual and ideological opposition to Sartre was 
Raymond Aron, described by Lilla as being (4) "la plus 
importante [personalite] dans le combat mene pour maintenir 
vivante une pensee politique serieuse sur la democratie 
liberale". 
1. LILLA, op. cit., pp. 19-20 
2. idem. -- p. 22. The words appeared in SARTRE, 
Jean-Paul -- Critique de la raison dialectique, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1960, p. 9 
3 • LI LLA , op. c it. P . 22 
4. idem. -- p. 23 
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Describing the influence of Aron, by contrast, Lilla argues 
that (1): 
" [ ... ] a la difference de Sartre, Aron reconnut, a 
partir de ses experiences, la valeur du scepticisme 
liberal et developpa une persistente hostilite a toute 
forme de determinisme historique, y compris celle dont 
etait porteur le marxisme." 
The method of linguistic structuralism (2) applied to the 
study of society, associated originally with the name of 
Claude Levi-Strauss, appealed to a new French generation. 
(Levi-strauss's Anthropologie structurale was published in 
1958.) Lilla argues (3) that the idea of "l'universalisme 
dans un seul pays", emanating from the revolutionary ethic 
and with a stated respect for cultural differences, seemed, 
by the end of the 1970s, to be no more than an absurd myth 
to a new generation of political thinkers. 
The decade of the 1960s, Lilla continues, saw the advent 
of thinking associated with the name of Michel Foucault 
(broadly, post-structuralism) which focussed upon social 
marginality and which sought (4) "de promouvoir l'Autre au 
rang de nouveau sans-culotte. Tout ce qui etait marginal 
dans les societes occidentales pouvait desormais etre 
justifie, voire philosophiquement celebre." 
1. LILLA, Ope cit. p. 23 
2. For a detailed history of structuralism, see DOSSE, 
Franyois -- Histoire de structuralisme (2 vols) , 
Editions la DecQuverte, Paris, 1991 
3. LILLA, op. cit. -- p. 25 
4. idem. -- p. 26 
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Lilla regards both the events of May 1968 and the election 
of Franyois Mitterrand to the Presidency in May 1981 as 
being significant for the development of the practice of 
politics in France and hence for new political thinking. 
Of the impact of May 1968 he argues that the choices facing 
France made it more difficult (1): 
"d'ignorer la tension entre une position poli tiquement 
a gauche, implicitement fondee sur les valeurs des 
Lumieres, et un anti-humanisme philosophique qui 
revenait a faire de l'action pOlitique le lieu 
d'exercice d'une decision purement arbitaire." 
As to the election of Mitterrand, Lilla maintains that this 
represented (2): 
"[ ... ] le dernier chapitre de l'histoire de la lutte, 
en France, autour de la question de l'heritage de la 
Revolution franyaise. Loin d' annoncer la gauche au 
pouvoir, c'etait, la, la fin d'une longue tradition 
d'antiliberalisme politique qui contribua a faciliter 
la transition vers ce que certains ont appele la 
republique du centre." 
Increasingly, beginning in the mid-1970s, an emphasis upon 
individualism began to dominate French political thinking. 
This was a novelty in France, Lilla comments (3); in 
contrast, individualism was a central concept in Anglo-
American political and economic thought, to such an extent 
that it was considered a fact of life. Differences, if any, 
in the intellectual response in France to the phenomenon, 
Lilla continues, are methodological. 
1. LILLA -- "L'humanisme en questions" in RENAUT (ed.) 
Histoire, op. cit. p. 27 
2. idem. p. 28 
3. idem. 
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What Lilla calls "une des approches dominantes" (1) was 
historical and leaned heavily upon anthropology. An early 
exponent of the new political thinking was Louis Dumont, 
a contemporary of Levi-strauss and, like him, an 
anthropologist who had studied under Marcel Mauss. Dumont' s 
professional reputation as an anthropolgist had been gained 
through his work on the Indian caste system. 
Lilla (2) describes his work as emanating from a 
consideration of the ideas of Tocqueville concerning the 
relationship of the individual to modernity. At the heart 
of his writing is a focus upon the distinction between 
"holist" societies whose ideology is hierarchical, and 
"individualist" societies whose ideological framework is 
built around ideas of equality and liberty. 
"si toute societe est bien constituee d'individus, les 
societes holistes sont organlsees suivant les 
principes qui ne reconnaissent pas l'individu en tant 
que source ultime de valeur. (3) 
Lilla summarizes the essential thrust of Dumont's argument 
(4): European history, from the early Christian era to the 
Revolution, has been dominated by the tension between 
individualist and hierarchical values which were only 
resolved by the institution of the modern state and the 
separation of economic affairs and religious power from 
this state. 
1. LILLA, Ope cit. p. 28 
2. idem. -- p. 29 
3. idem. 
4. idem. 
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Another attempt to analyse what Lilla calls the "historico-
anthropological" approach to the problem of individualism 
and modernity is provided by the thinking of Marcel Gauchet 
and specifically by his Le Desenchantement du monde. (1) 
Lilla summarizes Gauchet's thinking (2): 
"L'affirmation de la subjectivit~ humaine a induit, 
sur le plan politique, la domination progressive de 
l'individualisme d~mocratique, mais ~galement, comme 
cons~quence du retrait des dieux, l'essor 
d'id~ologies, de la bureaucratisation, du 
nationalisme, de la puissance ~tatique toujours 
grandissante, voire du totalitarisme. Plus l'homme est 
libre, plus le pouvoir social s' accroit et moins 
l'homme est heureux." 
Both Dumont and Gauchet contend, Lilla writes (3), that 
modern political forms are the product of a continuous 
historical process; this approach is disputed by other 
thinkers, such as Pierre Manent (4). 
1. LILLA, op. cit. p. 29. Lilla is referring to: GAUCHET, 
Marcel Le Desenchantement du monde, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1985; English language edition: 
The Disenchantement of the World: A Political 
History of Religion, Princeton University Press, 
1997 
2. LILLA, idem. p. 30 
3. idem. 
4. idem. 
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In a series of works focussing on the history of modern 
political thought, Manent argues, according to Lilla, that 
liberal democracy must be considered as a conscious modern 
break with the ancient and mediaeval worlds (1): 
" [ •.. ] la moderni te n' est pas le produi t de cette 
force impersonnelle que sera it l'histoire, mais plutot 
un 'projet' conscient (et contestable), con9u par les 
premiers philosophes modernes et poursuivi par leurs 
epigones au cours des siecles qui suivent. L'histoire 
moderne fut engendree par la philosophie moderne, et 
non pas l'inverse." 
This position is also held by Alain Renaut and Luc Ferry, 
Lilla maintains (2). In addition, these two philosophers 
are numbered among those who are seeking to develop a 
clearly modern humanist philosophy of history. Lilla writes 
(3) that, like Manent, Renaut and Ferry consider that 
"l'historicisme est insoutenable et qu'il y a eu, sur la 
politique moderne, des effets dommageables." 
The two philosophers distinguish, Lilla continues (4): 
"[ ... ] sujet et individu, affirmant qu'une conception 
humaniste du sujet, etablie par Kant et Fichte, avait 
ete abandonnee au benefice d'une conception de l'ordre 
social procedant subrepticement de l'interaction 
irrationnelle d'individus." 
Thus, they continue, any political philosophy based on the 
thought of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche or Heidegger is 
fundamentally individualist and hence would tend toward 
anti-humanism (5). 
1. LILLA, op. cit. p. 30 
2. idem. 
3. idem. 
4 . idem. p. 31 
5. idem. 
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Lilla concludes that, seen from outside France, the work 
of these scholars seems to be particularly important 
because (l): 
"[ ... ) ils ont permis de replacer le phenomene de la 
vie politique au centre de la reflexion philosophique. 
La philosophie est devenue moins politique, au sens de 
I 'engagement ideologique, mais elle est devenue 
cependant plus pOlitique, sur le plan de l'analyse 
rigoureuse." 
Charles Larmore (2) focusses on the work of these (and 
other) contemporary French political thinkers and provides 
a different perspective in a chapter in Vol. V of 
L' histoire entitled "Repenser I' humanisme et la democratie. 
La philosophie politique en France depuis vingt ans". He 
subdivides the chapter into four main sub-headings: 
morality, autonomy, natural law and history. This 
subdivision reflects, Larmore implies, four substantial 
elements in the re-thinking of concepts of humanism and 
democracy over the last twenty years. 
He begins by arguing that one of the undoubted signs of the 
overtaking of Marxism in France is the renewed interest 
shown by many French philosophers in human rights and the 
normative fundamentals of modern democracy. The novelty of 
this evolution, he argues, goes far beyond the abandonment 
of Marxist and revolutionary principles. 
1. LILLA, op. cit. p. 31 
2. LARMORE, Charles "Repenser l' humanisme et la 
democratie" in RENAUT (ed.) -- Histoire, op. ci t. 
Vol. V, pp 97-125 
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What is happening, Larmore continues (1), is a rejection, 
or at least a questioning, of a more venerable French 
tradition, a tradition upon which Marxism had been grafted, 
that is, the republican tradition: 
"De Rousseau jusqu'A notre si~cle, en passant par les 
grands architectes de la llle Republique, cette 
tradi tion a prone la suprematie de la souverainete 
populaire et montre donc une repugnance A admettre que 
la volonte collective doit etre limitee par les droits 
naturels de l'individu." (2) 
What is new and exciting in contemporary French philosophy, 
Larmore contends, is the desire to focus upon the moral 
foundations of modern democracy. In the section of his 
chapter headed "La Morale", he draws attention to the work 
of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (3): 
"En 1984 et 1985, deux jeunes philosophes, Luc Ferry 
et Alain Renaut, font une entree eclatante sur la 
sc~ne intellectuelle. Dans toute une serie de livres, 
ils reclament une reorientation profonde de la pensee 
politique de leur temps. Leur objectif est de 
demontrer, A l' encontre des courants philosophiques 
voulant faire table rase de la notion moderne de 
subjectivite, que la vision morale du monde est 
incontournable." 
1. LARMORE, Charles -- "Repenser l'humanisme" in RENAUT 
(ed.) -- Histoire, Ope cit. pp. 97-98 
2. Larrnore draws attention to what he describes as 
"1' etude excellente" of NICOLET, Claude -- L' Idee 
republicaine en France, 1789-1924, Gallirnard, 
Paris, 1994 (2nd edition) 
3. LARMORE, OPe cit. p. 98 
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Larmore lists some of the collective and individual work 
of Ferry and Renaut (1). He points out (2) that perhaps 
the best-known work of Ferry and Renaut - La Pensee 68 -
targetted the post-structuralist, anti-humanist 
philosophies which had had their vogue in France, 
beginning in the 1960s and continuing until the early 
1970s. These philosophies had been profoundly influenced 
by Heidegger's critique of modern thought, Larmore argues. 
Larmore summarises (3) Ferry and Renaut's argument, which 
began with a consideration of Heidegger's contention that 
the world of modern subjectivity is a world in which men 
and women can respect nothing greater than their own 
individual desire, be this even their own humanity. 
1. LARMORE, op. cit., p. 98 The works listed are: 
FERRY, Luc Philosophie poli tique, 2 
vols, PUF, Paris, 1984 
FERRY, Luc and RENAUT, Alain -- systeme et 
critique, Ousia, Brussels, 1984 
do. La Pensee 68, Gallimard, 
Paris, 1985 
do. 68-86. Itineraires de 
l'individu, Gallimard, Paris, 1987 
do. -- Heideqqer et les modernes, 
Grasset, Paris, 1988 
RENAUT, Alain -- L'Ere de l'individu, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1989 
RENAUT, Alain and SOSOE, Lukas 
Philosophie de droit, PUF, Paris, 1991 
RENAUT, Alain and MESURE, Sylvie La 
Guerre des dieux, Grasset, Paris, 1996 
2. LARMORE, op. cit. p.99 
3. idem. 
17 
In spite of their important inspirational differences (the 
works of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud), Larmore continues, (1) 
the common ambition of French thinkers such as Althusser, 
Derrida, Foucault and Lacan was to overthrow the idea that 
reality has no other meaning than that which may be known, 
and hence mastered, by mankind. This concept was not only 
wrong, but had clear moral implications and could favour 
a totalitarian political development. 
A broad conclusion of the anti-humanist arguments, Larmore 
argues, was that in order to thwart the desire to dominate 
reality (the supposed characteristic of modern thought), 
it would be necessary to go so far as to challenge the 
notion of individual responsibility. This conclusion Ferry 
and Renaut "repoussent de toutes leurs forces" (2). 
Their argument, as summarized by Larmore (3), is that: 
"[ .•• ] la leyon principale de la philosophie de Kant, 
dans laquelle ils voient donc a cet egard, comme a 
d'autres, l'horizon indepassable de la pensee, la 
forme de la subjectivite moderne irremplayable." 
Larmore points out that it is not only Kantian morality 
which is evoked by Ferry and Renaut but also the idea of 
autonomy (4). He cites Renaut's L'Ere de l'individu (5): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
"L'homme n'entend plus recevoir ses normes et ses lois 
ni de la nature des choses (Aristote), ni de Dieu, 
mais ... les fonde lui-meme a partir de sa raison et 
de sa volonte." 
LARMORE, op. cit. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 99 
p. 100 
p. 101 
p. 102 
p. 103 
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This contention leads to a philosophical argument, touched 
upon by Larmore, an argument which leads to considerations 
of natural law, the subj ect of the third section of 
Larmore's chapter (1), and to a consideration by him of 
the work of Blandine Barret-Kriegel (2). 
Larmore argues that the neo-Kantian ideal espoused by 
Ferry and Renaut contains a difficulty. This ideal (3): 
"[ ... ] indiquant ce que nous devons a nous-memes, non 
ce que nous devons a autrui, ne possede pas lui-meme 
de caractere moral et ne suffit pas non plus pour nous 
faire entrer dans le point de vue moral." 
This difficulty, Larmore continues, is at the heart of 
Barret-Kriegel's argument for a return to natural law, an 
argument which he summarises (4): 
"[ ... ] dans un univers oil les principes de conduite 
deviennent tous negociables, il ne peut exister de 
droits individuels qu'il faut respecter 
inconditionnellement. La oil la volonte humaine devient 
source du droit, aucune regIe prealable ne limite la 
sorte d'association pOlitique qu'il est permis 
d'instituer." 
1. "La loi naturelle", LARMORE, op. ci t. pp. 108-117 
2. idem. -- p. 109. Larmore lists the following 
3. 
4. 
works by Barret-Kriegel, who is Professor of 
Political Philosophy at the University of 
Paris X-Nanterre, (she is now generally also 
known as Blandine Kriegel): 
idem. 
idem. 
Les Droits de l'hornme et le droit 
naturel, PUF, Paris, 1989; 
- Cours de philosophie politique, LGF, 
Paris, 1996 
p. 109 
p. 110 
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Larmore continues (1) that another way to set out Barret-
Kriegel's thesis is to say that a contractualist theory 
can defend effectively the rights of the individual only 
on condition that is not completely contractualist. It 
becomes necessary to have recourse to a range of moral 
obligations, the validity of which does not depend upon 
any agreement among human beings, that is to say a moral 
law which defines what sort of agreements are legitimate. 
Natural law, Larmore contends (2), means the spelling out 
of moral obligations which have a fundamental character, 
obligations which apply to all mankind as such and the 
validity of which does not depend upon human will nor upon 
conventions which men and women might agree among 
themselves. 
In the final section of his chapter, ilL' Histoire" (3), 
Larmore repeats the contention that morality means a 
willingness to submit to rules of behaviour which are 
themselves necessarily related to human will, and that 
this concept is neither essentially religious nor 
teleological. 
1. LARMORE, op. cit. p. 112 
2. idem. p. 114 
3. idem. pp. 117-125 
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In this context he points to the necessity of facing up to 
the argument of Ferry and Renaut (1) "selon laquelle nous 
vivons le recul des traditions morales, les criteres 
qu'elles nous offraient autrefois n'etant plus 
disponibles." 
Larmore also cites Claude Lefort (2) who draws the same 
picture of a world in which no moral principle has any 
longer the status of an acquired truth. Larmore quotes 
Lefort as writing that: "La democratie s'institue et se 
maintient dans la dissolution des reperes de certitude" 
(emphasis in Larmore's text. JT). 
Larmore concludes by quoting Lefort' s criticism of the 
Kantian ethic, which, Lefort maintains, has the effect 
( 3) : 
" [ ... ] d' ecarter toute ref lex ion sur l' insertion du 
sujet dans le monde et l'histoire qu'il interroge et 
sur l'enracinement de la connaissance, connaissance de 
soi et connaissance de I 'autre, dans une matrice 
inconsciente." 
1. LARMORE, op. cit. p. 117 
2. idem. p. 118. Larmore quotes from: 
LE FORT , Claude Essais sur le politique, 
Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1986, p. 29. 
3. idem. -- p. 119. The quotation from Lefort 
comes from op. cit. p. 11 
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In Vol. IV of the Histoire Les critiques de la 
modernite politique -- two issues are explored which would 
seem, prima facie, to be relevant to new French thinking 
about democratic values. The first is set out in an 
introductory note by Renaut: "R~volution am~ricaine, 
R~volution fran9aise" and the second in an essay by Ferry 
entitled "L'emergence du couple Etatjsociete". 
Renaut (1) argues that both the American and French 
revolutions have contributed to the history of political 
philosophy by either pointing to or renewing some major 
considerations. He continues: 
"C'est sous ce dernier angle que lion evoquera ici la 
contribution apportee par les deux processus 
revolutionnaires a la transformation de la raison 
politique moderne: cette contribution, qui engage a la 
fois la definition des principes ultimes de la 
modernite politique (a savoir les valeurs des 'droits 
de l'homme') et la conception du processus politique 
par lequel ces principes pourraient etre mis en 
oeuvre, apparait d'autant plus riche et complexe 
qu'elle n'a nullement ~t~ homogene, rnais qu'elle s'est 
trouvee d'emblee dedoublee a la faveur de tout ce qui 
est venu distinguer la version amer~caine et la 
version fran9aise de la 'revolution des droits de 
l'homme'." 
In his essay (1), Ferry makes the point that the modern 
notion of democracy contains intrinsically within itself 
the possibility of several political models. He argues 
that the birth and evolution of "le couple Etatjsoci~te" 
is nothing less than "un episode eharni~re dans les 
transformations de la raison pOlitique moderne." 
1. RENAUT -- Histoire, Ope eit. Vol. IV, p. 21 
2. FERRY, Lue in RENAUT (ed.) -- Histoire, op. eit. Vol. 
IV, pp. 37-51 
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The sociological approach to a reconsideration of 
democratic values in France comes from the EHESS (1). 
Following the growing disillusionment with the ideology of 
international Communism in the early 1970s, and roughly 
coterminous with the presidency of Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing (1974-1981), came a fundamental realignment of 
French political thinking and a concomitant evolution of 
the study of politics in les grandes ecoles. The EHESS was 
at the forefront of this realignment. 
Franc;:ois Furet became president of the School in 1977. 
Other significant appointments (as Directors of Studies) 
were those of Jacques Ozouf in 1971, Pierre Nora in 1976 
and Jacques Julliard in 1979 (2). 
According to Pierre Rosanvallon (3), these appointments 
provided the human element in a development of political 
studies arising out of the changing intellectual climate 
in France which marked the decade of the 197 Os. This 
development was stimulated by an intellectual critique of 
Marxism and by the perception of a certain number of 
limits to positivism as far as the social sciences were 
concerned. The major event of the period was what 
Rosanvallon calls "la crise du totalitarisme". 
1. See REVEL, Jacques and WACHTEL, Nathan, (eds) -- Une 
Ecole, op. cit. 
2. ROSANVALLON, Pierre -- "Le Politique" in REVEL 
and WACHETL, op. cit. p. 299 
3. idem. p. 300 
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Rosanvallon describes the intellectual environment of the 
decade of the 1970s (1): 
"11 Y a quelque chose d'exceptionnel dans cette 
conjuncture intellectuelle du milieu des annees 1970. 
Les evenements et la question du totalitarisme se 
joignent a la grande transformation culturelle qui est 
celle de l' epuisement du marxisme dans la culture 
politique et dans les sciences sociales. D'ou l'enorme 
soif de retour aux classiques qui peut etre constatee 
pendant cette periode. Toute une nouvelle generation 
s' ecarte du positivisme marxiste ou structuraliste 
dans 1es sciences socia1es, mais prend aussi des 
distances vis-a-vis de l'essayisme ideologique, pour 
se rep longer dans la lecture des classiques." 
The change of emphasis in the EHESS in the 1970s went in 
parallel with the re-formulating of existing and the 
launching of new political journals to reflect the 
intellectual spirit of the times. The revue Esprit, 
founded by Emmanuel Mounier in the 1930s, donned new 
clothes in 1976 and announced that henceforth its 
editorial policy would be built around a sub-title: 
"Changer la culture et la politique". 
A new journal, Libre, was founded in 1977, carrying a sub-
title "Politique, anthropologie, philosophie"; the team of 
scholars behind Libre included Cornelius castoriadis, 
Claude Lefort and Krzysztof Pomian, with Marcel Gauchet as 
editor. 
1. ROSANVALLON, Ope cit. p. 301 
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Perhaps the most influential new journal, one which 
captured an emerging intellectual mood, was Le Debat, 
founded in 1980, with Pierre Nora and Marcel Gauchet as 
editors, with the conviction that (1) "[ ... ] une veritable 
metamorphose du modEHe intellectuel etait en train de 
s'operer." 
The work of virtually all the scholars so far listed is 
marked by a desire to return to the classics, or, rather, 
to the fundamentals of political philosophy. It is as 
though French scholars felt insecure about the foundation 
of the new thinking and hence perceived a need to 
reconstitute the intellectual basis for the study of 
politics in France. 
A consequence of the desire for a return to the 
fundamentals of political philosophy is that much 
scholarly effort has gone into works which are essentially 
histories of the evolution of ideas. Some of these 
histories are unsurprisingly conventional, others claim to 
be seeking to evolve a "conceptual history" (2). 
1. Le Debat -- "Notre histoire" in Le Debat, May-August 
1988, Introduction; this issue, marking the 20th 
issue of the journal, contains some extremely 
useful and relevant articles. 
2. The idea of a "conceptual history" comes from Pierre 
Rosanvallon. See JENNINGS, Jeremy "The 
Return of the Political? New French Journals in 
the History of Political Thought" in History of 
Political Thought, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, spring 
1997, p. 149. 
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Two new periodicals (1) devoted to the study of the 
history of political ideas and political philosophy were 
launched during the early years of the decade of the 
1990s: Philosophie politique (a bi-annual launched in 1992 
by the Presses Universitaires de France with Blandine 
Kriegel as editor) and the Revue FranQaise d'Histoire des 
Idees Politiques (dating from 1995). 
Each issue of Philosophie politique focuses upon a 
specific broad philosphical idea or the work of a renowned 
philosopher; for example, No. 2 is devoted to Kant, No. 4 
to La Republigue, No. 5 to Hegel, No. 8 to La Nation. 
Relatively recent works of reference covering the history 
of political ideas also include the monumental Nouve11e 
histoire des idees politiques, edited by Pascal Ory and 
published in 1987 (2) and a work jointly authored by 
Philippe Braud and Franyois Burdeau: Histoire des idees 
politiques depuis la Revolution, published in 1992 (3). 
1. JENNINGS, Ope cit. pp. 148-156 
2. ORY, Pascal (sous la direction de) -- Nouvelle 
histoire des idees politiques, Hachette Pluriel, 
Paris, 1987 
3. BRAUD, Philippe and BURDEAU, Franyois -- Histoire des 
idees politiques depuis la Revolution, 
Montchrestien, Paris, 1992 
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Inevitably, given the radical change in the political 
environment, a large number of individual works covering 
the evolution of political thinking in France have been 
published over the course of the last two decades of the 
twentieth century. Claude Lefort, born in 1924, offered 
the perception of an older generation. His Essais sur la 
politique (1), published in 1986, included essays on 
modern democracy, on the Revolution, and specifically a 
lengthy and positive review of Furet's Penser la 
Revolution franQaise entitled "Penser la revolution dans 
la Revolution franc;:aise", and on liberty. 
Lefort touches upon the differing approaches to political 
thinking in contemporary France between the social science 
disciplines and those of philosophy (2): 
"Penser le politique au sens que nous pretons aces 
mots releve donc d'une intention differente de celle 
de la science et de la sociologie politiques, et nous 
enjoint d'interroger nos liens avec la tradition de la 
philosophie pOlitique. 
citing Hannah Arendt (3), he makes a strong anti-
historicist argument: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
"[ ••• ] les evenements du siecle au premier rang 
desquels l'essor des regimes totalitaires sont sans 
precedent, et [ ... ] ils creent a la pensee l'exigence 
d'un nouveau depart." 
LEFORT, Claude Essais sur le politique, Editions 
du Seui 1, Paris, 1986 
idem. p. 8 
idem. p. 13 
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Lucien Jaume is a Director of Research at the Centre 
d'etude de la vie politigue fran<;:aise. His L'individu 
efface ou le paradoxe du liberalisme fran9ais Cl) traces 
the development of French liberal political thinking from 
Madame de Stael and Benjamin Constant to Raymond Aron. In 
his introduction Jaume provides an analysis of the 
historical evolution of the two main strands of French 
thinking about political liberalism, the one giving 
primacy to the liberty of the individual, the other, 
following the ideas of Guizot, giving primacy to a liberal 
Etat. Jaume emphasizes that French experience until very 
recently has leaned heavily towards the second option (2). 
And yet, Jaume asks, do we not usually (3): 
n[ ... ] considerer le liberalisme comme la doctrine qui 
fait droit par excellence a l'individu moderne, 
emanclpe a la fois de la tutelle spirituelle que 
faisait peser l'Eglise et de l'omnipotence conferee a 
la souverainete, dans les monarchies absolues,?n 
Jaume's work is a history of these two strands of 
liberalism. He makes substantial reference to the work of 
Gauchet, Manent and Rosanvallon. 
1. JAUME, Lucien L'individu efface ou le paradoxe du 
liberalisme fran9ais, Fayard, Paris, 1997 
2. idem. p. 11 
3. idem. 
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In summary, recalling my first objective in this chapter 
(1) of seeking to examine the significant literature 
reviewing mainstream French political thinking, I argue 
that, in part due to the socio-economic transformation of 
France and the associated broad acceptance by a 
significant majority of French political thinkers of 
Furet's contention that "la Revolution franyaise est 
terminee", there has been sUbstantial rethinking of the 
meaning of democracy and its values. These thinkers are 
concerned with humanist values and with the importance of 
political pluralism in a dynamic social environment which 
is dominated by the imperatives of the global market 
economy and in which the tensions between concepts of 
individualism and community tend to generate intolerance. 
In short, the most important theme of present-day French 
political thought is the relationship between 
individualism and modernity. 
Further, contemporary political thinkers are seeking to 
relate their thought to the realities of the current 
practice of politics. This is in marked contrast to the 
thought of the Sartrean generation, which was generally 
contemptuous of the present-day political scene. 
1. p. 1 supra 
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A striking manifestation of the difference between the 
present generation of French political thinkers and that 
of Sartre is found in the value given to the work of 
Raymond Aron. Aron embraced liberal scepticism and argued 
strongly againt all forms of historical determinism; he 
was concerned with current realities and argued for an 
acceptance of political pluralism, an approach derided by 
his "petit camarade" Sartre. 
Between Sartre and the thought of the present-day 
generation there emerged in France the phenomenon of 
structuralism and post-structuralism, a complex search for 
a universalist theory with a marked concern for social 
marginality. 
contemporary French political philosophy recognizes the 
dichotomy between society and "1' Etat" and is concerned 
with the implication of this dichotomy for the essential 
democratic values, for the rights of individuals and of 
the wider community, in short, on the moral foundations 
of modern democracy. 
The recognition that there is a possibility of more than 
one democratic model and that within each model there is 
room for a number of incommensurable values is an integral 
part of contemporary French political thought. 
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I have approached my second objective in this chapter -
the identification of a number of contemporary French 
scholars whose work has a strong focus on individualism and 
humanism, which constitutes a break with the past and which 
thus would warrant a much closer examination and analysis -
with a concern to balance breadth of consideration with 
depth of analysis. I have chosen three philosophers -
Renaut, Ferry and Kriegel - three sociologists - Manent, 
Gauchet and Rosanvallon - and one - Dumont - whose work I 
judge to contain ontological elements as well as basic 
anthropological and sociological reasoning. 
A starting point for my selection has been the work edited 
by Lilla, New French Thought (1), published in 1994. This 
volume includes samples of the work of thirteen 
contemporary French political thinkers of broadly the same 
generation. One, Tzvetan Todorov, was born in 1939, the 
other twelve between 1946 and 1958, the youngest being 
Anne Godignon (1958). Lilla's selection includes Luc Ferry, 
Marcel Gauchet, Blandine Kriegel, Gilles Lipovetsky, 
Bernard Manin, Philippe Raynaud, Alain Renaut and stephane 
Rials. 
1. LILLA, Mark, (ed.) Political Philosophy, 
Princeton University Press, 1994 
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A bibliography of "Primary Works" offered by Lilla lists 
over thirty scholars, including (in addition to those 
mentioned in the previous paragraph) Raymond Aron, 
Cornelius Castoriadis, Vincent Descombes, Louis Dumont, 
Franyois Furet, Claude Lefort, Edgar Morin, Pierre Nora, 
Alexis Philonenko, Pierre Rosanvallon and Paul Yonnet. 
The work edited by Pascal Ory, Nouvelle histoire des idees 
politiques (1), published in 1987, is not sufficiently 
recent to focus in depth on contemporary political 
philosophers, though Raymond Aron, Cornelius Castoriadis, 
Louis Dumont, Luc Ferry, Pierre Manent, Alain Renaut and 
Pierre Rosanvallon are mentioned en passant. In a 
conclusion entitled "Situation id6ologique de cette fin de 
siecle", Ory argues that the work of Ferry and Renaut 
traces a line from Fichte to social democracy (2). 
Braud and Burdeau's Histoire des idees politiques depuis 
la Revolution (3), published in 1992, mentions Raymond 
Aron, Cornelius Castoriadis, Marcel Gauchet and Pierre 
Rosanvallon, again en passant. 
1. ORY, Pascal (ed. ) -- Nouvelle histoire des idees 
politiques, Hachette Pluriel, Paris, 1987 
2. idem. p. 752 
3. BRAUD, Philippe and BURDEAU, Franyois -- Histoire des 
idees politiques depuis la Revolution, 
Montchrestien, Paris, 1992 
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A valuable source which outlines the sociological roots of 
mainstream contemporary French political scholarship is 
contained in Revel and Wachtel's Une ~cole pour les 
sciences sociales (1), published in 1996 and already 
mentioned. This work lists all the scholars referred to in 
the preceding pages with the exception of Anne Godignon 
and Gilles Lipovetsky. 
I have sought to ensure that my selection should give 
roughly equal weight to the triad of concepts which form 
integral elements in the French polity liberty and 
individualism; equality of conditions and humanism; 
"L'Etat" and the rule of law. 
It is essential, I believe, to consider the ground-breaking 
work of Dumont. The anthropological basis of his thought 
and the fact that he and Levi-strauss were contemporaries 
and were both students of Marcel Mauss provides a link with 
the work of the latter. More important are the ontological 
elements in his work revolving around his consideration on 
the hierarchical nature of traditional society and the 
individualism of modern societies. 
1. REVEL, Jacques and WACHTEL, Nathan -- Une ecole pour 
les sciences sociales, Editions du Cerf, Paris, 
1996, op. cit. 
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The work of Ferry and Renaut is sans pareil as far as 
thinking about the philosophical implications of 
individualism, about subjectivity and about humanism is 
concerned. In addition, each of the two philosphers has a 
sUbstantial professional reputation, as witnessed by their 
published work. 
Two scholars, one from the University of Paris-X 
(Nanterre), and the other from the EHESS, respectively 
Kriegel and Rosanvallon, focus on the exigencies of the 
modern state, Kriegel from the point of view of the 
philosophy of the French concept of "la Republique" and the 
rule of law and Rosanvallon from that of the evolution of 
the modern "Etat". Again, each has a noteworthy 
professional reputation and significant published work. 
Kriegel is also editor of the revue Philosophie politique. 
Pierre Manent, an historian and a Director of Studies at 
the EHESS, has earned a significant reputation for his work 
on the history of political liberalism. His argument with 
the concept of historicism puts him in opposition to his 
EHESS colleague, the sociologist Marcel Gauchet. Gauchet 
has made a sUbstantial contribution to thinking about the 
implications for morality in a modern secular state of the 
general abandonment of religion as an arbiter of normative 
socio-political behaviour. He is also an editor of Le 
Debat. 
-------000-------
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Chapter 2 
CONTEXT 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, I consider the context of the emergence 
of the new French thought which is the focus of this 
thesis. 
Initially, I set out in this introduction a resume of the 
socio-economic and political transformation of France in 
the decades following the Liberation and of the effects of 
this change. I follow this with a brief mention of the 
salient elements of French thinking since Rousseau and the 
Revolution on democracy and its values. 
This leads into three sections, each devoted to one of the 
determinants providing a base for the new thinking: 
Fran~ois Furet's contention that "la Revolution est 
terminee"; the rise and fall of structuralism (which was 
sometimes regarded as being an ideological attack on French 
bourgeois society and hence as a new revolutionary creed); 
and a recognition of the historical fact of a stream of 
politically liberal thought in France and, specifically, 
the work and influence of Raymond Aron. 
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Transformation of the Economic and Social Environment 
Over the course of the 30 years from the Liberation to the 
death of President Georges Pompidou, the French nation 
experienced a hitherto unparallelled economic and social 
transformation, a transformation which affected the 
practice of politics and contemporary political thought. 
Over this period, France experienced and survived two major 
political crises, in 1958 and in 1968; from the first came 
a new constitution and a return to power of General de 
Gaulle. France's links with its erstwhile colonial empire 
were sundered, a process accompanied by significant 
violence, especially in Indo-China and in Algeria. 
Industry was modernised, and for the first time in the 
country's history the total of the urban-dwelling 
population exceeded that of the rural population. The 
standard of living of a great majority of the population 
grew rapidly; increased social mobility led to a 
progressive embourgeoisement. France became a founder 
member of the European Iron and Steel Community, which was 
to be the forerunner of the European Common Market and, 
ultimately, the European Union. There was a general 
national recognition that France-in-Europe was part of the 
global economy and hence that the nation had to be 
sensitive to the competitive pressures of the international 
economy. contemporary France has become, like its European 
partners, far more consumer-oriented. 
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Beginning in the mid-1970s, there was a greater tendency 
for a re-thinking of the relationships between individual 
citizens, the society in which they lived, the nation of 
which they formed part and the state and its institutions 
which embodied and directed the affairs of the nation. 
A noteworthy detail illustrating the nature of the changes 
which the nation was undergoing was the injunction of 
Georges Marchais, at that time Secretary-General of the 
French Communist Party (PCF), to the effect that universal 
suffrage and political liberty had to be regarded as 
victories for the people and the working class and that, 
accordingly, the concept of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat had become redundant (1). 
Ory and Sirinelli describe the political climate (2): 
"Recul du marxisme, riflexion sur le phinom~ne 
totalitaire, corrosion des mod~les rivolutionnaires de 
rechange qui avait pris le relais de l'Union 
soviitique, ce sont, dans la sph~re ideologique comme, 
plus largement, dans le champ de la politique, autant 
de paradigmes, ces mots types qui, en grammaire,sont 
donnis comme exemples pour une conjugaison, qui ne 
pretent plus, en effet, depuis quelques annees, et 
avant meme l'implosion des rigimes communistes a 
l'Est, a la declinaison rivolutionnaire." 
BRAUD, Philippe and BURDEAU, Francois 
des idees politiques depuis la 
Montchrestien, Paris, 1992, p. 448 
Histoire 
Revolution, 
2. ORY, Pascal and SIRINELLI, Jean-Fran<;ois Les 
intellectuels en France de l'affaire Dreyfus a 
nos jours, (second edition), Armand Colin, Paris, 
1992, p.248. Marchais could be said to have been 
simply rationalizing the inevitable: from peaks 
of 28.6% of the popular vote in November 1946 and 
25.4% in January 1956, the vote of the PCF had 
fallen to around 10% (Same source, p. 157) 
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Increasingly, French intellectuals and political thinkers 
moved away from the totalising, universalist and unifying 
Jacobin and Marxist precepts which had marked the early 
post-war decades (1) and focussed their energies on basic 
issues such as human rights and freedom of expression (2). 
Over this period, of course, the somewhat romantic image 
of the soviet Union (following the victory over fascism in 
1945) had been tarnished by Khruschchev's speech to the 
XX Congress and the invasion of Hungary in 1956. A long 
period of growing disillusion with the USSR among French 
intellectuals continued, to cUlminate in the 1970s with the 
publication of Solzhenitsyn's Gulaq Archipelaqo. 
The fundamental nature of the impact on political thought 
of the transformation of the nation since 1945 cannot be 
over-emphasized. There is a broad unanimity of view among 
scholars, both French and foreign, about the import of 
these changes. 
1. BIRBNBAUM, Thierry -- "Critiques de 'totalitarisme It, 
in ORY, Pascal (ed.) Nouvelle histoire 
des idees politiques, Hachette, Paris, 1987, 
p. 723 
2. There is a useful analysis of the attitudes 
intellecuals in Tony JUDT's Past 
(University of California Press, 
and Los Angeles, 1992 
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Imperfect 
Berkeley 
As Marcel Gauchet put it, what was happening represented 
(1) : 
"La dissolution, peut-etre, de l'autarcie du systeme 
politico-intellectuel franyais. Aussi bien la 
redecouverte du politique, de la democratie, des 
droits de l'homme, en un mot, la recomposition d'une 
autre idee de soi consecutive a cette rupture 
d'allegeance s'effectueront-elles sur fond de la vague 
conservatrice internationale et du tournant liberal 
des economies, dramatises en France par la pOlitique 
a contre-courant des socialistes et le revirement de 
cap de 1983." 
But old attitudes did not suddenly vanish, as Tony Judt 
points out (2): 
"The radical fallacy in which the search for 
ultimate solutions displaced sustained attention to 
the costs of economic or social stagnation or the 
limits upon political action continued to 
captivate writers and polemicists until the very eve 
of Franyois Mitterrand's election to the presidency in 
1981." 
The attendant constitutional evolution of this period 
underlies the development of political thought. As Jack 
Hayward points out, milestones in this evolution were 
marked (inter alia) by a "transition from heroic to 
humdrum Gaullism" (3) and by Mitterrand's interpretation 
of the role of the President of the Republic as being one 
steering a middle way between the function of arbitrator 
and the function of authority (4). 
1. GAUCHET, Marcel "Totali tarisme, liberalisme, 
individualisme" in Le Debat, no. 50, May-August 
1988, p. 185 
2. JUDT, Tony -- The Burden of Responsibility, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 17 
3. HAYWARD, Jack "From Republican sovereign to 
Partisan statesman" in HAYWARD, Jack (ed.) -- De 
Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential Power in 
France, Hurst & Co., London, 1993, p. 26 
4. idem. p. 33 
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Thus by the 1990s, with the tacit acceptance by a majority 
of national opinion of the political pluralism implied by 
alternance and cohabitation, there was now little doubt 
about the stability of the French polity. "La Ve RApublique 
a fait de la France une dAmocratie moderne [ .•. ]", "modern" 
in this context being defined as needing to bring together 
three elements simultaneously (1): 
"1) que les gouvernAs choisissent effectivement les 
gouvernants; 
2) que les gouvernements aient effectivement les 
moyens de gouverner; 
3) que les gouvernants soient 
responsables devant les gouvernAs." 
effectivement 
Gauchet summarizes the impact of this new-found 
constitutional stability (2): "La conscience s'est imposAe 
que la stabilisation de la dAmocratie Atait un fait acquis 
en France et que nous Ations sortie de l'orbite 
rAvolutionnaire." As a result, government in France, after 
a long period of revolutionary-inspired turmoil, has become 
stable and effective. Jacques Julliard argues that (3): 
"La force des institutions de la Ve RApublique est 
donc d'avoir AtA une crAation coutumiere, fruit d'une 
conspiration prolongAe entre la volontA d'un homme, 
l'exigence logique des citoyens et les alAas de 
l'histoire. De cette Apoque date le clivage clair et 
net entre une majoritA et une opposition; systeme 
dualiste fort ancien chez les Anglo-Saxons, rnais 
jusqu'alors inconnu en France." 
1. CARCASSONE, Guy La constitution, Editions du 
Seuil, Paris, 1996, p. 17 and p. 21 
2. GAUCHET, Marcel "Totalitarisrne, liberalisme, 
individualisrne" in Le Debat, no. 50, May-August 
1988, p. 186. 
3. JULLIARD, Jacques in FURET et al. -- La Republique du 
centre, Calmann-LAvy, Paris, 1988, p. 83 
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The Evolution of Political Ideas and Values 
In this section I look at the development of some of the 
salient elements in French political thinking about 
democracy and its values which have emerged since Rousseau 
and the Revolution, and especially the relationship of 
democracy to the French idea of the Republic and to two of 
the basic ideals of the Revolution, "liberte" and 
"egalite". Out of these elements the three strands 
considered subsequently in this chapter -- Furet's work on 
the legacy of the Revolution, the complex issues of 
structuralism and post-structuralism, and the acceptance 
of the idea of political liberalism -- have evolved. 
Rousseau regarded "democratie" as "un vice radical" (1), 
an attitude which led to a sustained debate in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as to what democracy 
really entailed (2). Did it mean the primacy of society 
over the individual, which became in purely political terms 
a question of finding an acceptable form of representation? 
Was it possible to evolve a system in which the sovereignty 
of the people, limited by a proclamation of individual 
rights, never became the mere omnipotence of large numbers 
of people? What was the relationship between the people and 
their government to be? Was it possible to envisage a form 
of democracy which did not descend into mob rule? 
1. RAYNAUD and RIALS (eds) -- Dictionnaire de philosophie 
politique, Ope cit. p. 131, citing 
Rousseau's "Sur le gouvernement de Pologne" 
2. idem. --
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Both Hegel and Tocqueville saw in these problems in 
nineteenth century Europe a dialectic between" liberte" and 
"6galit6"; both held that the practice of democracy would 
favour the latter (1). 
Thus the debate on democracy and its values in France is 
not new. What might be considered new, however, is a 
recognition that, contrary to the universalist principles 
of the Revolution, democracy will always engender debate 
and its values may be incommensurable. It could be argued 
that it was possibly this fact which aroused Rousseau's 
suspicion of democracy. Be that as it may, Ferry argues 
that (2): 
"L'id6e mod erne de d6mocratie, pour 6vidente qu'elle 
nous apparaisse aujourd'hui, reste complexe, travers6e 
qu'elle se trouve consubstantantiellement par des 
profondes 6quivoques, qui engagent la port6e 
proprement politique d'une r6f6rence & cette id6e." 
Closely allied to concepts of "d6mocratie" in France is 
that of "la R6publique". Nicolet's magisterial L'idee 
republicaine en France (3) traces the history of the 
concept of "la R6publique" from the Revolution to the early 
twentieth century and emphasizes the specific understanding 
of the concept. 
1. RAYNAUD and RIALS (Eds) Dictionnaire, op. cit. --
p. 132 
2. FERRY, Luc -- "L'6mergence du couple Etat/soci6t6" in 
RENAUT Histoire, vol. IV Les 
critiques de la modernite po1itique, op. 
cit. p. 37 
3. NICOLET, Claude L'idee republicaine en France 
(1789-1924), Gallimard, Paris (2nd edition), 
1994 
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Nicolet writes that (1): 
.. [ ••• ] le mot republicain a un valeur ideologique, 
qu'il ne se contente pas de qualifier un systeme 
institutionnel ou une tendance politique, mais que, a 
la maniere de toute ideologie, il pretend exprimer une 
attitude mentale, une certaine presence au monde et 
une explication du monde, un comportement, qU'auront -
ou que devront avoir -- en commun tous ceux qui se 
reclament de lui." 
He continues (2): "[ ••• ] l'ideologie republicaine ne 
pretend justement a aucune autre autorite que celle de sa 
propre pertinence" and proposes a formula (3): "la 
Republique est, pour les Francais, 1 'expression meme de la 
temporalite historique." 
Further, he affirms, (4): 
"La republique est le regime, et le seul, qui assure 
et garantisse a tous la pleine liberte de conscience 
et la pleine liberte d'expression, y compris pour ceux 
qui cherchent a la modifier ou a la detruire." 
A current conception of "la Republique" and of "democratie" 
was implied in a question put by the editor of Le Monde 
to Blandine Kriegel in June 1994. He asked whether the two 
could be considered on the same level (5). 
1- NICOLET L'idee republicaine, op. cit. p. 11 
2 . idem. p. 41 
3 • idem. p. 497 
4. idem. pp. 503-504 
5. Interview reproduced in KRIEGEL, Blandine La cite 
republicaine, Galilee, Paris, 1998, p. 55 
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Kriegel answered that the two ideas are complimentary and 
continued (1): 
"La formation r~publicaine A fait progresser 
l'~galite, c'est pourquoi elle est si populaire chez 
les Franyais qui se sont indentifies A la R~publique. 
Ajoutons qu'on doit A l'id~e r~publicaine la 
centralisation politique qui a etabli l'unit~ et 
l'ind~pendance nationales, la s~paration de l'Eglise 
et l'Etat qui a institu~ la lalcite et enfin, la mise 
en place d' un Etat providence qui a assur~, avec 
l'assistance sociale et la r~distribution, la fin de 
la misere." 
Kriegel's response is revealing of the fact that the 
expression "French republican democracy" has meant in the 
past (and, following Kriegel, can mean still) giving 
primacy to the community (and hence to "~galit~") at the 
expense of the individual ("libert~"). The emphasis given 
to individualism in contemporary French society clearly 
presents a challenge to a conceptual value which has 
perhaps tended to become an unquestioned tradition. The 
Revolutionary objective of "~galit~" was itself, of course, 
a response to the structured hierarchy of l'Ancien R~gime. 
1. KRIEGEL -- La cite republicaine, op. cit. pp. 55-56 
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Philippe Raynaud (1) argues that "[d]ans la perspective 
des sciences sociales contemporaines, l'opposition entre 
'egalite ' et 'hierarchie ' est une des expressions possibles 
de la difference entre les societes 'modernes' et celles 
qui les ont ('aristocratiques' ou 
'tradi tionnelles' ) ." He contends that concepts of "egali te" 
and "hierarchie" as such represent permanent philosophical 
problems (2). "Egalite" has meant in France, at least since 
the time of the First Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the citizen, equality before the law. It also means, in 
contemporary idiom, equality of opportunity; it can never 
mean social and economic equality, any more than it can 
mean equality of intelligence, ability or attainment. The 
concept of "egalite" implies, of course, the existence of 
an appropriate regulatory institution empowered to ensure 
that the precept is followed. 
The contemporary idea of "egalite" is underpinned by a 
universal representation of humanism and is (3) "tout 
autant celle d'une interminable experience de depossession 
du sujet, qui ne trouve jamais la trace de ses intentions 
dans la complexite des relations sociales." (emphasis in 
original. JT.) 
1. RAYNAUD, Philippe -- "Egalite" in RAYNAUD, Philippe 
and RIALS, Stephane (eds.) Dictionnaire de 
philosophie politique, PUF, Paris, 1996, p. 189. 
2. idem. p. 190. 
3. idem. p. 194. 
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The Revolutionary slogan "liberte", a demand for a 
recognition of the rights of the individual, was paired 
with "egalite", the recognition that individuals were also 
members of a collectivity. Balancing the demands for 
"liberte" with those of "egalite" presented a dilemma for 
the political thinkers of the Revolutionary years. 
The first Article of the original Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and the citizen of August 1789 held that: "Les 
hommes naissent et demeurent libres et egaux en droits". 
subsequently, this became an element in the j acobin-
girondin confrontation which might seem, prima facie, to 
be trivial but which was actually of considerable 
significance in the development (or, rather, non-
development) of liberal democracy in France. 
The issue was, in part, about whether priority was to be 
given to collective "egalite" rather than to individual 
"liberte" in policy statements. Article 11 of the 
"montagnarde" Declaration of 24 June 1793 defined the 
"droits naturels et imprescriptibles" of mankind as 
"l'egalite, la liberte, la surete, la propriete." (1) There 
was already a significant conflict between concepts of 
"egalite" and "liberte", a contributing factor to the 
ideological crisis of the time which was resolved with the 
elimination of the girondins. 
1. See JAUME, Lucien -- Les Declarations des Droits de 
l'Homme, 1789, 1793, 1848, 1946, Flammarion, 
Paris, 1989, p. 299. 
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There was nothing new in the idea of a dialectic between 
concepts of "egalite" and "liberte"; the problem was 
recognized by Kant (1): 
"Man has an inclination to live in society, since he 
feels at this stage more like a man, that is, he feels 
able to develop his natural capacities. But he also 
has a great tendency to live as an individual, to 
isolate himself, since he also encounters in himself 
the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct 
everything in accordance with his own ideas." 
(Emphasis in original. JT.) 
The outwardly simple Rousseauean concept of "liberte" --
the freedom to participate in the affairs of the community 
through direct democracy, "la volonte generale" -- was less 
easy to put into practice. During the early nineteenth 
century, as Benichou points out (1): 
"L'idee de la liberte, au cours de la crise 
revolutionnaire, avait ete compromise par le fait de 
la Terreur. Une doctrine de la liberte issue du 
contrat social, et qui absorbait la souverainte de 
l'individu dans sa participation a une volonte 
genera le omnipotente, avait servi d'appui a une 
dictature. La liberte portee aux nues avait engendre 
son contra ire . I 1 restai t a demontrer, face a la 
contre-revolution, que la liberte pOt etre autre chose 
en France qU'un despotisme d'un nouveau genre." 
The slogan "fraternite", linked popularly with the 
Revolution, does not figure in the various declarations of 
the revolutionary years. 
1. KANT, Immanuel Idee zu einer allgemeinen 
Geschichte in weltbtirgerlicher Absicht in REISS, 
Hans (ed.) -- Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge 
university Press, 1991, p. 44. 
2. BENICHOU, Paul Le temps des prophetes, 
NRF/Gallimard, Paris, 1977, pp. 33-34, cited by 
RAYNAUD in Esprit, no. 75, op. cit. p. 51. 
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I argue that "fraternite" equates to humanism. Jean-Fabien 
spitz (1) offers a classical definition of humanism which 
had its genesis in the Italian Renaissance: 
"[ ... ] I' humanisme ci vique est une conception 
anthropologique qui definit l'homme comme un etre 
essentiellement politique, dont la nature ne 
s'accomplit que dans le statut de citoyen [ ... ]." 
Humanism, specifically civic humanism in this context, is 
a concept of social responsibility; men and women as 
citizens have rights, but they also have obligations, in 
the name of "the public good", towards their fellow 
citizens in the society of which they are members. "Cette 
notion de bien public est primordiale: elle signifie que 
la realisation de notre nature passe par l'activite 
civique, et que c'est la le bien le plus precieux; [ ... ]." 
(2) • 
Ideas of "liberte" have changed over two centuries; Con-
stant's De la liberte chez les modernes makes the point 
that classical "liberte" meant the freedom to participate 
in the affairs of the polity whereas "modern" (for 
Constant, in the first decades of the nineteenth century) 
"liberte" meant, in essence, the freedom not to participate 
in public affairs. 
1. SPITZ, Jean-Fabien -- "Humanisme civique" in RAYNAUD 
and RIALS -- Dictionnaire, Ope cit. p. 282. 
2. idem. p. 285 
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Late twentieth century "liberte" often carr ies a 
connotation of maximum personal independence and a 
consequent: ( 1) 
"[ ... ] 'liberation des entraves', avec pour horizon la 
fayon dont l'individu moderne tend a ne se preoccuper 
que de lui-meme, les societes modernes peuvent se voir 
attribuer une tendance marquee a concevoir la liberte 
au sens de cette 'liberte sans regle' dont Rousseau 
faisait la caracteristique de l'etat de nature: 
[ . . . ] . " 
Thus contemporary "liberte" is an expression of an 
individualism, which might be thought of as the right of 
individual men and women to denounce tradition and any 
consequent and contiguous social value standards in the 
name of what is claimed as liberty (2). But already in 1840 
Tocqueville (3) expressed a concern that: 
"L'individualisme est une expression recente qU'une 
idee nouvelle a fait naltre. Nos peres ne connaissent 
que l'egolsme. [ ... ] L'individualisme est un sentiment 
reflechi et paisible qui dispose chaque citoyen a 
s'isoler de la masse de ses semblables et a se retirer 
a l'ecart avec sa famille et ses amis; de telle sorte 
que, apres s'etre ainsi cree une petite societe a son 
usage, il abandonne volontiers la grande societe a 
elle-rnerne." 
I argue that untrammelled liberty and highly developed 
individualism lead to a concept which is at the heart of 
the philosophical consideration of humanism and 
subjectivity. In a secular society, this leads also to 
considerations of natural law and morality. 
1. RENAUT, Alain "Liberte" in RAYNAUD and RIALS 
(eds.) -- Dictionnaire, OPe cit. p. 347. 
2. RENAUT "Individu et individualisrne", in RAYNAUD 
and RIALS (eds.) -- Dictionnaire, Ope cit. p. 
293. 
3. TOCQUEVILLE De la democratie en Amerique, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1968, p. 242; cited by RENAUT 
in "Individu et individualisrne", Ope cit. p. 293 
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In discussing the contemporary concept of egalite, Renaut 
makes a point of considerable significance. The present-
day idea of an equality of conditions contains precepts 
which are likely to have been difficult to understand 
during the Revolutionary years (1): 
"La dynamique de I' egalisation des conditions, que 
toute histoire de la philosophie moderne a accompagne, 
se revele ainsi plus complexe encore qu'on ne l'avait 
cru en general a partir de ces interpretations les 
plus fameuses: si le monde ancien , qui fonctionnait 
a la meconnaissance de l'identite de l'autre, a certes 
du, pour ceder le pas au monde moderne, laisser 
reinscrire l'alterite ou la difference sous l'identite 
(en permettant de reconnaltre l'autre, qu'il s'agisse 
de la femme, du Noir, de l'enfant meme, comme etant 
lui aussi un etre humain, donc comme partageant la 
meme idenite que moi), il fallait aussi, pour que ce 
processus ouvrlt bien sur 1 'egalite des hommes en 
droit et non pas sur une fantastique entreprise 
d'homogeneisation et sur un monstreux effacement des 
differences, que la reconnaissance de l'identite, la 
reconnaissance de l'autre comme n'etant pas un 'tout 
autre', mais un 'meme', s'accompagnat d'une 
reconnaissance de sa difference." 
It is part of the function of "l'Etat" to balance the 
conflicting desires for "egalite" and "liberte" in a given 
civic society. That "l'Etat" should be distinct from civic 
society is a relatively modern concept attributable to 
Hegel (2). 
1. RENAUT "Conclusion genera le" in RENAUT, (ed.) 
2. 
Histoire de la philosophie politique, Vol. V 
Les philosophies poli tiques contemporaines, 
op. ci t. p. 472 
COLLIOT-THELENE, catherine "Etat 
civile" in RAYNAUD and RIALS, 
Dictionnaire, Ope cit. p. 229. 
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et societe 
(eds. ) 
Braud and Burdeau (1) argue that the modern occidental 
democratic state has the merit "d'avoir ~t~ l'instrument 
de r~alisation des droits de l'homme," in other words, the 
defender of humanism. writing in 1985, Ferry and Renaut (2) 
argued that the question of humanism was at the centre of 
then-current debate on philosophy. 
In 1999, Lilla wrote (3) that, viewed from outside France, 
it is the relationship between individualism and modernity 
which constitutes the most important theme in the 
development of French political philosophy. At the same 
time, Larmore (4) identified what he considered four 
dominant themes in the re-thinking of humanism and 
democracy in France over the last twenty years: morality, 
autonomy, natural law and history. 
Larmore also outlined (5) what is, in his view, novel and 
exciting in contemporary philosophy in France: 
11 le souci de mettre en lumU~re les fondements 
moraux de la d~mocratie moderne. On se montre 
aujourd'hui plus ouvert que dans le pass~ a l'id~e que 
la philosophie politique doit etre ancr~e dans la 
r~flexion morale. On se dit a la recherche d'un nouvel 
humanisme." 
1. BRAUD and BURDEAU, Ope cit., p. 552 
2. FERRY and RENAUT -- La pensee 68, OPe cit. p. 22 
3. LILLA "L'humanisme en questions" in RENAUT (ed.) -
Histoire, vol. V, Les philosophies poli tiques 
contemporaines, Ope cit. p. 28 
4. LARMORE -- "Repenser 11 humanisme. .. 11 in RENAUT (ed.) 
Histoire, Ope cit. Vol. V. pp. 97-125 
5. idem. p. 98 
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Larmore recalls (1) the French Republican tradition, dating 
from Rousseau and enduring well into the twentieth century, 
which refused to admit that "la volontA collective doit 
et re limitAe par les droits naturels de l' individu." He 
cites (2) Ferry and Renaut's La pensee 68 and specifically 
their evocation of the philosophy of Kant in which they see 
"l 'horizon indApassable de la pensAe, la forme de la 
subjectivitA moderne irrempla~able." 
Earlier, in 1991, Larmore (3) wrote of the profound 
transformation in the nature of political philosophy in 
France as he saw it at that time: 
"Le consensus marxiste de l'apres-guerre, la violente 
critique des droits 'purement formels et illusoires' 
des dAmocraties liberales et la confiance en la marche 
de l'Histoire, se sont pratiquement Avanouis. De nos 
jours, ce sont plut6t l'articulation et la dAfense des 
principes de la dAmocratie libArale, surtout dans leur 
forme genAralisee des 'droits de l'homme', et l'examen 
des dangers auxquels ils sont aujourd'hui exposes, qui 
occupent le devant de la scene." 
1. LARMORE "Repenser l'humanisme", Ope cit. p. 98 
2. idem. p. 101 
3. LARMORE, Charles "Histoire et raison en 
philosophie poli tique" in stanford French Review, 
Vol. 15, 1-2, 1991, p. 183. 
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Larmore's suggestion that it is the articulation ann the 
defence of the principles of liberal democracy which j. in 
the forefront of contemporary French political thinking is, 
I argue, a reasonable summary of the current 
reconsideration of democratic values but also, in so far 
as the suggestion might carry an implication of a liberal 
consensus in France, risks being misleading. It is not 
always easy to reconcile the historic and continuing role 
of and concept of the French republican state with the 
broad stream of occidental liberal political thought. 
Yet Larmore's title in L'histoire ( l) , "Repenser 
l'humanisme et la democratie", a concept carrying a 
concomitant need to understand what humanism means for 
individuals, for French society and for "l'Etat fran9ais" 
is at the heart of the contemporary debate on democracy and 
its values. 
I conclude this introductory tour d' horizon by citing 
Renaut's conclusion about the role of "l'Etat". He argues 
that "l'Etat" must continually be equated with (2): 
"[ ... ] le regime moderne, OU qu'on veuille en situer 
l'emergence, est celui OU l'autre est apparu au 
contra ire comme le meme, comme un sujet egal a tout 
autre sujet et comme dote des memes droits que tout 
autre sujet: en virtue du principe de l'egalite des 
conditions, l'individu est ce qu'il est en detient les 
droits qui sont les siens, non pas en vertu de son 
appartenance a un groupe, mais en raison de son 
individualite meme." 
1. LARMORE in RENAUT (ed.) -- Histoire, Vol. V, op. cit. 
pp. 97-125 
2. RENAUT, "Conclusion general" in op. cit. Vol. V. p.473 
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Three significant Determinants 
The Acceptance of the End of the Revolution: Francois Furet 
A fundamentally reoriented debate on political ideas was 
initiated by Franyois Furet. The timing of his Penser la 
Revolution franyaise, published in 1978, was propitious; 
the work appeared at a time when the older revolutionary 
and Marxist-inspired political philosophies, as well as 
structuralism and post-structuralism, in France were 
seemingly losing their relevance. Thus the work had 
immediate pertinence to then-contemporary France; it 
appealed to a wide audience and became a marked commercial 
success. 
Furet argued that, in the past for a large part of the 
French nation: " [ ... ] la Revolution franyaise n' est pas 
seulement la Republique. C' est aussi une promesse indef inie 
d'egalite, et une forme privilegiee du changement." (1) 
But, he argued, now: "La Revolution est terminee puisque 
la France retrouve son histoire, ou plutot, reconcilie ses 
deux histoires" (2). 
1. FUR ET , Franyois Pens er la Revolution franyaise, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1978, p. 18. 
2. idem. -- p. 130. 
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Furet was mounting a challenge to the teaching of the 
history of the Revolution in France. This history had, for 
a number of years, been strongly influenced, first by 
Georges Lefebvre and then by Albert Soboul, both of whom 
had held the Chair of the French Revolution at the 
Sorbonne. Both men had earned a solid reputation for 
original work on the social classes and structures of the 
revolutionary period; Lefebvre's early major work was his 
magisterial Les Paysans du Nord of 1924 and Soboul had 
earned his professional 'reputation for his 1958 thesis on 
the Parisian sans-culottes. Both were eminent and greatly-
respected historians; Lefebvre had marked left wing 
sympathies, Soboul was a Marxist. Both were concerned with 
the social and economic causes and consequences of the 
Revolution, both had a strongly-developed sense of social 
justice. 
Furet's preoccupation was with the political consequences 
of the Revolution. His main conclusion that the Revolution 
should no longer be regarded as a factor in the politics 
of contemporary France was arguably in line with the 
inclinations of many French citizens. It was a conclusion 
which provoked much criticism and debate among French 
historians of the Revolution, a process which peaked at the 
time of the bi-centenary of 1789 (1). 
1. See KAPLAN, Steven Laurence -- Farewell Revolution, 
Cornell U.P., 1995 for an account of this 
debate. 
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Furet argued that, in the past, for as long as the spirit 
of revolution remained in the consciousness of the French 
polity, it had been virtually impossible for a popularly-
elected government to sustain controversial political 
policies, because the political divisions engendered by the 
controversy tended to invoke echoes of the Revolution: "La 
revolution, c'est l'imaginaire d'une societe devenu le 
tissu m~me de son histoire." (1) 
Yet, Furet emphasized, the acceptance of the end of the 
Revolution did not imply in any sense that the Revolution 
had failed (2): 
"La revolution bourgeoise est faite, et achevee, sans 
compromis d'aucune sorte avec l'ancienne societe, des 
1789-1791. Tous les elements essentiels du nouvel 
ordre bourgeois qui fondent notre monde contemporain: 
l'abolition des ordres et de la 'feodalite', la 
carrlere ouverte aux talents, la substitution du 
contrat a la monarchie de droit divin, la naissance de 
l'homo democratus et du regime representatif, la 
liberation du travail et la libre entreprise, sont 
acquis sans retour des 1790; [ ... ]." 
Furet drew attention to the work of Tocqueville, 
specifically L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution, and hence 
to De la Democratie en Amerique (3). Arguably, he thus made 
a substantial contribution to what might be termed a 
"rediscovery" in France of Tocqueville's oeuvre. 
1. FURET, op. cit. p. 206 
2. idem. p.201 
3 • idem. pp. 209-256 
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In another work written by Furet with two EHESS colleagues, 
La Republique du centre: La fin de l'exception franQaise, 
published in 1988 (1), Furet and his co-authors summarise 
the results of the transformation of the French polity by 
the eclipsing of two opposing authoritarian tendencies, 
Gaullism and Communism. Furet argues that (2): "[ .•. ] 
l'enrichissement du pays, l'hedonisme des moeurs, la 
naissance d'une economie et d'une conscience europeennes" 
together sounded the knell of the "politics of 
authoritarianism". 
Furet himself described his work more generally as the 
study of "French political rationalism" (3). In addition 
to being an element in the national recognition of the idea 
that the Revolution had ended, Furet was, of course, 
undermining the intellectual position of historians of the 
Revolution in French universities. 
He subsequently entered a sUbstantial challenge to the 
Russian Revolution and its consequences in a controversial 
work, Le passe d'une illusion: essai sur l'idee communiste 
au XXe siecle, published in 1995. 
1. FUR ET , Franc;:ois, JULLIARD, Jacques et ROSANVALLON, 
Pierre et al. La Republique du 
centre: La fin de l' exception franQaise, 
Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1988 
2. FURET, in FURET et al., Ope cit. p. 20 
3. KAPLAN, Ope cit. p. 74 
4. FURET, Franc;:ois -- Le passe d'une illusion: essai sur 
l'idee communiste au XXe siecle, Robert 
Laffont/Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1995 
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In the later years of his career, Furet spent a 
significant amount of time in the United states, first at 
Princeton and the University of Michigan. He subsequently 
held a permanent part-time position at the University of 
chicago (1). 
Through his "[ •.. ] preference for liberty over equality, 
his belief in the indissociability of capitalism and 
democracy, his antipathy to certain kinds of state 
intervention in social life, his ample (though not 
absolute) confidence in market arbitration, his skepticism 
of notions of general interest, his horror of the tabula 
rasa [ ... ]" (2), Furet was regarded as being eminently 
liberal in outlook. His insistence on a systematic and 
pragmatic (rather than an ideological) understanding of 
the past was also regarded as being an essentially liberal 
attribute. In short, he challenged conventional wisdom 
and, specifically, the wisdom of a received idea, that is, 
the concept both of the Revolution and the idea of 
revolution as a universal promise. 
1. KAPLAN, Ope cit. p. 51 
2. idem. -- p. 133 
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Furet's influence has the effect of moving history back to 
the centre stage of French intellectual life, Gauchet 
contends, as a master discipline at the expense of 
sociology and ethnology. At the same time, the study of 
politics has begun to take on a similar status. The 
individual, human rights, the Republic itself, were no 
longer regarded as the deceiving masks of class domination 
but the reality of contemporary French society. What was 
at stake, Gauchet maintains, was a complete renewal of the 
history of ideas (1). 
Gauchet's summary of Furet's achievement underlines the 
catalytic importance of his work as far as a 
reconsideration of the essential elements of democratic 
values in contemporary France is concerned. His 
contribution did not represent a sudden conversion on the 
road to Damascus for French political thinkers. Rather, 
it engendered a national debate of genuine historic 
dimensions which, in the environment of the socio-
economic transformation of the nation, contributed towards 
a recognition of the necessity for a fundamental 
reconsideration of basic political values. 
1. GAUCHET, Marcel, "Changement de paradigme en sciences 
sociales" in Le Dibat, no. 50, Ope cit. p. 
168 
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Rejecting structuralism: The Failure to Find ~ Universal 
Theory 
The need to find a viable political alternative in France 
did not, of course, begin with Furet's contention that the 
Revolution had ended. As is well known, following the 
example of Sartre, a great many French intellectuals during 
the decade of the 1950s had become involved intensely in 
the national and international political debates and 
polemics of the period. Descombes contends that the 
disillusionment following the soviet invasion of Hungary 
in 1956 and the French constitutional crisis of 1958, as 
well as a growing disappointment with Sartre, caused many 
to seek inspiration in less obviously political subjects 
such as linguistics and anthropology (1). 
There developed a wish to find a "unification des savoirs" 
(2) which would embrace as well all significant scientific 
thinking, a concept which became known as "structuralisme", 
described by Michel Foucault as being "pas une methode 
nouvelle; il est la conscience eveillee et inquiete du 
savoir moderne" (3). 
1. DESCOMBES, Vincent "Structuralisme" in RAYNAUD 
and RIALS -- Dictionnaire, op. cit. pp. 647-649 
2. GAUCHET, Marcel "Discours, structure" in Le 
3. 
Debat, No. 50, May-August 1988, p. 178. 
FOUCAULT, Michel 
Paris, p. 
Histoire du 
Decouverte, 
-- Les Mots et les choses, Gallimard, 
221; cited by DOSSE, Franyois 
structuralisme, (2 vols), Editions la 
Paris, 1991, introduction. 
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I contend that structuralism represented an attempt to 
develop a new philosophy which would have relevance to the 
transformation of France. The subject is complex and I aim 
to do no more in this section than signal issues which are 
relevant to the debate on democracy and its values. The 
rejection of structuralism, and specifically the 
philosophical counter-arguments advanced by Dumont (chapter 
3 infra), as well as by Ferry and Renaut (chapter 8 infra), 
means that it is important to place the structuralist 
phenomenon in the context of my consideration of 
contemporary French political thought. 
Gauchet described the attraction of structuralism to 
intellectuals (1): 
"Il Y a eu un attracteur intellectuel intense au foyer 
de ce mouvement, un scheme de pensee monotone, mais 
puissant, et remarquablement accorde par ailleurs a 
une sensibilite de l'epoque. Brutalement dit: Saussure 
relu a la lumiere de Heidegger, l'idee de structure 
linguistique appropriee au dessein d'une critique ou 
d'une deconstitution de la subjectivite." 
Thomas Pavel, more favourable to the ideas of structuralism 
than Gauchet, descr ibed how "les concepts de la 
linguistique se sont transformes, au courant des annees 
soixante, en un instrument de modernisation intellectuelle" 
(2). He gives a brief history of the development of 
structuralism in France. 
1. GAUCHET, Marcel "Discours, structure", in Le 
Debat, no. 80, Ope cit. p. 179. 
2. PAVEL, Thomas -- Le Mirage linguistique, Les Editions 
de Minuit, Paris, 1988, p. 7 
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Beginning in the 1950s, what Pavel calls (1) "un important 
mouvement ne sous le signe de l'innovation et de 
scientif ici te" gradually imposed itself on the mul tiplici ty 
of often-conflicting new ideas then circulating among the 
French intelligentsia. The terms "structuralism", 
"semiology" and "post-structuralism", each illustrating one 
of the elements of the paradigm, described imperfectly the 
plethora of ideas then circulating and emanating from the 
anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, the psychoanalysis of 
Jacques Lacan, and the epistemology of Michel Foucault, as 
well as from numerous variations on these themes. The total 
made up diverse philosophies of signification and of 
modernity, economies of the symbolic and theories of the 
human body and of the subject. 
Franyois Dosse argues that some followers of structuralism 
believed that the post-war transformation of French society 
had upset all idea of the continuity of past-present-
future. The eclipse of traditional rural France ("la fin 
des terroirs") and the advent of a society having no links 
to the rural environment ("une societe du hors-sol") 
created a state of worldly weightlessness, a dampening 
relationship to the spirit of the times (2). 
1. PAVEL, Ope cit. -- p. 9 
2. DOSSE, Franyois Histoire du structuralisme, vol. 
1. "Le Champ du signe, 1945-1966", p. 432. 
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Dosse contends that others saw structuralism as having a 
direct link with the coming of a technocratic society. At 
this level, structuralism was seen to take on the role of 
legitimization of a social caste; it became the 
technostructure of the new industrial state, justifying its 
place at the highest levels of the exercise of power and 
as a theory postulating the end of history. The middle 
class, it was held, had become dominant and structuralism, 
as an ideology of the constraints on human liberty which 
had been reduced to mere acquisitions, would become a 
reflection of a consumerism in which the citizen ceded 
place to the user (1). 
The intellectual roots of structuralism, Dosse argues, were 
found in the work of Nietzsche, Saussure and Heidegger 
(2); both Nietzsche and Heidegger rejected humanism, that 
is, independent human autonomy and volition. 
1. DOSSE -- Ope cit. pp. 432-433 
2. idem. p. 446 
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In addition, Heidegger pointed the way towards the 
evolution of linguistics (1): 
"Dans la perspective heideggerienne, le champ du 
langage sera donc l' obj et d' etude pr i vi 1 ig ie. L' on 
retrouve bien evidemment une racine essentielle de ce 
qui va caracteriser le structuralisme, lequel 
connaitra son essor en generalisant le modele 
linguistique a tout le champ du savoir des sciences 
humaines." 
Dosse emphasizes that an understanding of the structuralist 
phenomenon in France requires also an understanding of the 
intellectual environment created by the spectacular 
development of the social sciences in French universities 
over the decades following 1945 (2). 
He stresses the essential pluridisciplinary nature of 
structuralism in the early years of its postulation as a 
major element in the search for intellectual legitimacy by 
the rapidly growing faculties of the social sciences in 
French universities and continues (3): "D'ou le caractere 
insecable des aspects scientif iques et ideologiques en 
cette per iode, car cette socialisation intensement 
recherchee induit l'ideologisation du discours 
scientifique." 
1. DOSSE -- Histoire du structuralisme, vol. 1, op. cit. 
p. 448. 
2. idem. p. 458. 
3. idem. p. 459. 
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The advocates of structuralism opposed both the traditional 
disciplines of philosophy and history. "On part alors en 
guerre contre l'historicisme, le contexte historique, la 
recherche des origines, la diachronie, la teleologie pour 
faire valoir les permanences, les invariants, la 
synchronie, le texte clos sur lui-meme." (1) At the same 
time, there was a conscious rejection of much of Sartre's 
thinking. 
Out of the concept of structuralism there developed what 
might be thought of as a corollary, post-structuralism, 
sometimes loosely (and inaccurately) referred to as "la 
pensee 68". Lilla comments (2): 
" [ ..• ] la pense franc;:aise de l' apres guerre [ ... ] 
debutant avec le marxisme de Sartre, s'achevait avec 
le post-structuralisme de Foucault, Oerrida, Althusser 
et Lacan." 
Braud and Burdeau (3) argue that, during the years 
preceding the crisis of May 1968, there was "une 
effervescence intellectuelle tout a fait remarquable" 
around the question of structuralism. What they term "la 
mode de I' epoque" sought to make a "School" out of the 
differing work of authors such as Levi-strauss (ethnology), 
Lacan (his attempts to renew psycho-analysis) and Althusser 
(seeking an epistemological approach to the works of Marx) . 
1. OOSSE -- Histoire du structuralisme, Ope cit. Vol. 1, 
p. 464 
2. LILLA, "L'humanisme en questions", Ope cit. in RENAUT, 
(ed.), Histoire de la philosophie politique, Vol. 
V, Les philosophes pOlitiques contemporaines, p. 
31 
3. BRAUO and BUROEAU, Histoire des idees politiques 
depuis la Revolution Ope cit. p. 474 
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Braud and Burdeau summarize (1): 
"Tous ces auteurs fondent leur d~marche scientifique 
sur le fait d'~crire sur l'~criture, discourir sur le 
discours, percer le mystere des formes de la 
communication." 
These post-structual discourses and proposed systems were 
essentially anti-humanist (2), underlining as they did the 
claim that the effects of systems would always have 
predominance over the deliberate will of individuals. Out 
of these ideas there developed during the 1960s "a grands 
fracas m~diatique" the concept of the death of mankind. 
The ideas of post-structuralism postulated not only the 
death of mankind, but also of philosophy, of history and 
of politics. Bernard argues that the decade of the 1960s 
was one haunted by an obsession with texts (3) to such an 
extent that it was regarded as important to study basic 
texts (Marx or Freud) and to weed out of these texts 
whatever might get in the way of an understanding of the 
original purity. 
1. BRAUD and BURDEAU, Ope cit. p. 474 
2. idem. -- pp. 475-476 
3. BERNARD, Jean-Pierre -- "Une 'pensee 68'" in ORY, 
Pascal (ed.) Nouvelle histoire des idees 
politiques, Ope cit. p.700 
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The basic post-structuralist ideas carried through into the 
early 1970s, most remarkably in teaching in French 
universities. Massive changes in curricula introduced 
following the crisis of May 1968, involved " [l]a 
socialisation ou democratisation de l'enseignment des 
sciences, leur implantation massive et leur pouvoir 
ideologique assurant alors conjointement le succes du 
paradigme structuraliste." (1) 
There developed a desire to unify academic disciplines and 
post-structuralism appeared to offer such a possibil ty. Its 
proponents envisaged the theoretical concept of an eventual 
total conceptualisation and an analytical framework 
permitting all-embracing explanations of social diversity 
(2) • 
Thus, as Gauchet described the situation (3): 
"L'organisation intellectuelle (emphasis in original. 
JT) du champ des sciences sociales au plus haut de 
leur rayonnement fin des annees soixante, debut des 
annees soixante-dix, pourrait etre schematiquement 
decrite comme un systeme a trois grands termes: une 
discipline modele, la linguistique, porteuse de 
l'esperance d'une semiologie unificatrice; deux 
disciplines-reines au plan des applications, la 
sociologie et l'ethnologie; et deux theories de 
reference, le marxisme et la psychoanalyse." 
1. DOSSE -- Histoire, Vol. 2. Ope cit. p. 168. 
2. 
3. 
idem. p. 224. 
GAUCHET, Marcel "Changement de 
science sociales?" in Le Debat, 
August 1988, p. 165. 
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paradigme en 
no. 50, May-
This surge of post-structuralist thinking in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s represented yet another manifestation in 
France of ideas of revolution based upon (1) "l'illusion 
de commencement ou de recommencement absolu". Yet, I argue, 
it was the very irrelevance of these ideas to the French 
political environment which caused their disappearance. 
They represented a reductio ad absurdum of Lilla's comment 
(2) that the more French intellectuals in the post-1945 
years became "political", the less interested they became 
in the practice of politics. The attitude of some 
intellectuals (Barthes, for example) to the "events" of May 
1968 was highly equivocal. 
I contend that the rejection of structuralism may be put 
alongside the oeuvre of Furet in establishing the context 
of the reconsideration of democratic values in contemporary 
France. "La Republique du centre", with all that the 
concept implies in terms of political pluralism and 
tolerance, was arguably the logical consequence of a 
national rejection of radical, authoritarian and esoteric 
political formulae. 
1. BERNARD, Ope cit. p. 695 
2. LILLA -- "L'humanisme en questions", in RENAUT (ed.) 
Histoire, Ope cit. p. 28; see also p. 8 supra 
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Recognizing Political Liberalism 
French intellectuals in the past, as Catherine Audard 
points out (1), "coming from a tradition deeply influenced 
by Rousseau and his mistrust of 'the liberal individual''', 
were seldom enthusiastic about the concept of political 
liberalism. 
Yet there was a strong liberal current (to be thought of 
in the context of the liberty of the individual) in French 
political philosophy throughout the nineteenth century as 
thinkers sought to come to grips with the intellectual 
implications of the legacy of the Revolution. 
The reorientation of French political thinking which began 
in the mid-1970s and the consequent reappraisal of the 
history of ideas aroused renewed interest in those 
nineteenth century political thinkers of whom the adjective 
"liberal" may be used. Largely forgotten for over a 
century, the writings of Constant, Guizot and Tocqueville, 
to name only three, were "re-discovered" (2). 
1. AUDARD, Catherine "The 
Reason'" in Ratio 
March 1995, p. 16 
Idea of 'Free Public 
j ur is, Vo 1. 8 , No. 1 , 
2. Marcel Gauchet, a disciple of Furet, was among the 
first French scholars to publish comment on 
Constant and on Tocqueville. He edited and 
contributed a lengthy introductory to a new 
edition of Constant's work published in 1980 
and, in the same year, contributed a long 
essay entitled "Tocqueville, l'Amerique et 
nous" in the periodical Libre (Vol. VIr, 
pp.43-120) 
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The thinkers of the revolutionary years had difficulty with 
precise definitions of "Les droits de l'homme" (1). In 
addition, as Lucien Jaume (2) points out, during the 
Jacobin ascendancy, much thought was given to the question 
whether the individual should be either no more than a 
simple numerical unit or a "citoyen vertueux"; the decision 
went to the concept of the "citoyen vertueux", but the 
debate on the boundary between "inten~ts" and "vertu" was 
never concluded satisfactorily. 
In another work, L'individu efface (3), Jaume describes an 
essential paradox in French political liberal thinking: in 
essence, in the past, the citizen had always to yield 
primacy to the state (l'Etat). 
1. There were three "Declarations" during the years of 
the Revolution: 26 August 1789, 29 May 1793 
and ("Declaration des droits de l'homme et 
du citoyen") 24 June 1793 
2. JAUME, Lucien -- Le discours jacobin et la democratie, 
Fayard, Paris, p. 191 
3. JAUME, Lucien -- L'individu efface, ou le paradoxe du 
liberalisme franQais, Fayard, Paris, 1997 
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In his introduction to this second work, Jaume offers an 
idea of political liberalism and a suggestion as to why 
"l'individu" has been "efface" over the period of his 
study, that is, during the nineteenth and the first half 
of the twentieth centuries (1): 
"Faut-il admettre un droit de l'individu, et notamment 
le droit de juger de son droit, face au pouvoir 
poli tique et administratif -- ou faut-il, plutot, 
envisager les libertes du point de vue de la puissance 
publique, comme autant de limitations que, par 
benevolence, elle s'inflige? [Les alternatifs sont] 
privilegier l'individu, jusqu'a, eventuellement, un 
liberalisme du sujet (Mme de stael), assujettir 
l'individu a un esprit de corps qui le discipline 
(point de depart de Guizot). Le liberalisme fran9ais 
a, tres majoritairement, adopte la seconde voie, celle 
d' un liberalisme par I' Etat, et non contre ou hors 
l'Etat." 
And yet, Jaume continues (2) , political liberalism is 
thought of habitually as the doctrine which, par 
excellence, upholds the rights of the modern individual, 
emancipating him from the spiritual tutelage of the Church 
and the dominance conferred by the sovereignty of absolute 
monarchs. For Jaume (3), political liberalism is, by 
definition, "l'individualisme consequent". 
2. 
3. 
4. 
JAUME L'individu efface OPe cit. p. 11 
idem. 
idem. --
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A consequence of the transformation of the French polity, 
economy and society which has taken place since 1945 is 
perhaps that the primacy of l'Etat over the individual is 
less accepted than was previously the case. Raynaud argues 
that, as a result, over the last decades of the twentieth 
century in France political liberalism has experienced "un 
remarquable renouveau" (1). 
Jaume's paradox needs to be explored in a broader context, 
the starting point of which is Rousseau. 
Raynaud contends that, in seeking to square the circle of 
individual liberty in a collectivity, Rousseau confused "la 
volonte genera le" with "la souverainete populaire": the 
former meant, according to Du contrat social, "l' alienation 
complete de chaque individu avec tous ses droits et sans 
reserve a la communaute", whilst at the same time the 
sovereignty of the people could be "ni alienee, ni 
deleguee, ni representee." (2). 
1. RAYNAUD, Philippe "Liberalisme" in RAYNAUD, 
Philippe and RIALS, Stephane (eds) 
Dictionnaire de philosophie politique, Presses 
universitaires de France, 1996 p. 338 
2. RAYNAUD, Philippe -- "Un romantique liberal: Benj amin 
Constant" in Esprit, no. 75, March 1983, p.56. 
JULLIARD, in La faute a Rousseau, op. cit. writes 
(p.40) of the: "[ ... ) antinornie de la raison 
politique se Ion Rousseau: volonte genera le et 
souverainete populaire se confondent et se 
distinguent [ ... )." 
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This contradiction is well known; the belief that "la 
volont6 g6n6rale" would be infallible has also had 
pernicious consequences. Benjamin Constant pointed out the 
essential problem (1): 
"L' uni versali te des ci toyens est le souverain, 
dans ce sens que nul individu, nulle fraction, 
nulle association partielle ne peut s'arroger la 
souverainet6, si elle ne lui a pas 6t6 d616gu6e. 
Mais il ne s'ensuit pas que l'universalit6 des 
citoyens, ou ceux qui par elle sont investi de la 
souverainete, puissent disposer souverainement de 
l'existence des individus. Il y a au contraire 
une partie de l' existence qui, de necessi te, 
reste individuelle et independante, et qui est de 
droit hors de toute competence sociale. La 
souverainete n'existe que d'une maniere limit6e 
et relative. Au point de commencement 
l'ind6pendance et 1 'existence individuelle, 
s'arr~te la juridiction de cette souverainete." 
The fact of this contradiction in an uncertain political 
environment in which the original constitutional legitimacy 
had been destroyed served to strengthen central political 
control at the expense of individual autonomy. In any case, 
in contrast to the American and British experience, France 
has had a long history of a centralised political 
authority. As Tocqueville argued (2), the centralising 
administrative policies of L'ancien regime were maintained 
by successive governments, irrespective of their political 
colour, because central control was deemed to be the only 
method capable of exercising control in a society in which 
the emotional legacy of the Revolution remained potent. 
1. CONSTANT, Benjamin De la liberte chez les 
mod ernes , Le livre de poche, Paris, 1980, p. 271; 
cited by RAYNAUD, Esprit, no. 75, Ope cit. p. 57. 
2. TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de -- L' ancien regime et la 
Revolution, (reprint), Gallimard, Paris 1967, p. 
98 
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Rousseau had argued that the ultimate freedom of the 
individual would be found in membership of a community in 
which the will of each individual was subsumed into the 
general will, an idea at the heart of revolutionary 
thinking which was held by revolutionary and republican 
thinkers in France to be unchallengeable, in spite of the 
fact that it seemed unable to result in firmly-based and 
effective governments. The nineteenth-century marriage of 
comtean positivism to the Jacobin discourse sustained the 
centralising republican narrative throughout the years of 
the Third Republic. 
This republican narrative, as Judt (1) points out, resulted 
in a situation in which for most of the first half of the 
twentieth century French public life was "occupied and 
preoccupied with doctrinal language and quarreling to the 
occasional near-exclusion of anything else." Judt argues 
that this political friction had little effect on French 
society, which remained largely self-sufficient, rural, 
conservative and stable. He summarizes (2): 
"In twentieth century France [ ... ] history and 
memory conspired to exclude any sustained 
attention to what now appear to have been the 
country's true dilemmas -- one of them being the 
intolerable burden of competing pasts." 
--------------------------------------------------------
1. JUDT, Tony -- The Burden of Responsibility: Blum, 
Camus, Aron and the French Twentieth Century, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998, p 7 
2. idem. -- p.10 
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The determinist principles of Marxism in vogue in France 
in the late 19405 and 1950s were not alien to the 
administrative centralisation characteristic of the classic 
French republican ethic; these principles served to sustain 
the Jacobin element in the Revolutionary cannon and hence 
to fuel political differences. 
An exception to the post-1945 dichotomy between political 
philosophy and the practice of politics was provided by the 
example of Raymond Aron. In the left-inclined intellectual 
environment of post-Liberation France Aron was regularly 
derided by his peers as being a "liberal". Judt (1) 
describes Aron as "the only prominent French thinker of his 
generation who had taken a consistent liberal stand against 
all the totalitarian temptations of the age" and as 
providing "a beacon of light pointing to the future at a 
time of confusion and doubt within the intellectual 
community." 
Typical of Aron' s closeness to and perception of the 
realities of day-to-day political problems is a comment 
from a text published in 1965 (2): 
"Les societes occidentales d'aujourd'hui ont un 
triple ideal: la citoyennete bourgeoise, 
l'efficacite technique et le droit pour chacun de 
choisir la voie de son salut." (Emphases in 
original. JT) 
1. JUDT, op. cit. p. 137 
2. ARON, Raymond Essai sur les libertes, Calmann-
Levy, Paris, 1965, p. 72 
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Influenced as a young man by Elie Halevy, Aron had studied 
in Germany before World War 11 and had observed at first 
hand the breakdown of democratic processes which had 
permitted Hitler to seize power. He eschewed the 
disinterest in everyday politics demonstrated by a majority 
of his fellow intellectuals and wrote in his memoires that 
he asked himself constantly (1): "qu' est-ce que j e pourrais 
faire A la place de celui qui gouverne?" strongly 
influenced by the thought of Max Weber (2), his doctoral 
thesis (presented before the outbreak of World War 11 and 
published in 1948) had been an introduction to the 
philosophy of history (3). In this work he focussed upon 
the individual in history and on the concept of political 
pluralism. 
Aron's argument is that (4), briefly, there is a plurality 
of possible interpretations of human aspirations and 
endeavour; hence there has to be choice in giving 
preference to one interpretation at the expense of others. 
Again, nothing is pre-determined; the problem of choice is 
ever-present. Finally, men and women must accept 
responsibility for their choices. 
1. ARON, Raymond 
56 
Memoires, Julliard, Paris, 1983, p. 
2. JUDT , Ope cit. p. 145; Judt cites 
appreciation of Weber's distinction 
conviction and responsibility 
Aron's 
between 
3. ARON, Raymond -- Introduction a la philosophie de 
l'histoire, Gallimard, Paris, 1948 
4. See, for example, JUDT, Ope cit. p. 142. 
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In the last section of his thesis, headed "L' homme et 
I' histoire", Aron examines the problems created by the need 
for governments to make choices and to take action. citing 
Weber, he emphasizes that governments must come to grips 
with and understand problems by means of a rigorous and 
pragmatic analysis i he invokes the Kantian antinomy between 
a "politigue de l'entendement" and a "politigue de la 
Raison" (1), or between the dictates of chance and those 
inherent in an historic inevitability which regards 
immediate problems as being largely irrelevant. 
A pragmatic political leader needs a duality of ends and 
means, of objective and subjective standards, Aron argues. 
He cannot accept either an immediate totality of causes or 
a pre-determined future; every moment is for him a novelty. 
On the other hand, the only problem for the politician who 
follows the dictates of rationality is one of tactics, 
given that the overall strategy is immutable. 
Aron insists that these two concepts were extremes, and 
that practical politics had to have a mixture of both 
attitudes. The pragmatist needs to have at least a broad 
policy goal towards which he is working, the doctrinaire 
cannot afford to brush aside all the unforeseen day-to-
day problems. 
1. ARON Introduction a la philosophie de l'histoire, 
Ope cit. p. 331. 
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In a seminal work published in 1955 (1) Aron questioned the 
relevance of determinist ideology to France, a stand which 
isolated him intellectually and ideologically both from the 
Marxist and broad Sartrean schools of French intellectuals. 
Aron was critical of what he called "revolutionary 
messianism" and "proletarian eschatology", but for at least 
two subsequent decades the watchword among French 
intellectuals was "better be wrong with Sartre that right 
with Aron" (2). 
Judt argues (3) that L I opium des intellectuels is .. in 
certain respects a companion volume and successor to his 
Introduction i la philosophie de l'histoire and makes the 
point that Aron was himself a careful reader of Marx. Aron 
came back to his deep understanding of Marxism again and 
again in his subsequent writing. For example, in his 
Dimensions de la conscience historique, he wrote (4): 
"[ •.• ] le marxisme est la seule philosophie de 
l'histoire au dernier sens que nous venons de degager, 
c'est-a-dire la seule interpretation du passe humain 
dans son ensemble en fonction d'un metaphysique, qui 
exerce aujourd'hui une influence etendue et profonde 
sur la civilisation occidentale. Encore la plupart de 
ceux qui le professent, ayant perdu le souvenir des 
origines hegeliennes de leur foi, transposant le 
materialisme dialectique sur le plan de la science et 
du fait, degradant leur philosophie en une ideologie 
justificatrice." 
1. ARON, Raymond -- L'opium des intellectuels, Calmann-
Levy, Paris, 1955. 
2. BAVEREZ, Nicolas Raymond Aron, Flammarion, 
Paris,1993, p. 507. 
3. JUDT, op. cit. p. 143 
4. ARON, Raymond Dimensions de la conscience 
historique, Plan, Paris, 1961, p. 23 
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Aron never strayed from his belief in the importance of 
pluralism in his substantial oeuvre. He outlined his 
appreciation of the principle of pluralism (again in 
Dimensions de la conscience historique) (1): 
"Sous une forme moins rigide, la philosophie du 
pluralisme est pour le moins suggeree par le spectacle 
des richesses humaines et le souci des elements 
irratione1s, sentiments, croyances re1igieuses, styles 
artistiques. A partir du moment ou l' on attache a 
l'eternel jaillissement des mythes et des arts autant 
qu'au progres du savoir et du pouvoir, l'histoire se 
defait inevitablement en un nombre indefini 
d'humanites, chacune vouee a une certaine maniere de 
sentir, de vivre et d'imaginer le vaste univers." 
He sought always to relate his thinking to the contemporary 
practice of politics (2) and never deviated from his basic 
concept of the vital de facto liberal political mechanism 
(3) : 
"Les reglmes occidentaux que nous appelons couramment 
democratiques et que je prefere, au risque de 
pedantisme, baptiser constitutionnels-plura1istes, 
comportant, en termes sociologiques, deux aspects 
essentie1s: l'existence legitime de groupes multiples 
dont la rivalite commande la designation des 
gouvernants, le respect des reg1es lega1es, 
constitutionnelles au sommet, conformement auxguelles 
sont des ignes les deteneurs des fonctions executives 
ou legislatives et ces fonctions elles-memes 
exercees." (Emphases in original. JT) 
1. ARON, Dimensions, op. cit. p. 25 
2. JUDT, op. cit. p. 161 
3. ARON Essai sur les libertes, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 
1965, p. 156 
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Aron argued that there was a danger to liberal democracy 
inherent in the powerful surge of egoistic individualism 
characteristic of modern western societies and believed in 
the need for the ultimate primacy of a liberal state. "Il 
a fait toute sa place a l'Etat [ ... ]; il a fait sa place 
a I' individu egalement, dont la responsabilite est une 
donnee indepassable sauf a plonger dans la teratologie." 
(1) • 
He had no doubt that nations had to be grounded in 
institutions offering the authority of moral and spiritual 
as well as legal and political authority (2). Mahoney 
argues that Aron championed commerce as providing the 
ultimate key to liberal democracy, as had Montesquieu and 
constant before him (3). Jaume describes Aron as being 
evidence of the permanence of the liberal spirit (4): 
"Il est le continuateur de cette qu@te de la liberte, 
qui s'est ouverte dans la fracture revolutionnaire et 
qui se continue aujourhui: recherche d'un liberalisme 
du suj et et de la conscience tout autant que d' une 
liberte par l'Etat." 
1. JAUME -- L'individu efface, Fayard, Paris, 1997, p. 
554. 
2. ARON Essai sur les libertes, (re-issue), Par is, 
1976, Postface, cited by MAHONEY, Ope cit. pp. 
117 and 171. 
3. MAHONEY, Daniel J. -- The Liberal Political science of 
Raymond Aron, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 
Inc., Lanham, Md, 1992, p. 121. 
4. JAUME -- L'individu efface, Ope cit. p. 554 
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Judt's final words on Aron are apposite (1): 
"[ ••. ] he will in time be recognized as the greatest 
intellectual dissenter of his age and the man who laid 
the foundations for a fresh departure in French public 
debate." 
The importance of Aron in any consideration of the 
development of political thought in contemporary France 
cannot be gainsaid. He provides an essential frame of 
reference for the genesis of much subsequent thought, and 
particularly that of Gauchet, Manent and Rosanvallon. 
1. JUDT, OPe cit. p. 182 
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Summary 
One of the effects of the sUbstantial increase in the 
economic and social living standards of a significant 
proportion of French men and women during the latter part 
of the twentieth century was the possibility of a far 
greater upward social mobility than hitherto experienced 
in French history. Substantial increases in disposable 
income and hugely improved standards of living meant that 
the revolutionary idea of class struggle lost much of its 
meaning. The political edge of the Revolutionary slogans 
of "libertA" and "AgalitA" was blunted as freedom tended 
to become a matter of choosing between an increasing number 
of economic and social options. 
In such an environment, the ideology of the Revolution 
simply lost much of its topical relevance, as did the 
endogeneous anti-bourgeois thinking implicit in 
structuralism. The day-to-day political issues ceased to 
be often a matter of a stark choice between incompatible 
options as internal politics became increasingly a matter 
of debate and agreement to differ rather than of apparently 
irreconcilable confrontation. 
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At the same time, the relevance of Marxism to the situation 
in contemporary France became uncertain and the PCF 
attracted a decreasing number of voters at each legislative 
election. The growing gap between the living standards and 
general quality of life of a great majority of French 
citizens and the standards and quality of life in the 
Eastern European "People's Democracies" was apparent to 
even the least well-informed French voter. 
That is not to say that the liberty of economic and social 
choice integral to the new expression of individualism 
current in France was regarded as being ideal. On the 
contrary, it was seen at times to border on the libertine. 
The concept of transcendant moral values emanating from the 
Church or from natural law, via the Republican ethic, 
became weakened and was often challenged with apparent 
impunity in a society in which, increasingly, values tended 
to be given a monetary index. 
Thus thinkers, seeking to find a political order in a 
radically different economic and social environment in 
which the economics of international trade in commodities 
and services had become a major motivating force, were 
forced to think about the basic mechanisms and values of 
democracy in France. 
83 
This included thinking about the basis of the legislative 
process, about the dynamic role of "1'Etat" as an 
administrator of the law and as a social regulator, arbiter 
and ultimate safety net, about the implications of an 
historical situation in which the myths of the past had 
little relevance, about the philosophical meaning of 
subjectivity in a community in which individualism and 
humanism had become values transcending the older" liberte" 
and "egalite", and about the significance of acceptance by 
the French polity of the concept of value pluralism. 
------000-------
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PART II 
SEVEN EXPONENTS OF NEW FRENCH POLITICAL THOUGHT 
Introductory Note 
This Part contains six chapters, one devoted to each of the 
seven selected thinkers apart from Ferry and Renaut, who 
are considered together. 
First, the work of Dumont, Manent, Kriegel and Rosanvallon 
is considered, in that order, because each published 
significant work in the late 1970s and thus was in the 
forefront of the new thinking which emerged at that time. 
Dumont, an anthropologist, had been a fellow student of 
Levi-strauss and in mid-career had been attracted to the 
anthropological aspects of structuralism. Manent, an 
historian, acknowledged Raymond Aron in his first major 
published work. Kriegel, an historian and philosopher and 
one-time student of Foucault, indicated her influence by 
Franyois Furet. The title of Rosanvallon's first published 
work, L'Age de l'autogestion, which appeared in 1976, 
indicates his links to "la generation 68"; he is also an 
historian. 
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I then consider the work of Gauchet (who was a student of 
Claude Lefort at the University of Caen) and of Ferry and 
Renaut (both of whom are Professors of Philosophy at the 
University of Paris) dates from 1985. 
I begin each chapter with a brief reference to the context 
of the ideas being developed by the author and a list of 
the works being considered. Each chapter is concluded with 
a summary of that scholar's perception of the essential 
democratic values in contemporary France. In my treatment 
of the work of each, I have sought to demonstrate the main 
thrust of his or her thinking while maintaining an overall 
balance. To consider every work of each thinker would risk 
excessive length, some distortion and, in some cases, a 
significant degree of repetition. 
-------000-------
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Chapter 3 
LOUIS DUMONT 
Introduction 
"[ ... ] la vraie fonction de la sociologie est 
[ ... ] de remedier a la lacune qui introduit la 
mentalite individualiste, lorsqu'elle confond 
l'ideal et le reel. [ ... ] [La sociologie] a sa 
racine dans [ ... ] la perception de la nature 
sociale de l'homme." (1) 
Louis Dumont (1911-1997), an anthropologist and sociologist 
who, for part of his career, taught at the EHESS and whose 
professional reputation was built upon his work among 
Indian castes (2), sees his later published work as part 
of a general comparative study of modern ideology, based 
upon his original professional discipline of social 
anthropology. He examines the development of modern 
egalitarian society against a background of the classical 
form of an hierachical, quasi-tribal society. He maintains 
that there are currently two forms of sociology (3): the 
one begins with human beings and sets them subsequently in 
society; the other sees the birth of society as being a 
result of the interaction of individuals. 
1. DUMONT, Louis 
castes 
Paris, 
Homo hierarchicus -- Le systeme de 
et ses implications, Gallimard, 
1967, p. 18 
2. Dumont's earlier publications include: Une sous-caste 
de l'Inde du sud, Mouton, Paris, 1957 and La 
civilisation indienne et NOus, Armand colin, 
Paris, 1964 
3. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, Editions du 
Seuil, Paris, 1991, pp. 11-12 
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Dumont is of the latter persuasion and has no doubt that 
( 1) : 
.. [ ... ] la societe avec ses institutions, valeurs, 
concepts, langue, est sociologiquement premiere 
par rapport a ses membres particuliers, qui ne 
devienne les hommes que par l'education et 
l'adaptation a une societe determinee." 
This approach, Dumont insists, puts him apart from "les 
anthropologues anglo-saxons" and firmly in the stream of 
Durkheim and Mauss, the latter of whom emphasized the 
importance of understanding the reasons for the differences 
between concrete societies (2). 
Dumont's professional reputation as an anthropologist was 
established through his work on the Indian caste system 
among structured, hierarchical "holist" (the total is 
greater than the sum of the parts) societies. In the later 
years of his career, influenced by the work of Tocqueville, 
Dumont focus sed on the fact that contemporary accidental 
societies were largely unstructured and were marked by an 
anti-hierarchial individualism. 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. pp. 
98-99 
2. idem. p. 12 
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Dumont's thinking is built around a detailed and rigorous 
analysis of relevant texts. His work may be considered from 
four different aspects: the ideological import of 
economics; the evolution of occidental concepts of 
individual autonomy which had its genesis in Christianity; 
the emergence of the concept of natural law in occidental 
societies; and finally the application of his ideas to 
post-Revolutionary France and its "left-right" dichotomy. 
In this chapter I shall focus on his Homo aequalis I (1), 
his Essais sur l'individulisme (2) and on an article 
entitled "Sur l'idAologie politique fran9aise" (3) which 
appeared in Le Debat in 1990. 
1. DUMONT, Louis Homo aequalis I: Genese et 
2. 
3. 
epanouissement de l'ideoloqie 
economique, Gallimard, Paris 1977 
idem. Essais sur l'individualisme: Une 
perspective anthropoloqique sur 
l'ideoloqie moderne, Collection 
Esprit/Seuil, Paris, 1991 
idem. "Sur l'idAologie politique 
fran9aise. Une perspecti ve comparative" 
in Le Debat, No. 58, January-February 
1990, pp. 128-158 
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The Ideological Import of Economics 
Dumont recognizes that economic inequality is inevitable 
(1). In a major work (2) he explores the advent of economic 
considerations in the modern world and seeks to relate 
these considerations to the all-embracing configuration of 
the individual, politics and morality, or, as he writes, 
as part of his overall (3) .. [ ••• ] idee generale d' une etude 
comparative de l' ideologie moderne [ ... ] issue de mon 
travail anterieur d'anthropologie sociale." 
He traces in characteristic detail the genesis and 
evolution of thinking about the social implications of 
economic determinants from Locke's Two Treatises on 
Government, Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, first published 
in 1714 (Dumont signals the subtitle: "Vices privees, 
benefices publics" (4», Quesnay's Tableau economique of 
1758, and Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. This leads him 
to a major section of the work headed "L'Epanouissement: 
Karl Marx" (5). 
1. DUMONT -- Homo hierarchicus, Ope cit. p. 26 
2 • DUMONT, 
3 • 
4. 
5 
Louis Homo aequalis I: 
epanouissement de l'deologie 
Gallimard, Paris, 1977. 
idem. p. 11 
idem. p. 86 
idem. pp. 137-218 
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Genese et 
economique, 
The importance given by Marx to economic questions and to 
political economy is well-known as is the political impact 
of Marx's thought in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Europe. Dumont does not claim to bring any insights 
to considerations of the significance of Marxism, although 
he does seek to steer a path between a sociological 
critique of Marx's thinking and the revolutionary element 
in this thinking (1). 
Significant is his signalling (2) of Marx's reference in 
Das Kapita1 to the tendency in capitalist societies for 
relations between individuals and objects to become more 
important than inter-human relationships. 
Dumont takes issue with Marx's contention that revolution 
has to be the primary -- indeed, the only objective of 
mankind. He recalls Marx's thesis (3): the existence of 
three stages in historical development, that is first, 
primitive societies dominated by religion, second, the 
development of the natural power of individuals which leads 
to subjection and alienation and, third, the remodelling 
of society on a transparent and humane basis, in other 
words, on the emancipation of mankind. In a detailed 
analysis he points to what he considers to be 
inconsistencies in Marx's arguments. 
1-
2 • 
3 • 
DUMONT Homo aequalis I., Ope cit. p. 204 et seg. 
idem. p. 207 
idem. pp. 209-210 
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In summary, he writes of these arguments that (1): 
"Marx s'ecarte des 'larmes sentimentales' du 
romantisme, mais ne partage-t-il pas le sentiment 
fondamental de celui-ci? On dirait qu'il a pense, avec 
un haussement d'epaules: une domination ne vaut pas 
mieux qU'un autre, tous ces traits attrayants ne sont 
que des apparences, nous le savons parce que nous 
sommes en possession de la loi de l'histoire: au fond 
la propriete feodale du sol n' etait pas politique, 
elle etait economique, elle etait 'la racine de la 
propriete prive' (emphasis in original. JT), et c'est 
pourquoi tous les ornernents devaient disparaitre." 
Dumont claims that this argument is just not true (2). He 
suggests that Marx' s precepts, especially in so far as 
private property is concerned, have been overtaken by 
history and are no longer relevant. He emphasizes the 
importance of the recognition of social dynamics: "les 
differentes periodes historiques ou les differents types 
de societe apparaissent comrne discontinus et heterog~nes" 
(3). He is not so much seeking to discredit the 
significance and the recognized brilliance of Marx's 
thought, as pointing out that the often solidification of 
this thought into a quasi-religion in essence robs it of 
much of its significance. 
1. DUMONT Homo aequalis I., op. cit. p. 215 
2. idem. p. 216 
3. idem. p. 217 
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Emphasizing his concern with precision in the use of 
language, in a concluding paragraph of his Essais sur 
l'individualisme Dumont refers back to his principal 
objective, which has been, he maintains, to isolate the 
characteristics of modernity in contrast with non-modern 
societies. Of this feature, or "configuration", he writes 
( 1) : 
"11 apparalt aujourd'hui, tout compte fait, qu'on peut 
l'appeler individualiste (emphasis in original. JT), 
tant l'individualisme y est fondamental. 11 est bien 
vrai que la modernite prise en un sens purement 
chronologique -- et non pas seulement sa phase la plus 
recente, 'contemporaine' -- contient bien davantage, 
au plan de la pratique sociale et meme a celui de 
l'ideologie, que la configuration individualiste qui 
la caracterise comparativement." 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. p. 
299 
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The Christian Individual 
The concept of an individual having a distinct identity 
apart from that of the community or society of which he or 
she is a member is relatively modern, Dumont affirms, and 
is closely associated with the development of Christianity 
in occidental societies. In seeking to understand this 
phenomenon, he insists upon the importance of a disciplined 
historical approach (1): 
"[ ... ] la dimension historique est essentiel; la 
configuration individualiste des idees et valeurs qui 
nous est familiere n'a pas toujours existe, et elle 
n'est pas apparue en un jour." 
Dumont writes that in the traditional caste societies of 
India in which he had begun his professional career, an 
indi vidual was considered to be an ex-member of a community 
who had deliberately renounced his community and become 
independent from it, autonomous, an "individual-not-of-
this-world" (un "indi vidu-hors-du-monde") (2). The "holy 
man" or ascetic is a familar sight in those large areas of 
India where the modern world has made little impression. 
The ascetic is similar to, but not identical with, the 
concept of the outsider, the outcast, a man or a woman 
implicitly at war with society, from Ishmael, the son of 
Abraham and Hagar, to Dostoevsky's Idiot and legion 
twentieth-century examples. 
1. DUMONT, Louis Essais sur l'individualisme, p. 22 
2. idem. op. cit. p. 304 
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Although in some traditional societies the outsider might 
have been respected as one who aspired to, or had achieved, 
spiri tual serenity, in others he (rarely she) had very 
little hope of survival outside the matrix of his mother 
communi ty. still in the last decades of the twentieth 
century in the tribes of the Arabian peninsula, the 
imperatives of survival in the harsh pre-oil environment 
ensured that the interests of the community which was the 
tribe always had primacy over those of the individual. In 
the starkest and simplest terms, an individual could not 
survive in the desert outside the structure of the tribe; 
if the desert did not kill him, a neighbouring tribe would. 
( 1) • 
Dumont (2) argues that the occidental concept of the 
individual, a concept which, he insists, has changed 
significantly over the centuries, had its genesis in the 
first centuries of the Christian belief. St Matthew's 
"Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's 
[ ... ]" was an invitation to an individual to offer less 
than total allegiance and subjection to a temporal 
authority. 
1. Personal experience. JT. 
2. Dumont acknowledges 
Weber, and 
Protestant 
capitalism; 
Ope cit. p. 
his intellectual debt to Max 
specifically to Weber's The 
Ethic and the spirit of 
see Essais sur 1 ' individual isme, 
82 
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The essential early Christian concept of an individual 
(recalling the persecution of Christians for their faith 
during a period when a Second Coming was believed by those 
with faith to be imminent) was subtly different to that of 
Ishmael the outcast or the Indian ascetic, embracing as it 
did the persona of a man or a woman whose individuality 
existed purely in the presence of God. 
Dumont advances an idea of early Christianity in terms of 
the emancipation of the individual through a personal 
faith and the union of an "individual-not-of-this world" 
in a terrestial community with its heart in heaven (1). The 
appeal of such a religion was anti-authoritarian, plebeian 
and egalitarian, a combination of factors which made it 
anathema to successive Roman emperors. 
It is a mark of contemporary occidental societies, when 
compared to more traditional societies, that members of 
these contemporary societies have a largely unquestioned 
and accepted concept of the rights of the individual member 
of the society, rights which will tend to have primacy over 
the interests of the wider community. In a modern society, 
individuals have aspirations, priorities and activities 
which mayor may not be coterminous with those of their 
fellows and of the community as a whole, but which tend to 
be respected by others. 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 45 
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It is the development of what might be termed the interface 
between the evolving aspirations and rights of autonomous 
individuals in a given community and the upholding and 
defence of the interests of that community from the 
original inception of the concept of the individual in 
early Christendom which is at the heart of Dumont's 
thinking. In this context he cites Max Weber's The 
Protestant Ethic and the spirit ot capitalism (1) (his own 
translation from the original text) : "Le terme 
'individualisme' recouvre les notions les plus heterogenes 
que lion puisse imaginer." 
He traces the evolution of the "individual-not-of-this-
world" of early Christian communities into the" individual-
of-this-world" ("l'individu-dans-Ie-monde") who is an 
active member of a society and who is (distinguishing him 
from "le sujet empirigue, echantillon indivisible de 
l'espece humaine") (2): 
1. 
2. 
"[ ... ] l'etre moral, independant, autonome, et ainsi 
(essentiellement) non social, tel qu'on le rencontre 
avant tout dans notre ideologie moderne de l'homme et 
de la societe." 
DUMONT 
DUMONT 
Homo hierarchicus, OPe cit. p. 22 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. p. 
84. Dumont emphasizes the importance of 
precise definitions of the concepts he 
introduces. 
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Dumont stresses moral, a concept which implies, of course, 
a recognized and generally accepted code of social 
behaviour with its associated ideas and values and a 
consequent need for choices. He maintains that in pre-
modern societies it was impossible to draw a clear line 
between ideas and values; he therefore introduces the 
concept of "idea-values" ("les idies-valeurs") (1). 
These pre-modern societies, he maintains, were at one and 
the same time both hierarchical and holist (2). Dumont 
gives a specific meaning to the word "hierarchical" which, 
in the context of socio-political relationships means an 
unquestioned social order based upon the communal 
acceptance of a value. He employs the word "holist" in a 
way in which philosophers (and also biologists, for 
example) would understand it, that is describing the 
tendency in nature to form entities which are, in an 
ordered grouping, greater that the sum of the constituent 
elements. 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. p. 
274 et seq. and p. 303. Dumont emphasizes 
(p.303): "L'impossibiliti de s~parer id~es 
et valeurs dans les formes de pens~e non 
modernes conduit a parler d'id~es-valeurs". 
2. idem. pp. 301-305. Dumont groups together 
in a final "Lexique de quelques mots clefs" 
brief outlines of his definitions. These 
definitions are enlarged upon in this and 
other of his works. 
98 
Traditional tribal societies are holist, in Dumont' s sense, 
in that existence outside the community of the tribe is 
unthinkable for members of the tribe. In mid-twentieth 
century Oman, for example, every child in every tribe 
learned from an early age something which would make him 
or her a useful member of the tribe, be it only humble 
tasks such as pouring coffee or herding camels. Every child 
in every tribe learned the extent of the lands of his tribe 
and their boundaries, knew his tribe's allies and enemies, 
learned the art of water resource management without which 
survival in the desert would be impossible (1). 
In this sense, for Dumont holism is an ideology (2), a 
conglomerate of the ideas and values which form an integral 
part of a specific society. It is thus to be contrasted 
wi th individualism which, Dumont avers, is an ideology 
which gives primacy of value to the individual (in the 
sense of the moral, autonomous being) and thus tends to 
neglect, or give a subordinate role to, the social 
totality. 
1. Personal experience. JT 
2. Dumont's definition of an ideology, which he insists 
is "l'ideologie moderne": "Ensemble des 
representations caracteristiques de la 
civilisation moderne." (Essais sur 
l'individua1isme, OPe cit. p. 304) and 
" [ ... ] le systeme d' idees et de valeurs 
caracteristique des societes modernes." 
(idem. p. 20). The 1968 Petit Robert defines 
ideologie as: "Science qui a pour obj et 
l'etude des idees, de leurs lois, de leur 
origine". The dictionary gives also the 
Marxist definition: "Ensemble des idees, des 
croyances et des doctrines propre a une 
epoque, a une societe ou a une classe." 
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In modern, individualistic ideology, that is the 
collectivity of the common and characteristic 
manifestations of contemporary occidental civilization, 
values are segregated and diffuse, whereas in the 
traditional holist society, values were concentrated and 
integrated. 
In any society, the accepted system of values determines 
the mental outlook and culture of that society; there is 
a hierarchy of accepted values (in the sense that some are 
more important than others), and each society's internal 
hierarchy of values marking its culture is an essential 
element of difference in any comparison with other 
societies (1). 
Dumont insists that modern ideology is individualist, 
individualism being defined sociologically from the point 
of view of global values. The "individu comme valeur" has 
attributes, such as "egali te" (2), an idea especially 
important in France since the Revolution. Dumont cites 
Tocqueville (3 ) as writing that whereas in then-
contemporary England (1835-1840), personal liberty was 
given high priority with scarcely a thought for any form 
of equality, in the united states of the same period, ideas 
of personal liberty had been inherited as a base upon which 
equality was developed. In France, however, the Revolution 
"s'est faite entierement sous le signe de l'egalite". 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. p. 18 
2. idem. -- p. 21 
3. DUMONT -- Homo hierarchicus, op. cit. p. 27 
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The dominance of the concept of "egalite" marked the French 
polity from the period of the Revolution to the final 
decades of the twentieth century. Major problems arose, 
because man does not just think, he also acts and hence he 
has values in addition to ideas. Because positive action 
requires weights and priorities to be given to different 
values, a consensus on the relative importance of these 
weights and priorities is required if social chaos is to 
be avoided. Clearly this reality can mount a fundamental 
challenge to concepts of "egalite". 
Reverting to the origins of individualism, the advent of 
which over recent decades has been described by some as 
representing an exceptional phenomenon (1), he sets out in 
summary his prime thesis (2). This thesis is that something 
of modern individualism was found among the first 
Christians and in the world about them, but that this 
individualism is not exactly the same as the individualism 
with which we are familiar. He continues that the 
transformation of the idea of the individual over some 
seventeen centuries has been both radical and complex. 
Religion was the prime motivator in the first 
generalisations of individualism and this source of 
motivation continues to the present day. 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 35 
idem. p. 36 
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For Dumont, although there was an historic event without 
precedent which can explain the traits of individualism, 
there is nothing which explains the emergence, the creation 
ex nihilo, of the individual as a value (1). 
Citing Troeltsch, Dumont maintains that for early 
Christians, and specifically from the teachings of Christ 
and of st Paul, the Christian was simply an individual-
in-relationship-to-God (2) and "egalite" existed only in 
the presence of God (3). Just as the individual took on a 
value, so was the material world as such devalued; the 
resultant dualism became a constituent element in 
Christianity and has remained an element in the evolution 
of ideas. It remains at the heart of the tension in modern 
occidental mankind between ideals and reality. 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
3. 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 41 
idem. p. 43 
idem. p. 45 
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Early Christianity, sustained by the faith in a Second 
coming, had thus, Dumont continues, two discrete elements, 
the one millenarist and the second spiritual (lIextra-
mondain"), with the latter having predominance (1). 
Subjective morality and ethics formed the link between life 
in the material world and social imperatives on the one 
hand and ideals and absolute values on the other (2). The 
only Goodness that mattered was in a man's soul, and his 
own will was the source of his dignity and his fulfilment. 
As Christianity became more of a force to be reckoned with 
in the Roman Empire, so were thinkers driven to seeking to 
reconcile the dualism implicit in "rendering unto Caesar 
" and the potential political dichotomy, and hence 
weakness, in the concept of an individual serving two 
masters. st Augustine's The City of God did not exclude the 
city of this world, but in the hierarchy of values temporal 
loyalties came second to spiritual imperatives and the 
temporal power had to give precedence to the Church. In his 
sermons, Augustine enjoined Christians: "si non potes 
intelligere, crede ut intelligas. Praecedit fides, sequitur 
intellectus" (loosely translated: "Believe and you will 
understand; faith comes first, followed by intelligence") . 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 47 
idem. p. 48 
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Augustine conceded that the temporal power rested on a 
basis of justice, but affirmed with vigour that a temporal 
power which did not recognize the power of God and the 
relationship of mankind to God was not based upon justice 
and therefore was not a legitimate authority (1). 
This concept was a challenge to the undoubted reality of 
the power of Roman Empire. If a nation be defined as a 
collectivity accepting common values, then (Dumont 
continues) Augustine asked for the temporal power to be 
judged from the transcendent point of view of the world 
being considered as the relationship of mankind to God, a 
radical and revolutionary idea (2). Reason had to give 
place to faith -- the experience of God -- but it was not 
easy to argue unambiguously where reason ended and faith 
began. 
Dumont maintains that Augustine's precepts mark the 
beginning of the modern era (3): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
"qu' on peut voir comme un effort gigantesque pour 
reduire l'abime initialement donne entre la raison et 
1 'experience. [ ... ] Augustin inaugure une lutte 
millenaire, toujours renaissante, proteiforme, 
existentielle, entre la raison et l'experience qui, a 
force de se propager d'un niveau a un autre, modifiera 
en fin de compte le rapport entre l'ideal et le reel, 
et dont nous sommes en quelque fayon le produit." 
DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, OPe cit. p. 
55 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 56 
p. 57 
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In summary, Dumont argues, the result of the early 
Christian experience was that faith and feeling invaded the 
domain of reason, that history acquired a shape and that 
the future of humanity was illuminated by hope (1). 
The recognition by Constantine of Christianity as the 
off icial religion of the Empire in 312 A. D. forced a 
hitherto fissiparous Church to unify and at the same time 
posed a fundamental philosophical problem: what form should 
a Christian state take (2)? For better or for worse, the 
Church could no longer turn its back upon the world. Over 
its early centuries, the concept of Augustine's two cities 
evolved into a tacit acceptance that the Church was a part 
of the Empire in so far as worldly affairs were concerned 
and the Empire was within the Church as far as divine 
issues were concerned (3). This understanding did not rule 
out, of course, all misunderstanding on exactly where the 
affairs of the world ended and those of God began. 
The splitting of the Church between its Eastern and Western 
organisations and the concomitant close political alliance 
in the West between the Church and the Frankish monarchs, 
resulting in the creation of the Holy Roman Empire, marked 
a stage in occidental political development. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
DUMONT Essais 
p. 61 
idem. 
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Dumont argues that (1): 
"Avec la revendication d'un droit inherent au pouvoir 
politique, un changement est introduit dans la 
relation entre le divin et le terrestre: le divin 
pretend maintenant regner sur le monde par 
l'intermediare de l'Eglise et l'Eglise devient 
mondaine en un sens Oll elle ne l' etait pas jusque-
la." 
This development was potentially rich as far as the 
historical development of concepts of the individual and 
of the modern state were concerned. Henceforth the 
individual who was a Christian was, willy-nilly, more 
intensely involved with the world. And the implication of 
the Empire was that, eventually, "une unite politique 
particuliere puisse a son tour emerger comme porteuse de 
valeurs absolues"(2), in other words the ground for the 
birth of the modern state was being prepared. 
Dumont draws the threads of his argument concerning the 
evocations of individualism in the early mediaeval Church 
together with what he calls the principal lesson to be 
considered, that is that "le plus effective humanisation 
du monde est sortie a la longue d 'une religion qui le 
subordonnait la plus strictement une valeur 
transcendante." (3) 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
3. 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
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idem. 
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The best part of eight centuries from the death of st 
Augustine in 430 to the birth of st Thomas Aquinas in 1225 
passed with the Church's priorities being concerned mainly 
with survival in an alien and generally lawless 
environment. Thomas, a Franciscan, was concerned with 
seeking a harmony between faith and reason. According to 
Dumont (1), his thought sought to combine Aristotelian 
philosophy with Christian revelation. For Thomas, each man 
is a living entity ("un tout vivant"; emphasis in original. 
JT), a private individual in direct relationship with his 
creator and, at the same time, paradoxically, at the level 
of terrestial institutions, he is a member of society ("une 
partie du corps social"). If on the one hand the individual 
is sufficient unto himself, this fact is based upon his 
intimacy with God, as opposed to his earthly relationships. 
On the other hand, following Aristotle, the earthly 
community is legitimised, thanks to Aristotle, as a second 
value in the form of a rational institution. This is in 
marked contrast to previous concepts dear to the Church, 
which held that human society on earth was a product of 
original sin. 
1. DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, OPe cit. 
p. 84 
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Dumont argues that the thought of Thomas Aquinas marks a 
transition from a concept of mankind as universitas, that 
is, a social organisation to be regarded as a totality in 
which living men are no more than elements, towards 
societas, a social organisation which is an association 
between individuals. 
Half a century after saint Thomas, William of Ockham, a 
Franciscan who was eventually excommunicated, mounted an 
intellectual challenge to mediaeval thought which was to 
influence Luther some two-and-a-half centuries later. 
Dumont avers (1) that Ockham is the founder of what he 
calls the "subjective theory" of law, which is, in fact, 
he continues, none other than the modern theory of law. 
There can be nothing above the law postulated either by God 
Himself or by man, with God's permission. The concept of 
law, which in its most fundamental aspect was an expression 
of the order in nature discovered by the human spirit, thus 
became in its totality the expression of the "power" or the 
"will" of the legislator. More, whilst rights were 
conceived as defining just relationships between social 
beings, they became the social recognition of the power 
("potestas") of the individual. 
1. DUMONT 
87 
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Dumont argues that, although Ockham's legal writings 
remained largely unknown for several centuries, his work 
has great significance in that it marked the birth of the 
Individual (original capitalised. JT) in philosophy and in 
law (1). Henceforth on a social level, there was no longer 
a unique place for the idea of community, which became 
supplanted by the concept of the liberty of the individual. 
Luther's hammering of nails into his church door in 
wittemburg in 1517 represented the birth of a new era as 
well as marking the beginning of the protestant revolt 
against the power of a holist and hierarchial Church 
establishment. A consequence of the Reformation was that 
the Church, the institution which had provided the extra-
mundane "element in occidental society and which had 
conquered the occidental world was henceforth itself 
condemned to being intra-mundane (2). From that time 
onwards, the supremacy of the Church, which had endured 
throughout the Middle Ages began to give way to the 
supremacy of the state (3). 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
3 • 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
pp. 88-89 
idem. p. 81 
idem. p. 90 
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In short (1): 
"La RAforme luthArienne porta un coup dAcisif 6 ce qui 
demeurai t de l' ordre mAdiAval et du saint Empire 
romain germanique. La sociAtA globale sera it dAsormais 
l'Etat individuel, tandis que l'essentiel de la 
religion aurait son sanctuaire dans le conscience de 
chaque chrAtien individuel." 
Some 1200 years after Constantine legitimised the Church 
(at least, as far as temporal authority was concerned), the 
place of the individual in a nominally Christian society 
had become virtually dominant. After Luther there was 
Calvin and of Calvin's Geneva, Dumont writes (2): 
"L'individu est maintenant dans le monde, et la valeur 
individualiste rAgne sans restriction ni limitation". 
Dumont argues that Calvin thought that he was following 
Luther but in fact produced a different doctrine, a 
doctrine with three elements: the concept of God as will 
("volontA"), predestination and the Christian city as the 
objective bearing the will of individuals (3). Whereas for 
Luther individuals could find their way to God through 
faith and love and, to a certain extent, through reason, 
for Calvin love was nothing and reason applied only in the 
temporal world. 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
3. 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 95 
idem. p. 73 
idem. 
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At the same time, Dumont argues, Calvin' s God is the 
archetype of will, wherein it is possible to identify the 
indirect affirmation of man himself as will and, beyond 
that, the strongest possible affirmation of the individual, 
responding to the needs of reason just as much as, or even 
more than, reason itself (1). 
Dumont maintains that (2) "[l]a suprematie de la volonte 
est dramatiquement exprimee dans le dogme de la 
predestination". This is a development which began with 
Luther, through his rejection of salvation through works, 
and which was aimed at the ritualism of the Church and its 
domination of the individual. Luther had replaced 
justification by works with justification by faith, 
stopping there and thus leaving a margin of liberty for the 
individual. Calvin went further, affirming the complete 
powerlessness of mankind in the face of the omnipotence of 
God, a development which might be thought to be placing a 
limitation on individualism rather than progress. 
1. DUMONT 
2 . 
Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. 
p. 73 
idem. p. 74 
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However, Dumont argues (1), Calvin regarded certain men as 
being graced by divine election with the remainder being 
condemned to reprobation, to being condemned by God •. The 
task of the elect was to work for the glorification of God 
in the world, and the fidelity with which this task was 
carried out was the sole mark of election. Thus the elect 
would exercise his will ceaselessly in action and in so 
doing, in absolute subjection to the Divine Will, he would 
be participating himself in fact in the realisation of his 
own objectives. 
Dumont finds an echo of Calvin's concept of the complete 
identification of individual with the will of God in 
Descartes' argument that mankind would become "maitre et 
possesseur de la nature". (2) 
1. 
2 . 
DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. p. 75 
idem. p. 76 
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He finds in this concept a significant point of reference 
in his basic argument of the evolution of the early 
Christian "individual-not-of-this-world" into the modern 
"individual-in-this-world" (1): 
"Si l'extra-mondanit~ est maintenant concentr~e dans 
la volont~ de l'individu, on peut penser que 
l'artificialisme moderne en tant que phenomene 
exceptionnel dans I' histoire de l' humani te ne peut 
comprendre que comme une cons~quence historique 
lointaine de l'individualisme-hors-du-monde des 
chretiens, et que ce que nous appelons le moderne 
'individu-dans-Ie-monde' a en lui-meme, cache dans sa 
constitution interne, un ~l~ment non per9u mais 
essentiel d' extra -mondani te. I I Y a donc une 
continuit~ plus grande entre les deux types 
d'individualisme que nous ne l'avions suppose au 
debut, avec cette consequence qu'une hypoth~tique 
transition directe du holisme traditionnel a 
l'individualisme moderne ne nous apparait plus 
seulement maintenant comme improbable, mais comme 
impossible." 
Dumont explains (2) this argument by recalling that the two 
elements in his initial paradigm had been introduced more 
or less independently and thus might appear to be mutually 
contradictory. He avers that the distinction between holism 
and individualism pre-supposes an individualism-of-this 
world, whilst the distinction between of-this-world (intra-
mundane) and not-of-this-world (extra-mundane) , the concept 
of not-of-this-world is not opposed to holism (at least in 
the same way as is the concept of-this-world). 
1. DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, OPe cit. p. 77 
2. idem. -- note. 
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In fact, individualism not-of-this-world is opposed 
hierarchically (emphasis in original. JT) to holisme: 
superior to society, the concept does not challenge 
society, whereas individualism of-this-world denies or 
destroys holist society and replaces it, (or claims to do 
so) . 
Dumont (1) summarises his argument by saying that Calvin 
sought to demonstrate that the Kingdom of Heaven may, 
little by little, be constructed on earth through the 
efforts of the elect. Any distinction between Church and 
state would thus be eliminated, with the formal church 
providing a form of social discipline and with objectives 
indistinguishable from those of the locus of political 
power, in other words, the elect. 
1. DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
pp. 78-79 
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The Concept of Natural Law 
There is an aspect of the Reformation, seen in the widest 
terms, which is considered important in the development of 
the occidental individual. In mediaeval Europe, as 
elsewhere in the world, the ratio of knowledge to mystery 
was heavily tilted towards mystery. Mankind could 
understand and explain a few phenomena; all that could not 
be explained was considered to be the prerogative of a 
divine authority. 
Key events in a process of the acquisition of knowledge and 
the consequent reduction in mystery included the capture 
of constantinople by the ottoman Turks in 1453, which 
closed trade routes and stimulated the voyage of Vasco da 
Gama around the Cape and of Columbus across the Atlantic. 
At about the same time, Gutenberg printed the Bible, thus 
making it available to a wider readership and leading to 
its translation into the vernacular of the more advanced 
European peoples. 
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The work of Kepler, Galileo, Copernicus and Newton showed 
that the universe was neither geocentric nor 
anthropocentric. Hitherto, mystery had begotten fear and 
fear discouraged individual initiatives which might put 
communal survival at risk, to say nothing of the survival 
of the power of the Church, which had a vested interest in 
maintaining mystery. Also, the achievements which had 
served so significantly to roll back the frontiers of 
mystery were the achievement of individuals, men who 
refused to accept the dictates of accepted wisdom, men who 
had had the courage to stand out against various 
established institutions and the authority of the Church 
which backed these institutions. 
A result of these developments was an increasing 
recognition that there were natural laws and natural 
phenomena which might well be distinct from what had been 
hitherto regarded as the province of the Divinity, clearly 
a development of very great significance. Dumont cites 
Ernest Barker's translation of Gierke' s Natural Law and the 
Theory of society, 1500 to 1800 (1), a brief summary of 
which, he writes, is the best manner of drawing attention 
to an important aspect of the modern idea of mankind and 
of society. 
1. DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 96 
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In summarising Gierke's work, Dumont writes (1) that the 
idea of natural law is the surety for and the philosophical 
justification of systematic theoretical and deductive 
research into rights. It is an idea which has undergone a 
profound change in the modern era, to such an extent that 
it is often possible to contrast two theories of natural 
law, the ancient theory and the modern theory. In classical 
theory in general, man was a social being, nature meant 
order, and it was possible to discern, over and above the 
specific conventions of each polis a social order which 
conformed with natural order (and which hence conformed 
with the inherent qualities of mankind) which made up an 
ideal or natural basis of law. 
In the modern world, influenced by Christian individualism, 
that which was termed natural law (as opposed to positive 
law) did not consider social beings but individuals, that 
is to say men, each one of whom was sufficient unto himself 
in so far as he was made in the image of God and was a 
depository of reason. The result was that in the initial 
viewpoint of jurists the fundamental principles of the 
constitution of the state ("l'Etat") and of society are to 
be extracted from, or deduced from, the properties and 
qualities inherent in mankind considered as an autonomous 
being, independent of any social or political linkage. 
1. DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. 
p. 97 
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From this concept there arose, according to Gierke as 
rendered by Dumont, the main problem of the theory of 
natural law (1): "etablir la societe ou l' Etat ideal a 
partir de l'isolement de l'individu 'naturel'''. 
The principal vehicle for expressing the necessary social 
and political unity of the social group became that of a 
contract. This concept initially developed two forms, one 
involving an association of equals, the second a political 
contract between individuals and a ruler. These differing 
approaches formed the basis of the thought of Locke and of 
Hobbes respectively and, subsequently, of Rousseau. Locke 
introduced the idea of a trust whilst for his part, 
Rousseau sought to eliminate any distinct agent of 
government. 
Dumont considers the implications of individualism for 
concepts of liberty, equality and property (2). He argues 
that individualism implies at one and the same time both 
equality ("egalite") and liberty. However, there is a 
distinction to be made between an egalitarian "liberal" 
theory which postulates an ideal equality of rights and of 
opportunities, compatible with the maximum of liberty for 
everyone, and a "socialist" theory which seeks to realise 
a factual equality, for example by abolishing private 
property. 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 100 
idem. pp. 101-102 
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This last position has an inherent difficulty: the act of 
abolishing private property takes away a significant 
element of liberty for the individual. 
Dumont maintains that a comparison between the thinking of 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau reveals that the contrast 
between political association and political subordination 
is at the heart of the matter. The three had in common a 
recognition of the difficulty in combining individualism 
and authority and of the need to reconcile equality with 
the necessary existence of differences in political power 
in a society or in a state (1). 
One of the great motivating forces which has been active 
in modern development, Dumont argues (2), is a sort of 
indignant protest against differences and social 
inequalities, be they fixed, inherited or prescribed, in 
other words inequalities of attribution rather than of 
accomplishment, be they inequalities of authority, of 
privilege, of capacity and, ultimately, of wealth. This 
protest began with Lutherean ideas of equality between men 
and amounts to a rejection of any concept of social 
hierarchy. 
DUMONT 
2 • 
Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 103 
idem. pp. 103-104 
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Dumont contrasts Hobbes' ideas as set out in Leviathan with 
those of Rousseau in Le contrat social; he maintains that, 
from a formal point of view, the one is at the antipodes 
of the other (1). Whereas the theory of Hobbes is 
representative, absolutist and insists on subjection, that 
of Rousseau is collective, based on laws ("nomocratique") 
and insists on liberty. Yet these obvious differences 
should not be permitted to hide a deeper similarity in the 
two theories. Each postulates a discontinuity between man 
in nature and political man such that for each the idea of 
a "social contract" marks the real birth of humanity as 
such. 
Both Hobbes and Rousseau begin with individualist ideas and 
their strict logic leads them to anti-individualist 
conclusions. Each is concerned above all else to ensure the 
transcendence of the sovereign, in the case of Hobbes the 
"ruler", in that of Rousseau "la volonte generale", both 
stress the identity of the sovereign and of the subject. 
In summary, both Hobbes and Rousseau seek to fuse into a 
social or political body men who think as individuals. 
DUMONT Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. 
pp. 112-113 
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As far as Rousseau is concerned, Dumont argues that he was 
not only the precursor of sociology in the fullest sense 
of the word but that, in addition, he set out at one and 
the same time the problem of modern mankind, a problem 
which remains with us: man has become a political 
individual but he remains at one and the same time, like 
his fellows, a social being (1). 
Thus the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizen 
of the summer of 1789 marks in one sense a triumph of the 
individual. It represented a desire to found a new state 
based only upon the consent of its citizens and to put this 
state out of the reach of the political authority (2). 
Dumont touches upon the influence of Tom Paine and of 
Condorcet in the drafting of the constitution of 1793 and 
comments that (3): "[ ••• ] Condorcet est un liberal, un 
Girondin, qui ne place pas l'ideal egalitaire au-dessus de 
tous les autres". 
1. DUMONT 
2 . 
3 • 
Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. 
p. 120 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 121 
p. 125 
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He argues that although the Revolution did mark at the time 
an apparent triumph for individualism, its consequences 
have made it appear as having marked a check on 
individualism. He summarises (1): 
"Telle est l'explication globale du retournement 
general que lIon perc;:oit, de l'optimisme au 
pessimisme, du rationalisme au positivisme, de la 
democratie abstraite a la recherche de 
l"organisation', de l'accentuation politique a 
l'accentuation economique et sociale, de l'atheisme ou 
d'un vague theisme a la quete d'une religion reelle, 
de la raison au sentient, de 1 'independence a la 
communion." 
If the associative idea of contract between governments and 
citizens is to be efficacious, there needs to be a body of 
law based on socially accepted values acting as a matrix 
binding the civic society together. Government based on 
subjection clearly has much less need for such a matrix. 
The idea of socially accepted values is one to which Dumont 
gives considerable attention (2). 
He writes that our system of values determines our entire 
mental outlook (3) and that (4): 
"En premier lieu, la conscience rnoderne attache la 
valeur de fac;:on predominante a l'individu, et la 
philosophie traite, en tout cas principalement, de 
valeurs individuelles, tandis que l'anthropologie 
considere les valeurs comme essentiellement sociales." 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. 
p. 127 
2. idem. ch. 7, pp. 255-299, "La valeur 
chez les modernes et chez les autres" 
3 • idem. p. 18 
4. idem. pp. 256-257 
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Irrespective of these alternate views, Dumont argues, the 
question of social values has become a major preoccupation 
in modern society (1). Classical ideas of such values being 
built around ideas of "Goodness", "Truth" and "Beauty" have 
been supplanted by a modern concern about the difference 
between ideas and reality, between what should be and what 
is. Dumont summarizes (2): 
"L'individualisme et la sAparation concomitante entre 
l'homme et la nature ont ainsi disjoint le bien, le 
vrai et le beau, et introduit un abime bAant entre 
etre et devoir etre. cette situation est notre lot en 
ce sens qu'elle est au coeur de la culture ou 
civilisation moderne". 
Dumont enlarges the discussion by introducing the concept 
of systems of values, incorporating both ideas and values 
(3), which he considers to be inseparable, as inseparable 
as right and left in the human body. 
1. DUMONT 
2. 
3. 
Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. 
p. 257 
idem. p. 267 
idem. pp. 272-273 
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This leads to three propositions, the first of a hierarchy 
of ideas and values, where "superior" ideas and values may 
contradict and can include" inferior" ideas and values (1). 
Dumont calls the second proposition inversion, which might 
be summarised as a modern version of the mediaeval Church-
state relationship, with the one being dominant in certain 
fields and subsidiary to the other in other fields. His 
third proposition, which he calls segmentation, is when a 
value does not apply across the board, but only in specific 
instances. 
Dumont calls the overall system of ideas and values 
incorporating his three propositions an "ideology" (see 
page 99 supra). He maintains that science plays a 
predominant role in modern ideology and argues that, as a 
result, modern scientific ideas, and to a great extent 
modern philosophical ideas also, are linked to a modern 
system of values and are thus often not easily adapted to 
anthropological study and sociological comparisons (2). 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, op. cit. 
pp. 278-282 
2. idem. p. 284 
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He insists upon the fact of mankind as an individual 
representing probably the cardinal modern value and upon 
the concomitant accent on the relationship between men and 
women on the one hand and obj ects on the other at the 
expense of the relationship between men and women as 
individuals. These two traits have important consequences 
as far as values are concerned (1). 
First, the concept of mankind as an individual implies the 
recognition of a wide liberty of personal choice. It 
follows that certain values, instead of emanating from 
society, will be determined by the individual for his own 
benefit. In other words, the individual, representing 
himself a social value, demands that society delegate to 
him a part of its capacity to establish values. Liberty of 
conscience is a classic example (2). 
concerning the complex links between the modern 
configuration of values and the relationship between 
mankind and nature, whereas relations between individuals 
are based upon the autonomy and equality of the subject, 
as far as nature is concerned, there is no such constraint, 
with the result that there can be (and there generally is) 
a wide gap between what should be and what is (3). 
1. DUMONT -- Essais sur l'individualisme, Ope cit. 
p. 289 
2. idem. 
3. idem. pp. 290-291 
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The concept of the individual-in-society can be approached 
from another direction. Dumont points out that both 
"egalite" and "liberte" are ideas which (1): 
"[ ... ] s'impose a partir de la conception de l'homme 
comme individu. En effet, si l'humanite tout entiere 
est censee etre presente en chaque homme, alors chaque 
homme doit etre libre et tous les hommes sont egaux". 
He draws attention (2) to the subtle change between 
Rousseau's "L'homme est ne libre" and the idea that tIles 
hommes naissent libres et egaux en droits" and concludes 
that "la Revolution va pretendre realiser le droit naturel 
en droit positif." 
1. DUMONT Homo hierarchicus, Ope cit. p. 26 
2. idem. -- p. 27 
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The "Left-Right" Dichotomy in Post-Revolutionary France 
Dumont brings his ideas back to modern France in a lengthy 
essay (1) and could be accused of stating the obvious: "Vue 
de dehors, la vie politique fran9aise depuis 1789 presente 
deux traits fort apparents: un haut degre d'instabilite, 
et une division profonde entre une droite et une gauche 
ainsi nommees" (2). His concern, of course, is with the 
evolution of political ideas and, in this context, 
specifically with ideas of right and left in French 
politics. He cites Emile Littre, who wrote in 1849 that 
(3) : 
" les classes qui gouvernent en France n'ont plus 
aucun principei tout est expedient pour elles, et les 
rapides changements de la situation politique 
permettent de voir, a peu de distance, les memes 
personnages soutenir ce qu'ils avaient combattu, 
combattre ce qu'ils avaient soutenu." 
Dumont recognizes the French predilection for taking an 
anti-"Etat" position, echoing the contradiction descended 
from the Rousseauean dichotomy between "la volonte 
generale" and "la volonte de tous" (4). 
2. 
3. 
4. 
DUMONT, Louis "Sur l' ideologie poli tique 
fran9aise. Une pespective comparative" in Le 
Debat, no. 58, janvier-fevrier 1990, pp. 
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idem. -- p. 130 
Conservation, 
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idem. -- p. 132, citing Littre -
revolution, positivisme, Paris, 
idem. -- p. 133 
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Insisting on his belief that individualism represents a 
fundamental value of the modern age, and specifically one 
of those of France since 1789, he maintains that it is easy 
to see that the systematic development of individualism by 
the political left has assured its ideological predominance 
(1). However (2): 
"si I' ideologie de gauche est irealisable a I' etat 
pur, les gens de gauche ne peuvent gouverner sans 
fa ire le compromis avec l'ordre, sans apparaltre comme 
des transfuges [ ... ] La montee du socialisme sous la 
IIIe Republique est a coup sur un des grands faits 
ideologiques de la periode." 
This "ideologie de la gauche" meant the adherence to 
abstract and objective principles, the least possible 
authority and, implicitly, "tant pis pour I' eff icacite" 
(3) • 
Dumont argues (4) that France has acquired along the way 
since the Revolution two perceptions: first, that the 
dominant national ideology as such is of the left and that 
this ideology, being far removed from social realities, has 
given rise through its application to all sorts of 
disappointments and relapses to such an extent that a 
century of trials and tribulations was necessary before a 
republic founded on universal suffrage could be eventually 
established. 
1. 
2 • 
3 • 
4. 
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idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
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Dumont acknowledges the sort of fatalism recognized, he 
says, by Raymond Aron, that is, to recognize how the 
political right has had to accept an element of the common 
national ideological patrimony. 
Recalling his basic proposition concerning the distinction 
between individualism and holism, he cites Jaures (1), 
writing that: "l'individu humain est la me sure de toute 
chose" and maintains that holism is the reverse, a 
situation where the social totality is given a higher value 
at the expense of individuals. In broad terms, he affirms 
that whereas the tendency of the political left is towards 
individualism, that of the political right in the past has 
been towards holism. 
Dumont concludes his essay with a lengthy consideration of 
the impact on French political ideology of three disastrous 
wars over a period of less than a century against Germany, 
a nation dominated by a holist ideology over that period. 
These disasters (although the outcome of 1914-1918 was even 
more apocalyptic for Germany than for France) had the 
effect of utimately reaffirming the French collective 
national ideological identity (with its strong universalist 
element) with a "modification minimale de cette ideologie" 
(emphasis in original. JT) (2). 
1. DUMONT --"Sur l' ideologie pol i tique fran<;aise" in Le 
Debat, no. 50, op. cit. p. 141 
2. idem. -- p. 157 
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The fact of the progressive (and effective) steps towards 
the creation of the European Union since the 1950s, coupled 
with the undoubted substantially greater national self-
confidence resulting from the socio-economic transformation 
of France which began in 1944, has removed much of the 
French defensive motivation for holding on to an ideology 
which had become traditional. In such a national political 
environment, the propounding of political ideas which may 
seem novel, and which may seem also to be incommensurable 
wi th more traditional ideas, is no longer seen to be 
potentially dangerously divisive. 
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Summary 
Dumont's principal objective is to isolate the prime 
characteristic of modernity in occidental societies. This 
characteristic is individualist, 
individualism is a fundamental 
given, he argues, that 
feature of modernity. 
Further, in modern occidental societies, contrary to the 
evolution envisaged by Marx, the ownership of property has 
become a fact and a social aspiration of major importance. 
A largely property-owning society has little interest in 
violent revolution. 
He sets out to to demonstrate how the concept of the 
individual in civil society has evolved over some two 
millenia from being no more than an element in a universal 
totality to becoming an autonomous entity associating with 
other autonomous entities in a specific society. He argues 
that, sociologically, a specific society must be given 
priority over its members whose essence has reality only 
in so far as they belong to such a society. 
Dumont attributes the origins of the occidental evolution 
of the idea of an autonomous individual to the implicit 
division of loyalty inherent in early Christianity between 
spiritual and temporal powers. This dichotomy engendered 
a change in concepts of law. Old Testament precepts and 
classical ideas of natural law had a common purpose, that 
is, the ensurance of social stability. 
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The development of Christianity brought with it the idea 
of the individual in relation to the Deity and hence a 
concept of personal conscience 
presented mankind with a dilemma, 
and moral law. This 
the conflict between 
ideals and reality, or between faith and intelligence. This 
dilemma was to become ultimately the antinomy between 
reason and understanding. 
The alliance of spiritual and temporal powers, originally 
in the Holy Roman Empire and subsequently in monarchies 
such as France, had the effect of putting a brake on any 
expression of personal individualism other than that inner 
individualism encapsulated in the concept of man in 
relation to God. The Protestant Reformation in its various 
guises, Anglicanism, Calvinism, Lutheranism, and the 
concomitant rise of capitalism and mercantile activity were 
expressions of an individualism which the Church could not 
contain. Politically, this was to lead to the evolution of 
a temporal political power, the state, which challenged, 
and ultimately supplanted, the political power of the 
Church. 
Individualism meant also challenging conventional wisdom; 
it thus stimulated exploration, both geographical and 
scientific and led to an unstoppable expansion of knowledge 
and, ultimately, of education. 
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The veils of mystery which gave the Church so much of its 
popular political power were gradually stripped away as 
more and more ancient "mysteries" became the subject of 
rational and scientific explanation. A consequence of this 
development was the erosion of divinity as a base for law. 
These two developments -- the growth of the power of the 
state and the parallel eclipse of ultimate divine sanction 
by terrestrial, man-made laws undermined ancient 
patterns of political authority and thus created a need for 
a definition of the relationship between the temporal state 
and its subjects, a relationship which would include the 
legally mutually binding concept of contract or trust. This 
development raised in turn questions as to the locus of 
legislative creation, as to what extent individual freedom 
should be constrained by man-made laws and to what extent 
these man-made laws should apply to all subjects in a 
specific civil society. This introduced an associative 
concept and the need for a commonly-accepted matrix of 
social values upon which formal laws could be based. 
So far, Dumont's analysis could be said to have applied to 
generally static societies. However, the rapid growth of 
commerce and mercantile activity in Europe following the 
discoveries during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
introduced a major new dynamic, economics, into the 
evolving civil society:state relationship. 
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Economic affairs were the realm of the individual 
untrammelled by restrictive laws, and acquisitive material 
values tended to become more important than the older 
spiri tual values; relationships between individuals and 
objects in the form of property became more important than 
intra-personal relationships. This development further 
clouded an already imprecise boundary between the values 
of personal liberty and those of social equality. 
Dumont explores the importance of the concept of natural 
law. In a secular society of free individuals, ultimately 
natural law -- however defined, but with an implicit 
understanding of the reality of non-negotiable social 
values and consequent rules of behaviour -- is at one and 
the same time the surety for and the philosophical 
justification of human rights. 
Relating his argument to contemporary France, Dumont argues 
that - the principle of "egalite" enshrined in the 
revolutionary canon as, ultimately, an abstract and 
objective value to be defended even to the point of 
governmental inefficacy, had marked the precepts of the 
left since the Revolution. The Fifth Republic represents 
a compromise set of values between those of the left and 
those of the right, both descended from 1789. 
-------000-------
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Chapter 4 
PIERRE MANENT 
Introduction 
"Chaque 'progres', de la nature ou de la loi, de 
la societe ou de l' Etat, du represente ou du 
representant, finit par manifester, apres un 
temps d'illusion 'liberale' ou 'etatique', que la 
division est toujours presente, que 1 'on est 
toujours incapable de la surmonter. En 
construisant une loi qu'il veut souveraine 
absolue de la nature, mais qui ne doit et ne peut 
trouver ses motifs queen celle-ci -- c'est bien 
cela la theme originel entre l'etat de nature et 
l'etat civil, entre la societe et l'Etat, le 
theme originel du gouvernement representatif 
le dispositif mod erne rend la loi de plus en plus 
unique souveraine, la nature de plus en plus 
libre, mais l' une et 1 I autre de plus en plus 
faibles, jusqula ce que la nature et la loi se 
soient plus occupees quia slater l'une a llautre 
leur force respective." (1) 
Pierre Manent was a disciple of Franyois Furet but has 
developed his own discrete scholarly reputation. Lilla 
regards him as believing (2): 
1. 
2. 
" that liberalism must be seen as a development 
within modernity, which in turn must be considered in 
contrast to the ancient and medieval worlds that 
preceded it. In other words, modern liberalism must be 
understood historically as a product of the modern 
break with the past". 
MAN ENT , Pierre 
liberalisme: dix 
1987, pp. 247-248 
Histoire intellectuelle du 
leyons, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 
LILLA (ed. ) New French Thought: Political 
Philosophy, op. cit. pp. 17-18 
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In the foreword to a work published in 1977 (1), Manent 
emphasizes his belief that, compared to the perceived 
certainties of traditional philosophies, a feature of the 
modern world is that history takes the place of established 
truths with the result that "une pensee qui ne peut etre, 
ne disons pas meme refutee, mais simplement contredite par 
une autre pensee". 
Manent acknowledges his intellectual debt to Leo strauss, 
who, he writes (2), carried with him what he called the 
three waves of modernity: first, modern natural law, 
originated by Machiavelli and developed by Bacon, Hobbes, 
spinoza, Descartes and Lockei second, the crisis of modern 
natural law and the emergence of history, inaugurated by 
Rousseau and elaborated by Kant and Hegeli and, finally, 
radical historicism, inaugurated by Nietzsche and 
culminating with Heidegger. 
Manent continues (3) by stating a basic premiss: the 
"complicite ultime" in modern political thought between a 
"scientific" or "realist" perspective -- the emphasis on 
"fact" and a "moral" or "utopian" perspective 
emphasizing "right" -- represents the two principal but 
opposing streams. out of the first stream there developed 
the imperative of Machiavelli: obedience to necessity (3). 
1. 
2. 
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As far as the second stream is concerned, Manent argues 
(1), Rousseau is justly regarded as being the most 
significant representative. Both streams represent 
extremes, as, Manent contends, is confirmed by the history 
of modern philosophy (2). 
Manent concludes his foreword (3) with the contention that 
the realist stream of modern political thought, which 
highlights fact, has developed from the work of 
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hegel. The utopian stream, built 
around idealistic concepts, emanated from Rousseau, Kant 
and, again, Hegel. Manent argues that Hegel is the common 
element in both streams. 
From this starting point, Manent produced three works 
during the 1980s focussing on the history of political 
liberalism (4). In a work published in 1994 he moved from 
his basic discipline, history, into ontology (5). 
1. MAN ENT 
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Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme 
"Comment attacher les droits a l'individu en tant 
qu'individu, puisque le droit regIe les relations 
entre plusieurs individus, puisque l'idee meme du 
droit presuppose une communaute ou une societe 
deja institue? Comment fonder la legitimite 
politique sur les droits de l'individu, puisque 
celui-ci n'existe jamais comme tel, que dans son 
existence sociale et politique, il est toujours 
necessairement lie a d'autres individus, a une 
famille, a une classe, a une profession, a une 
nation?" (1) 
Manent argues that, according to popular opinion, the basis 
of European political history is founded upon Christianity 
and the development of modern politics can be described as 
a "secularisation". What are "liberte" and "egalite" if 
not, ultimately, "evangelical values" meant to inspire and 
fashion civic life, he asks? (2) 
This popular concept, he continues, was born in the wake 
of the Revolution with the purpose of building a bridge 
between old values and new concepts. Yet, he points out, 
it should not be forgotten that this idea, which took over 
a century to win general acceptance from both sides of the 
revolutionary divide, was only taken seriously after the 
fact of the Christian religion completely losing for the 
first time any claim to political power, a power which it 
would never recapture (3). 
1. MANENT, 
2 . 
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The reality was somewhat different, Manent argues. In fact, 
the principles of the new politics - the rights of man and 
the citizen, freedom of conscience, the sovereignty of the 
people - were forged over some two centuries prior to the 
Revolution during the course of a bitter conflict against 
Christianity, and especially against the Catholic Church. 
Manent argues that the decisive question becomes (1): 
"[ ••• ] faut-il voir dans la guerre des Lumieres contre 
le christianisme I 'expression d'un immense malentendu, 
dont il s'agirait de comprendre les 'raisons 
historiques' , ou bien au contraire cette periode nous 
livre-t-elle le sens de l'entreprise politique 
moderne, et donc du liberalisme, bien plus clairement 
que la periode posterieure de la reconciliation?" 
In seeking to reconcile these propositions, Manent looks 
at what he calls the "European theologico-political 
problem", a problem born in the wake of the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire. After this cataclysmic event there 
remained in Europe three major political forms. The first 
was the Holy Roman Empire, the second city states such as 
Venice and Florence and, later, the North German Hanseatic 
cities, and third, the Church. But the existence of the 
Church posed an immense political problem for the peoples 
of Europe; Manent insists that European political 
development is only understandable if seen as a history of 
responses to the problems posed by the Church. Each 
institutional adjustment by the Church to counter problems 
served only to create new problems and to require thus new 
responses (2). 
1. MANENT 
2 • 
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Ope cit. pp. 12-13 
idem. pp. 19-20 
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Manent perceives two singular contradictions in the 
doctrine of the Church (1): at one and the same time, it 
left men free to organize their temporal affairs as they 
saw fit, offering a real emancipation in profane matters 
but imposed a hitherto inconceivable spiritual yoke upon 
them. This was simply a logical sequence from "rendering 
unto Caesar ... " In contrast to Judaism and Islam, it did 
not seek to impose rules upon every aspect of human 
behaviour. 
What was the impact of the pretensions of the Church on the 
first two political forms he defines, the Empire and the 
city, Manent asks? (2) He considers the city first, arguing 
that mediaeval cities were ideologically weak in the face 
of two so-called "universals", the Church and the Empire. 
This weakness, coupled with their propensity to indulge 
factional squabbles in their midst, was fundamental. 
As for the Empire, it could not compete effectively with 
the spiritual power of the Church, in spite of its 
longevity and of the achievements of a few outstanding 
emperors. 
1. MAN ENT 
2. 
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Whence, Manent continues, the European political problem 
evolved to become (1): 
"[ ... ] le monde non-religieux, profane, lal:c doit 
s'organiser sous une forme qui ne so it ni la cite ni 
l'empire, une forme moins 'particuliere' que la cite, 
et moins 'universelle' que l'empire, ou dont 
l'universalite sera it autre que l'universalite de 
l'empire." 
Initially the solution to this problem involved the 
establishment of monarchies in which the monarch could 
claim that his power came from God, in contrast to the 
cities in which the magistrates could not claim this 
authority (2). Nor did the monarch claim universality, thus 
limiting the scope of possible conflict with the Church 
( 3); such a concept of monarchy made it nearer to the 
Church than to the city, especially as the monarch claimed 
a divine right to rule. 
An initial ideological schism developed between those 
monarchs (as in France) who saw the overall political 
structure as being a union of Altar and Throne and those 
(as in late Tudor England) who were determined to keep all 
political power in their own hands (4). But in both cases, 
monarchies ultimately became a prey to secularisation (5). 
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The implications of the European "theologico-political 
problem" were considered, Manent points out, by Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, "the greatest Aristotelian since Aristotle" 
(1). This problem was to become the sharp focus of 
Machiavelli's political analyses (2) of the realities of 
the then-contemporary exercise of power in Italy. 
Machiavelli was, of course, a Florentine, as Manent 
recalls, and his experience of the exercise of power was 
in a city-state, a political form particularly inimical 
in so far as the Church was concerned and equally 
particularly vulnerable before the Empire (3). 
Manent begins his chapter on Machiavelli with the phrase 
"la fecondite du mal" (4), on the grounds that "le mal" 
(however defined) is more politically significant, more 
"'reel' que le 'bien'" (5). 
1. MAN ENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
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Machiavelli was not seeking to make a case for "le mal"; 
he was simply describing a political situation as it was, 
that is, concerned with the effective exercise of political 
power without sentimentality and without deference to any 
external "values" perceived as having little relevance to 
the immediate political situation. He recognized also that 
there was nothing especially novel in this phenomenon; he 
was simply describing the ruthlessness with which men (and 
women) seek power and defend power. 
Manent quotes at length (1) the well-known passage from 
chapter VII of The Prince describing the ferocity and the 
political effectiveness of Caesar Borgia's violence after 
his occupation of the Romagna. He summarizes the political 
message Borgia was conveying: the first level of violence 
was anarchic, that of the petty chiefs of the province 
before Borgia's takeover; the second was that of Borgia's 
lieutenant, Remiro d' Or co , elimination the petty chiefs and 
re-establishing order; the third, of Borgia against d'Orco 
proved simply that he was master, suppressing fear by fear. 
According to Manent, Hobbes' absolute monarch, the 
"Leviathan" was in a sense the institutionalisation of 
Caesar Borgia's action in the Romagna (2). Yet, as Manent's 
subsequent development of his argument shows, this 
simplification could be misleading. 
1. MAN ENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, Ope 
cit. pp. 48-50 
2. idem. p. 50 
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Manent underlines the violence of the period of gestation 
of Hobbes' Leviathan: the civil War and the regicide of 
1649, a period during which "[ .•. ] men live[d] without a 
common power to keep them all in awe [ ... ]" and in which 
there were: "No arts; no letters; no society; and which is 
worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; 
and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short" (1). His point is that Hobbes' description could 
have applied equally well to the pre-Borgia Romagna; there 
the solution was the imposition of strong government under 
Borgia, in England the solution was the imposition of 
strong government under the Lord Protector. 
Manent points also to political developments in England 
under the last Tudors and the first stuart monarchy as 
being a decisive development in the resolution of the 
overall European "theologico-political problem". Hobbes 
perceived, he writes, that the only way for the authority 
of the monarchy to be preserved was to detach it completely 
from the Church and thus make it fully sovereign (2). 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, Ope 
cit. pp. 51-59. The wording of Hobbes' text 
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Hobbes, according to Manent, saw the causes of the civil 
War being twofold: one profane, one religious. The first 
was built around the power of the English universities 
manifested in the aristocracy, the second was both Puritan 
and populist. The first envisaged classical solutions to 
political problems with classical ideas of political 
"liberty", the second encouraged individualist expression. 
The two streams together converged into a mood of political 
disobedience and of conflicting opinion. 
Hobbes worried that conflicting opinions could only result 
in the anarchic "natural condition of mankind" which he 
deplored, the war of all against all, every man against his 
neighbour, a situation which, he believed, had prevailed 
at least in parts of England during the recent Civil War. 
What was needed was a political contract, a covenant, but 
"Covenants without the sword are but words" (1). To 
paraphrase, the power of the sovereign, irrespective of 
whether this sovereign be individual or collective, had to 
be unrestricted and absolute, in order than civic peace be 
ensured and maintained. 
1. MANENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
op. cit. p. 62. Hobbes' words come from 
Leviathan, ch. XVII 
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The significant political and moral development, Manent 
suggests, is that a firm and unemotional concept, that of 
law ("droit") replaced the woollier classical concept of 
the common good ("bien") as being a dominant element in the 
matrix of society. Law, of course, meant a codification of 
the rights of individuals and introduced a new concept, 
that of political representation (1), it being patently 
impracticable for each individual to be able to make 
personal representation to the sovereign. A code of 
political rights enshrined in a Covenant might have given 
the people equality before the law, but did not, however, 
give them political power. "Ce qui est sUbstantiel ou 
naturel, c'est l'egalite des sans-pouvoir." (2) 
This, Manent argues, is a foundation stone in the evolution 
of political liberalism, creating a distinction between 
civic society and the state (3): 
"Comment ne pas voir que nous avons lA la matrice de 
la distinction entre la societe civile et l'Etat, la 
societe civile etant le lieu de l'egalite des droits, 
et l'Etat l'instrument de cette societe civile grace 
auquel sont assures l'ordre et la paix?" 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, op. 
cit. p. 63. 
2 . idem. p. 65 
3. idem. 
146 
But at the same time, what Manent calls the "provocative 
paradox" of Hobbes' doctrine -- that is, that the state is 
the only source of power in this civil society over which 
it exerts absolute power underlines the inherent 
difficulties with this distinction and the idea of 
representation which is inseparable from it. If civil 
society is what matters, which would be natural, if the 
state is no more than the instrument of this society, why 
is the gulf between civil society and the state so wide, 
Manent asks? This paradox, this lack of clarity between the 
functions of civil society and the state, he continues, set 
in motion a natural oscillation between two extremes: the 
fading away of the state and its absorption by civil 
society at one pole, the absorption of civil society by the 
state at the other (1). 
Hobbes introduced the idea of the general will, but for him 
the general will would be expressed by the desire of the 
collectivity for a cessation of intra-communal strife and 
a consequent recognition that only an absolute sovereign 
could ensure the elimination of social conflict (2); this 
sovereign's authority would be expressed as a form of trust 
between him and the community. 
1. MAN ENT 
2. 
Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
op. cit. p. 65 
idem. p. 67 
147 
Thus for Hobbes there could be only one political form: 
discussion of the merits of democracy, or an aristocracy 
or a monarchy was in essence pointless, for what mattered 
was that the sovereign, who might be the embodiment of any 
one of these three forms, had absolute political power 
( 1) • 
Manent argues that Hobbes contributed powerfully to the 
advent of the point of view of modern democracy in that his 
thinking presaged a realisation that there could be only 
Q.ng political form; democracy was just not one among a 
number of possibilities, it was the only possibility 
because it owed its legimacy to the will of the people (2). 
"Leviathan" ensured compliance; it was apart from 
individuals, each of whom represents a quanta of political 
power and who thus kept his basic liberty (3). 
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Manent considers that Hobbes may be considered the founder 
of political liberalism simply because he elaborated the 
liberal interpretation of the law: the law is a purely man-
made essence, neutral to each individual for whom it is the 
guarantee of peaceful coexistence in the community. He 
writes (1): 
"La pensie de Hobbes est ainsi la matrice commune de 
la dimocratie moderne et du liberalisme. Elle fonde 
l'idee democratique parce qu'elle elabore la notion de 
la souverainete etablie sur le consentement de chacun; 
elle fonde l'idee liberale parce qu'elle elabore la 
notion de la loi comme artifice exterieur aux 
individus." 
Hobbes was writing, of course, at a time of great civil 
unrest in England; there can be no political kid gloves 
during or in the immediate wake of a civil war. Thus his 
solution to the perceived political problems of the age in 
which he lived was, not surprisingly, short on humanity. 
His argument was that people would give up a great deal if 
they could be assured freedom from what they feared most 
at the time: violence and sudden death. 
1. MANENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
op. cit. p. 77 
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A generation later peace had been effectively restored, so 
that Locke could argue that what people feared most was 
hunger, thus entering an economic element into the classic 
political equation ( 1) • Manent argues that Locke 
established two significant propositions: first, the right 
to property pre-dates the institution of society and thus 
does not depend on the consent of others or on politically-
inspired laws; second, the link between man and nature is 
built around work. Thus man is an owning and exploiting 
being (2). Nature is neutral; only the toil of man can give 
value to what nature offers. Exploiting nature generates 
barter and, subsequently, trade and creates a need for a 
medium of exchange, money (3). 
Manent argues (4) that Locke's conclusions have a great 
importance for the elaboration of the liberal doctrine. The 
apparition of an acceptable means of exchange and a means 
of storing value -- money -- spawned the need for a 
society in which property would be protected and agreements 
between individuals upheld. But, Manent continues (5), it 
gave rise to what he calls: "[ ... ) le d~licat probl~rne du 
rapport entre l'individu, le travail et la propri~t~". 
1. MANENT Histoire inte11ectuelle du liberalisme, 
op. cit. p. 93 
2. idem. p. 97 
3. idem. p. 99 
4. idem. p. 100 
5. idem. p. 101 
150 
In other words, the evolution of civil society followed a 
necessary progression from its origins with the hungry 
individual (1) : 
"[ ... ] au commencement, le droit du proprietaire et le 
droit du travailleur ne font qu'un; une fois que 
l'invention de la monnaie et le developpement de 
l'echange ont permis au travail d'etre productif (de 
produire plus que ce qui est necessaire a la 
consommation du producteur), proprietaire et 
travailleur deviennent distincts." 
Manent argues (2) that from the time of Locke onwards, and 
to a large extent thanks to him, the right to property has 
been recognized as being the natural fundamental right. 
Hence economic activity developed as a "system" of 
production and exchange of values, in other words, as 
"political economy" in which what mattered was not so much 
the absolute rights of individuals but an essentially 
relative notion, that of personal interests and utility. 
Understood, of course, is the need for effective 
communication expressed as a meeting place (a market) 
between individuals where exchange may take place. Thus did 
the liberal political philosophy of natural rights tend 
spontaneously and, in a sense, irresistably, to transform 
itself into quite another type of thought: political 
economy. 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, op. 
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Thus for Locke the escape of mankind from a state of nature 
into a civil society in which the meeting place of the 
market becomes transformed into a legislative assembly (1) 
which concerns itself with the laws of ownership of 
property and those governing trade and commerce. 
This legislative assembly would become a sovereign body, 
itself subject to, the laws which it promulgates. In order 
that it did not become too powerful, Locke argued that it 
should not be in permanent session. Rather, there should 
be an executive power, subordinate to the legislative 
assembly, whose task would be the monitoring of the 
observance of the laws (2). This executive power embodies 
the difference between the state and civic society, or 
between the political condition of mankind and its 
"natural" condition (3). 
1. MANENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
op. cit .. p. 109. Although Manent does not stress 
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Thus, Manent sums up, the aim of politics became one of 
ensuring the security of people and property (1), and the 
idea of political liberalism was based upon representation 
in the law-making process (2). 
Montesquieu observed political development in England some 
two generations after Locke. Whereas Locke was, more or 
less, directly involved in the polity about which he wrote, 
Montesquieu was the outsider looking in. Manent argues that 
Montesquieu's concern was how to ensure that the liberal 
project might evolve from absolute sovereignty without 
revolution and without risking a descent into anarchy (3). 
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Montesquieu, unlike Hobbes and Locke, was not concerned 
with how mankind may have evolved from the original state 
of nature and how consequently political forms may have 
evolved. His interest was in studying an existing political 
experience, that of neighbouring England. This was a unique 
period in liberal political development, Manent maintains 
(1), a period in which the sovereignty of the monarch had 
become redundant in England and before the first stirring 
of the sovereignty of the people triggered the Revolution 
in France; simply, it was a period during which the 
question of political legitimacy was not an issue. 
In focussing on the conflict between the exercise of 
political power and individual liberty which he regarded 
as being at the heart of the political problem, 
Montesquieu, according to Manent (2), established what 
might be called the definitive language of political 
liberalism. Instead of taking as his starting point the 
concept of rights and laws assuring liberty, he began with 
an analysis not of the causes but the effects of the 
exercise of political power. His originality was in 
regarding power as a fact itself, separate in law and in 
fact from its origins and its purpose and separate in law 
and in fact from any man who seeks it or seeks to hold on 
to it. 
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Montesquieu recognized what whomsoever holds power 
ultimately will tend to abuse it (1) and therefore it was 
essential to ensure that power would limit power by a 
judicious limitation and distribution of political power 
between the legislative and executive loci. Manent cites 
De l'Esprit des lois (2): 
"Si la puissance ex~cutrice n'a pas le droit d'arr~ter 
les entreprises du corps l~gislatif, celui-ci sera 
despotique; car, comme il pourra se donner tout le 
pouvoir qu'il peut imaginer, il an~antira toutes les 
autres puissances. Mais il ne faut pas que la 
puissance l~gislative ait reciproquement la facult~ 
d'arreter la puissance ex~cutrice. Car, l'execution 
ayant ses limites par sa nature, il est inutile de la 
borner; outre que la puissance executr ice Si exerce 
toujours sur des choses momentanees." 
A check and a balance would be provided, Montesquieu 
believed, by the inevitable evolution of parties, in other 
words, of numbers of legislators representing groups of 
citizens who had specific views on specific political 
problems; the numbers of legislators representing each 
group would be approximately equal. This split would be 
reflected in both the legislative and executive bodies, 
limiting the power of each (3). 
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As Manent sums up Montesquieu's argument (1): "Parce que 
la societe est representee par un pouvoir divise, les 
citoyens vont etre impuissants a se faire beaucoup de mal 
les uns aux autres." [Emphases in original. JT] citizens 
in fact have a double interest: that the political power 
serve their interests and that it does not press too 
heavily upon the society. 
Manent concludes (2) that compromise was at the heart of 
Montesquieu's concept of political liberalism. Instead of 
being a product of deliberation, compromise became itself 
the driving force of decision, because what is decided is 
the composite result of what was desired by both parties 
to the decision. 
Thus the first full flowering of the concept of political 
liberalism due to Montesquieu is based upon two ideas I 
Manent maintains (3): the idea of representation and the 
idea of the separation of powers. The link between 
economics and politics becomes clear and the question (with 
considerable late twentieth century topicality) becomes 
whether each individual, be he (4): 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
"[ ... ] d'abord membre independant de la 'societe 
civile' ou sujet de l"Etat', bourgeois ou citoyen, 
homo oeconomicus ou homo politicus, appartient-il 
d'abord a l'espace transnational ou mondial du 
'marche' ou plut6t au territoire de la 'nation'?" 
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du liberalisme, 
Manent argues that the thought of Rousseau represented a 
break with the stream of liberal thought which had been 
evolving up to the mid-eighteenth century. He categorizes 
(1): [ ... ] trois positions fondamentales qui def inissent 
respectivement l'absolutisme, le liberalisme et la pensee 
de Rousseau". 
Whereas Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu 
concerned themselves with the world as they saw it, 
Rousseau sought after an ideal world, he waspre-occupied 
with the soul of man, he doubted the reality of progress 
unless the human spirit progressed, he was unhappy with the 
essential optimism of the age (2). Manent maintains that 
discovering the positive elements in Rousseau's thought is 
an exercise in subtlety, "une question particulierement 
delicate"(3). Modern society, according to Rousseau, made 
man both wicked and unhappy. The good society could only 
be that which conformed to the nature of man. 
1- MAN ENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
op. cit. p. 152 
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Thus, Manent continues, Rousseau wanted to know what was 
the point of seeking a form of society conforming to the 
nature of man, if man is not by nature social, if society 
as such is contrary to his nature? (1) The answer, Rousseau 
believed, was to be found in the concept of le contrat 
social and la volonte genera le (2); the liberal concept of 
a distinction between civil society and the state was 
unacceptable to Rousseau, for whom only unqualified 
"society" embodying la volonte generale could correspond 
to man's spiritual needs (3). 
Manent sets out what he considers to be the ultimate 
paradox in Rousseau's argument (4): 
" [ ... ]: d' une part, la societe est essentiellement 
contra ire a la nature; d'autre part, elle ne se 
rapproche de la conformite a la nature, de la seule 
conformite a la nature qui lui soit ouverte, que dans 
la me sure ou elle impose a ses membres l'unite la plus 
grande possible, ou elle identifie le plus possible 
chacun a tous et a tout, das la mesure ou elle 
denature l'homme." 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuel du liberalisme, OPe 
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According to Manent, the thinking of Rousseau marked the 
end of what he calls (1) "ce premier cycle du liberalisme", 
a watershed which may be summarized by the expression: 
"Rousseau and the French Revolution". The liberalism of 
the nineteenth century accepted the Revolution, in spite 
of the undeniable fact that the representative principle 
evolved from the Revolution could permit despotism, that 
the sovereignty of the people could be grabbed by a handful 
of men, and that the implementation of liberal principles 
was gravid with mortal dangers for liberty (2). One of the 
hallmarks of pre-revolutionary liberal political thought 
had been the concept of a clear distinction between civil 
society and the state. The edges of what had been a 
reasonably lucid notion, that of civil society, became 
blurred as society became more complex. And the idea of 
"history" determining events gained currency. (3). Both 
developments had an impact on the evolution of liberal 
political thought. 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, Ope 
cit. p. 173 
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Nineteenth century political liberal thinking in France 
revolved around three men: Constant, Guizot and 
Tocqueville. Manent devotes a chapter to each 
(respectively: "VIII -- Benjamin Constant et le liberalisme 
d'opposition", "IX -- Franyois Guizot: le liberalisme du 
gouvernement" and "X -- Tocqueville: le liberalisme devant 
la democratie") (1). 
Constant's long political career pre-dated the Empire; he 
was politically active as an opposition politician during 
the first decades of the Restoration. A sUbstantial element 
of his contribution to French political thought is 
contained in his De la liberte chez les modernes (2), a 
work concerned with the limitation of political power, 
taking into account the evolving nature of society and the 
reality of the forces of history (3). 
1. MANENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
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Manent cites Constant in setting out the latter's basic 
attitude. Constant asked (1): 
"La loi doi t etre l' expression ou de la volonte de 
tous, ou celle de quelques-uns. Or, qu'elle sera it 
l'origine du privilege exclusif que vous concederiez 
a ce petit nombre? si c'est la force, la force 
appartient a qui s'en empare; elle ne constitue pas un 
droit, et si vous la reconnaissez comme legitime, elle 
l'est egalement, quelques mains qui s'en saisissent, 
et chacun voudra la conquerir a son tour. si vous 
supposez le pouvoir du petit nombre sanctionne par 
I' assentiment de tous, ce pouvoir devient alors la 
volonte generale." 
This concern of Constant threw a light upon an ambiguity 
in the concept of the sovereignty of the people (2), and 
in so doing, of course, questioned the validity of 
Rousseau's thesis. 
Manent argues that Constant, as a politician in opposition, 
put forward the idea of an essential scepticism among the 
political representatives of the people (3) • Representation 
should thus not be an absolutist element in the structure 
of political sovereignty, but should be an expression of 
doubt, an institutionalization of scepticism. 
1. MAN ENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
2. 
3. 
Ope cit. p. 185. Manent is citing Constant's 
"Principes du politique", first chapter, p. 269, 
in De la liberte chez les modernes 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 186 
p. ·195 
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Guizot's long political career began in 1814. It was as a 
young minister in the Restoration government that he had 
to face up to an idea diametrically opposed to the 
"liberalism of opposition" of Constant, that of seeking to 
ensure some elements of liberalism in a government which 
hankered after absolutism. He began to put his ideas down 
on paper in 1820 (1). 
Guizot saw the importance of a political sensitivity on the 
part of those in power to the realities of public opinion 
(2) : 
"Si le pouvoir n'a plus de mysteres pour la societe, 
c'est que la societe n'en a plus pour le pouvoir; si 
l'autorite rencontre partout des esprits qui 
pretendent a la juger, c'est qu'elle a partout quelque 
chose a exiger ou a faire; si on lui demande en toute 
occasion de legitimer sa conduite, c'est qu'elle pe ut 
disposer de toutes les forces et a droit sur tous les 
citoyens; si le public se mele beaucoup plus du 
gouvernement, le gouvernement agit aussi sur un bien 
autre public, et le pouvoir s' est agrandi comme la 
liberte." 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, op. 
cit. p. 202 
2. idem. p. 205; Manent is citing 
Guizot's De la peine de mort en matiere 
politique, published in Paris in 1822, pp. 
84-86 
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Guizot was seeking to teach the government, Manent writes 
(1), that society should not be considered an enemy but as 
a partner. The essence of Guizot's political thinking was 
that he firmly rejected the political founding idea of 
human will, either collective or individual, and in so 
doing broke with the modern political tradition (2). This 
held that the distinction between civil society and the 
state pre-supposed the political founding role of human 
will. In order that the state be an instrument of society, 
it is necessary that society be the source of the state 
through the sovereignty of will, given that the state per 
§g could not have its roots in nature. Guizot saw civil 
society and the state as essential, twinned co-elements 
( 3) : 
"La soci~t~ et le gouvernement naissent ensemble et 
coexistent n~cessairement. On ne peut les s~parer, 
meme en pens~e. L'id~e, comme le fait de la soci~t~, 
implique l'id~e comme le fait du gouvernement." 
Guizot was an early advocate of the need to "finish the 
Revolution" (4), but became himself a victim of 1848. 
1. MANENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
Ope cit. p. 206. 
2. 
3 • 
4 . 
idem. 
"Philosophie 
ROSANVALLON, 
civilisation 
1985, p. 333 
idem. 
-- p. 216 
idem. Manent is citing Guizot' s 
pOlitique: de la souverainet~" in 
Pierre (ed.) Histoire de la 
en Europe, Hachette-Pluriel, Paris, 
p. 219 
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Tocqueville, having established his reputation with his 
two-volume De la democratie en Amerique, published in 1835-
1840, became politically active in 1848 and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs from June to October 1849. His pre-
occupation was to a considerable extent with the concept 
of egalite, specifically, according to Manent (1) with 
"'l'egalite croissante des conditions' -- dont il est tres 
difficile de concevoir le terme". 
Profoundly influenced by his travels in the United states 
in 1831-32, he wrote (2) that Americans were "nes egaux au 
lieu de le devenir", in contrast to the situation in France 
where people had had "egalite" thrust upon them, as it 
were. Democratic equality in the united states was the 
natural state of a frontier society and American political 
institutions had developed from this equality (3). 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, Ope 
cit. p. 222 
2. idem. p. 223. Manent is citing De la 
democratie en Amerique, (Gallimard, Paris, 
1961) vol. 11, second part, ch. Ill, p. 108 
3. This is a point of considerable importance. It was not 
for Americans to agonize about the possible character 
of a "state of nature"; they knew what it meant, 
because they lived in it and they knew that survival 
in a frontier society required a considerable amount 
of intra-communal co-operation and self-help. The 
"state of nature" was essentially an indifference to 
the efforts of mankind. In such a social environment, 
democracy and equality of conditions and opportunity 
do not need explaining, nor do they need to be 
codified; they form part of the common awareness of 
every citizen. 
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Thus democracy in the united states was primarily a social 
state in which the sovereignty of the people was implicit 
and which, consequently, rendered less sharp the 
distinction between civil society and that society's 
political institution (1). 
But Tocqueville, with considerable perception, could also 
see that the ultra-democratic equality of the American 
experience could also be, ultimately and paradoxically, 
destructive of society (2): 
"C'est dans l'Ouest qU'on peut observer la d~mocratie 
parvenu a sa derniere limite. Dans ces Etats, 
improvises en quelque sorte par la fortune, les 
habitants sont .arriv~s d'hier sur le sol qu'ils 
occupent. lIs se connaissent a peine les uns les 
autres, et chacun ignore l'histoire de son plus proche 
voisin. Dans cette partie du continent am~ricain, la 
population ~chappe donc non seulement a l'influence 
des grands noms et des grandes richesses, mais a cette 
naturelle aristocratie qui decoule les lumieres et de 
la vertu ... Les nouveaux Etats de l'Ouest ont d~ja 
des habitants; la societ~ n'y existe point encore." 
1. MANENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
Ope cit. p. 226. Again a point of some 
significance. Democracy in the United 
states, a federation, grew from the bottom 
up, whereas in France, a nation with a long 
history of dirigiste central government, 
following the Revolution, and especially 
following the inception of universal male 
suffrage in 1848, democracy was in essence 
imposed from the top down. 
2. idem. -- p. 227; Manent is citing De la 
democratie en Amerique, Part I, Ch. Ill, pp. 
50-51 
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This danger, Tocqueville argued, was not necessarily 
destructive of self-government in the United states, simply 
because there was no alternative. In France, however, with 
its dirigiste political tradition, a tradition not 
essentially changed by the Revolution, such a situation 
could lead to political indifference by individuals en 
masse with the result that liberal self-government would 
become meaningless (1). 
Manent mentions (2) a well-known Tocquevillian worry: that 
the extremes of democracy such as he observed evolving in 
the united states, where conformity in an egalitarian 
society was becoming the norm and where intellectual 
exchange might be regarded as being socially unacceptable, 
could lead to an infringement of the freedom to think for 
oneself. 
1. MANENT -- Histoire inte11ectuelle du liberalisme, op. 
cit. pp. 229-230 
2. idem. p. 235 
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In the concluding pages of his Histoire intellectuelle du 
liberalisme, Manent writes (1) of the nineteenth century 
evolution of the nation state which meant, in France, the 
problem of finding a political form which would satisfy the 
twin demands of "history" and of "revolution" and at the 
same time harmonise the division between nature and the 
law, or between civil society and "l'Etat". Both Communism 
and National Socialism could be regarded as early twentieth 
century attempts to establish this political harmony. In 
the last half of the twentieth century, with both these 
ideologies being fundamentally discredited, civil society 
and "l'Etat": "[ ..• ] se retrouvent-ils dans la nudit~ de 
leur confrontation reciproque, sans le sublime protecteur 
du Roi, de la Revolution ou de la Nation. [ ... ] La religion 
chr~tienne dont ils voulaient proteger la cite est aussi 
affaiblie que le sont la nature de not re soci~te civile et 
la loi de notre Etat". 
1. MANENT Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, 
op. cit. pp. 249-250 
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The Modern state 
Manent considers the modern state in a separate work (1). 
In the opening sentence of an article published in 1988 
he wrote: "When speaking about the modern state we speak 
of the modern state, pre-supposing its distinctiveness." 
In this article (2), Manent argues that the thrust of 
Montesquieu's De l' Espri t des 10is "was the progressive 
sUbstitution of the modern criterion of liberty for the 
ancient criterion of virtue". The Revolution marked the 
triumph of the modern and of the idea of the reign of 
reason. For Hegel, Manent maintains (3)," it was less a 
matter of criticizing the ancient than of showing the 
historical necessity that implied its being overtaken by 
the modern". 
In contemporary society, he continues, we have learned to 
mistrust reason but (4):"[w]e want to live and think 
according to modern reason without having it lead to the 
progressive historicism that Hegel most coherently and 
profoundly represented". 
1. MANENT, Pierre -- "The Modern state", in LILLA (ed.) 
-- New French Thought: Political Philosophy, 
Ope cit. p. 123. This is a translation of an 
article by Manent entitled "L'Etat moderne: 
2. 
3 • 
4 . 
Problemes d'interpretation" which appeared 
in commentaire (Spring 1988) pp.328-335 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. p. 124 
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Our contemporary mistrust of reason makes us doubt whether 
the perceived (1): "liberal-democratic principles of the 
modern state are not eternally rational and beneficial" and 
ask ourselves whether "the modern state that guarantees 
human rights is the ultimate form of human order". Yet we 
cannot accept any form of Hegelian determinism. 
Manent maintains that we are concerned in a way without 
parallel in human history with an abstraction "human 
rights" (2): 
"A poor wretch trembling with fear who does not 
want to die -- that is man, and that is his 
right. [ .•• ] and the right of self-
preservation became the right to comfortable 
self-preservation. But comfort presupposes 
property, property presupposes labor, and labor's 
productivity presupposes the free use of one's 
talents and what those talents produce." 
Manent argues (3) that in traditional, pre-modern 
societies, the good was equated with man's ends, which 
required a base of law. The early ideas of modernity 
recognized that ultimate human objectives could not be 
enshrined in a binding legal statement; in short, "the 
good" could not be imposed by a magistrate. Rather, the law 
must allow man "to seek his good freely, by prohibiting 
from hindering this liberty". (4) 
1. MAN ENT "The Modern state", in LILLA (ed. ) Ope 
cit. p. 125 
2. idem. p. 129 
3 • idem. p. 129/130 
4. idem. p. 130 
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Thus, Manent continues (1): 
"[ •.. ] the new form of law in modern states [is] 
founded on human rights. The ancient law, whether 
pagan or Christian, was a commandment, an 
authoritarian injunction; the law of the modern state 
is an authoritarian authorization." 
This leads to a recognition which, I argue, is fundamental 
to an appreciation of the implication of value pluralism 
and hence of the imperative of tolerance and a respect for 
the views of others and also of the implicit intolerance 
of deterministic politics. In Manent's words (2): 
"[ ..• ] the fact that the human problem, that of the 
relationship between nature and law, remains 
intrinsically, naturally, and therefore perpetually 
insoluble." 
Elsewhere (3), Manent argues that individuals who live in 
modern liberal societies escape the arbi tary personal 
commands of a prince. Today's individual, as a citizen and 
a worker or an entrepreneur (4): 
"derives his motivation from a general situation that 
he freely assesses i as a potential occupant of the 
seat of power, he prohibits any individual or group 
from violating equality through personal commands or 
monopolies. Thus the representative state and the 
market each imply the other". 
1. MANENT -- "The Modern state" in LILLA (ed.), Ope cit. 
p. 131 
2. 
3. 
4. 
idem. -- p. 132 
MAN ENT , Pierre -- "The Contest for Command" in LILLA 
(ed.) Ope cit. pp.178/185. This article 
appeared originally in the introduction to 
a work by Manent, Les liberaux, Hachette, 
Paris, 1986 
idem. p. 181 
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This leads to a situation in which, Manent argues, (1): 
"Competition [ ... ] remains the only acceptable 
candidate for social regulation, since the norm 
it offers is immanent to social activity. It is 
imposed on no one, it implies no dogmatism". 
This is a new and unique situation in the evolution of 
Occcidental political structures. It is a manifestation of 
Manent's contention that modern liberalism must be 
understood historically as a product of the modern break 
with the past (2). 
1. MANENT -- "The Contest for Command", OPe cit. in 
LILLA, Ope cit. p. 185 
2. See page 167 supra 
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La cite de l'homme 
Having considered the modern state, in a densely-argued 
work written around elements of the modern history of 
occidental ideas (1), Manent considers man, a word to be 
qualified, he argues (2), by "the obligatory Homeric 
epithet modern" (emphasis in original. JT). Modern man, 
Manent continues, defines himself by self-consciousness 
(3). More, modern man has a sense of history (4): 
"The consciousness of being historical is the central 
and perhaps also the strangest aspect of the modern 
experience. Modern philosophy is convinced that the 
experience of history is the most profound and 
decisive experience". 
Manent contends that his idea of modernity has its genesis 
in eighteenth century France and England and, specifically, 
with Montesquieu' s perception of what was happening in each 
country (5): 
"The movement of The spirit of the Laws unfolds between 
the two poles of Ancient and Modern. The one is the 
ancient world of republican 'virtue', the other is the 
England of 'commerce' and' liberty' . Between the ancient 
and the modern is the present of the French monarchy". 
The ancient idea of virtue was at the heart of pre-modern 
political and moral philosophy, Manet argues (6), and became 
a universal principle. 
1. MANENT, Pierre La cite de l'homme, Fayard, Paris, 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
1994; English language translation -- The city 
of Man, Princeton University Press, 1998 
idem. The City of Man, p. 5 
idem. p. 6 
idem. p. 7 
idem. p. 12 
idem. p. 18 
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This principle could not be sustained. Manent points out 
that from the eighteenth century, more and more, mankind 
tended "to live under the regime of commerce and liberty 
that was set in motion and maintained by the desire and the 
necessity of avoiding death and misery" (1), thus presenting 
a challenge to the concept of virtue. 
This created a dilemma for mankind: practising virtue was 
not enough to ensure human survival. Was virtue then 
"contrary to nature"? Was the price of law to be an eschewal 
of liberty or was the pursuit of liberty to amount to a 
denial of law? Manent seeks to rationalize the dilemma (2): 
"If the regime of virtue or law can legitimately be 
termed 'contrary to nature,' the regime of liberty 
cannot be said to be strictly speaking 'in conformity 
with nature.' It cannot be the unifying element of the 
different possibilities of human life. The 
classification of political regimes according to their 
greater or lesser conformity to nature gives way to the 
succession of the two great regimes of law and liberty. 
To call these two regimes political is anachronistic; 
it is much more appropriate to call them historical. 
History, and no longer Nature, is the umbrella under 
which the two regimes are joined in their succession 
and in their incompatibility". 
In France, Manent continues, the Revolution sharpened the 
question and engendered a focus upon "the task of 
extricating law from social necessities." (3) This task 
remained at the heart of the evolution of European political 
ideas through the nineteenth century. 
1. MANENT The city of Man, Ope cit. p. 46 
2. idem. p. 47 
3. idem. p. 51 
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After history, sociology. "The feeling of living 'within 
society' is the effective expression of living 'within 
history,' both of which are of central importance for us" 
Manent writes (1). He argues that Max Weber (2), by applying 
scientific method to the problem, gave: 
"a rightful place to what the real man lives, thinks 
and wills, the individual who chooses among diverse 
possible actions and produces real effects. Max Weber 
impressively accorded the real individual his 'values '''. 
But "society" is a dangerous commodity, Manent warns, and 
is, in essence, "only the sum of its internal differences, 
with no common substance" (3). These internal differences 
may be caused by a differing hierarchy of values, if one 
follows Weberian precepts, or by sociological "laws" if one 
is Durkheimian. Manent seeks to reconcile the differing 
sociological approaches (4): 
"Weberian man, who chooses in full liberty and 
sovereignty the values to which he will to devote his 
life, is the double of Durkheimian man, who is subject 
to the necessity of sociological causes and laws over 
which he has no control. These are the two opposed yet 
overlapping figures of the man deprived of reason by 
the sociological perspective". 
In addition to being a product of history and sociology, 
Manent argues, the modernity of mankind is also a product 
of economics, or, rather, the economic system (5): 
1. 
2 • 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
"The desire to better one's condition, the efficient 
cause of economic progress, constitutes the central 
wellspring of human nature in which, so to speak, nature 
and history are joined." 
MANENT The city of 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
Man, op. 
p. 55 
p. 67 
p. 74 
p. 87 
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cit. p. 51 
Manent devotes the first part of La cite de l'homme to what 
he describes as the self-consciousness of modern man, a 
factor derived from the facts (however interpreted) of 
history, sociology and economics. In the second part of the 
work he discusses what he calls "The Self-Affirmation of 
Modern Man" (1), beginning with a lengthy analysis of the 
work of Hobbes, Locke and Hume. 
Out of this, he contends (2) that "Man the holder of human 
rights combines pure activity and pure passivity in his 
empirical nature" and also (j) that "the majestic edifice 
of the modern state, the system of human rights, rests upon 
a very fine point: the human individual transforms nature 
in order to feed himself". 
Where does this leave liberty? Manent, who does not seek 
to hide his admiration of Heidegger (4), provides a 
conditional answer (5): 
"The doctrine of free will indeed aff irms human liberty, 
but only up to a certain point. Man is free within the 
framework and by means of his nature. That is saying, 
in an inverted way, that his nature comes between man 
and liberty. The proposal of liberating liberty leads 
to extenuating nature, dismantling substance, and 
abolishing essence". 
1. MANENT The city of Man, op. cit. pp. 109-206 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
idem. p. 140 
idem. 
idem. --; Manent refers to "the greatness 
of Martin Heidegger" - p. 155 
idem. p. 157 
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Manent argues (1) that the modern democratic experience 
contains an inherent paradox: men and women living in 
contemporary democratic societies are both free and 
domesticated. Is modern man, he asks, so sure of his freedom 
when in reality he has never been more subjected? 
He continues (2): 
"One the one hand, in effect, the will, in order to 
leave nature completely free, has to raise itself above 
all natural determinations, and thus to define and 
affirm itself again and again as pure will. But then, 
it is proper to man that the will determines him and 
thus his nature all the more". 
Manent concludes by citing Kant's verdict of the heteronomy 
of mankind, or the essential contradictions in human nature 
(3). He describes (4) the nature of man as being lithe mother 
of all heteronomies". 
He is arguing against the absurdity of seeking to trammel 
mankind into a grid of rules and regulations which are 
claimed to have universal applicability. To attempt to do 
so is to ascribe to individual men and women an unnatural 
desire for an overwhelming conformity. 
1. MANENT 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
The city of Man, Ope cit. p. 181 
idem. p. 182 
idem. p. 203. It could be argued that 
Manent is not saying anything new and 
that id and ego have long been recognized 
as essential, and contradictory, elements 
in the makeup of individual men and 
women. 
idem. p. 204 
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Summary 
Manent emphasizes the fact of modernity and argues that, 
as far as political philosophy is concerned, this fact 
represents a distinct break with the thinking of the 
classical and mediaeval worlds. In the modern world, history 
has replaced what were perceived by the ancients to be 
established truths. 
He distinguishes three phases of modern political thinking: 
first, modern natural law; second, the crisis of modern 
natural law and the emergence of history; and third, radical 
historicism. Against this background, he argues that there 
have been two streams in modern political thought, the one 
realist (recognizing the force of necessity), the other 
idealist or utopian. 
He offers a history of the evolution of the relationship 
between civil society and the state in Western Europe which, 
he says, has been a product of what he calls the theologico-
political problem. This is a problem known since the 
earliest conflict of Church and state in Europe; the Church 
had been forced to make institutional adjustments to meet 
new political situations; the effect of these adjustments 
was very often a new set of problems which required still 
more adjustment. 
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The autonomous European cities of the late Middle Ages were 
a product of this institutional adjustment: neither the 
Church nor the temporal power was strong enough to suppress 
the desire for political liberty on the part of groups of 
people who had the economic means to sustain themselves. 
Thus the stream of realist political thought from 
Machiavelli through Hobbes and Locke to Montesquieu was 
concerned with the growing reality of the exercise of 
political power untrammelled by ecclesiastical interference. 
This represented a gradual liberalisation of the political 
process, a process which stopped in France with Rousseaui 
Manent argues that there were in the mid-eighteenth century 
three fundamental political positions, absolutism, 
liberalism and the thought of Rousseau. Rousseau ignored 
economics and was concerned with an ideal world based upon 
a human reason which he perceived as having the potential 
to be ultimately infallible. 
Manent stresses what he regards as the ultimate paradox in 
Rousseau's argument: from one point of view, society is 
essentially contrary to the state of nature; from the other, 
the need to live in and exploit the natural environment 
imposes on mankind an essential social discipline 
destructive of the mores of a state of nature. 
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For the nineteenth century French liberals -- Manent cites 
Constant, Guizot and Tocqueville -- the question became one 
of a reassertion of liberal principles in the face of a 
Rousseauean monist revolutionary and republican ethic based 
upon "egalite" and the concept of the ultimate infallibility 
of human reason. The nineteenth century was a period in 
which the evolution of the nation state meant for France 
at one and the same time a need to reconcile the streams 
of history, that is, the evolution of the nation, and 
revolution, that is, the promise for the future. The history 
of the twentieth century caused both the idea of "nation" 
and that of "revolution" to lose much of their ideological 
potency. There remained, however, the dynamic imperative 
of a need to promulgate laws which might conflict with 
perceptions of natural freedom and those of an egalitarian 
society. Thus the relationship between "l'Etat" and civic 
society has potentially substantial confrontational 
elements. 
A prime legacy of the Revolution for the French nation was 
that individual French men and women became citizens from 
the moment when the laws of the nation were promulgated as 
issuing from the national sovereignty of the people. This 
reality left unresolved, however, the relationship between 
and the possibility of conflict between the collectivity 
of individuals, that is, civil society, and "l'Etat". 
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Manent sums up the consequent situation (1): 
"Ainsi la sociAtA civile et l'Etat se retrouvent-ils 
dans la nuditA de leur confrontation rec1proque, sans 
le sublime protecteur du Roi, de la RAvolution ou de 
la Nation". 
In other works, Manent returns to the concept of modernity, 
both that of the modern state and of modern man. He argues 
that the conflict between nature and law in human society 
is endemic, as is the internal conflict within and between 
individuals (recognizing Kantian heteronomy). Further, the 
modern fluid alliance of the democratic state and the global 
market place acts as an optimum social and political 
regulator. 
Modern man, Manent argues, is at one and the same time both 
self-conscious and self-affirmative. His self-consciousness 
is a product of his history, the evolution of the society 
in which he lives and the facts of economics. Manent points 
to what he describes as the dilemmea of modern man: the 
ancient "virtue" could not ensure survival; was it, then, 
contrary to "nature"? But "liberty" could not be said to 
be "in accordance with nature". History, Manent contends, 
provides the link between these two incompatible concepts. 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme, Ope 
cit. p. 249 
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Manent distinguishes sociologically between "Weberian man", 
who has his own hierarchy of values, and "Durkheimian man", 
who has no control over his destiny. He argues that modern 
man is torn between these two extremes. In one sense, modern 
men and women have great liberty; in another sense, they 
are subjects of the society which has spawned them and are 
"domesticated". 
-------000-------
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Chapter 5 
BLANDINE KRIEGEL 
"Les uns insisteront sur la pr66minence de 
l'Etat, les autres sur l'exigence des droits du 
citoyen, les troisiemes sur le caractere 
imp6rissable des droits de l'homme, les 
quatriemes sur les buts singuliers de la nation. 
Les frictions sont r6elles. Le premier pas 
consiste tout simplement ales reconnaltre et a 
faire valoir, pour soi, le caractere irr6ductible 
de ces diff6rences logiques, a observer que 
chacun de ces droits existe, qu' ils existent 
r6ellement et que chacun d'eux a sa force." (1) 
Introduction 
Blandine Kriegel has been Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Paris X-Nanterre since 1994; she also edits 
the biannual review Philosophie pOlitique. Previously, from 
1990, she was a professor at the University of Lyon-Ill. 
She has been successively head of a commission charged with 
making recommendations on the modernisation of the French 
state and a member of a commission charged with considering 
possible reforms of the French system of justice. 
Her first major work, L'Etat et les esclaves (2), was 
published in 1979 and republished in 1989. In it she first 
set out principles upon which she has developed a 
significant oeuvre over the ensuing two decades. 
1. KRIEGEL, Blandine -- Philosophe de la Republique, 
Plon, Paris, 1998, p. 314 
2. KRIEGEL, Blandine L'Etat et les esclaves: 
Reflexions sur l'histoire des etats, 
(2nd edition), Payot, Paris, 1989; English-
language translation -- The state and the 
Rule of Law, Princeton Uni versi ty Press, 
1995 
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In this chapter, I commence with an examination of the 
English-language translation (The state and the Rule of 
Law) (1) of her L'Etat et les eselaves, before considering 
her La Politique de la raison (published in 1994) (2), her 
La cite republieaine (a collection of previously published 
papers, essays and articles, published in 1998) (3), her 
Cours de Philosophie Politique (representing a course she 
presented to the French University College in Moscow in the 
early 1990s and published in Paris in 1996) (4) and her 
important Philosophie de la Republique (1998) (5). 
I have sought to bring out the main thrust of Kriegel's 
important contribution to contemporary French political 
thought. 
1. KRIEGEL, Blandine -- The state and the Rule of Law, 
Princeton University Press, 1999 
2. KRIEGEL, Blandine -- La Politique de la raison, Payot, 
Paris, 1994 
3. KRIEGEL, 
Paris, 
Blandine -- La cite republieaine, Galilee, 
1998 
4. KRIEGEL, Blandine -- Cours de Philosophie Politique, 
Librarie Generale Franyaise, Paris, 1996 
5. KRIEGEL, 
PIon, 
Blandine -- Philosophie de la Republique, 
Paris, 1998 
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L'Etat and les esclaves 
In this major work Kriegel focuses on the evolution of the 
laws which provide the matrix holding the modern state 
together. She begins by deploring the fact that, although 
contemporary historians have much to say about the history 
of ideas and ideologies, there has been no comparable 
development of histories of the state per se. (1) "So long 
as law and institutions, the very source of differentiation 
among states, are neglected, there can be no history of the 
state". (2) 
Kriegel writes that she is seeking to (3) "reinscribe the 
history of political theory in the history of the state" 
and that this political theory is "reducible to three 
essential elements: a doctrine of power, a doctrine of 
individual rights, and a political morality of law". 
As far as the doctine of power is concerned, she affirms 
that this can be summed up in one word: sovereignty (4). 
1. KRIEGEL, Blandine -- The state and the Rule of Law, 
Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 12 
2. idem. p. 13 
3. idem. p. 14 
4. idem. p. 15 
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Sovereignty is an integral element in the concept of the 
state, she continues; citing.Bodin, she argues that unless 
a state is sovereign, it has no form (1). Yet, as she 
points out (2), the idea of the sovereign state has tended 
to earn a bad reputation in the twentieth century and has 
tended to be confused with absolutism. Yet, she argues at 
length, sovereign power per se is not evil, not despotic, 
and not feudal (3). 
If sovereignty then is neither evil nor absolute, what, 
then is it, Kriegel asks? She supplies an answer to her own 
question (4) : "Sovereignty articulates a threefold 
conception of the state: external independence, internal 
coherence, and supremacy of the law". 
External independence, she maintains, is the principle of 
autonomy with respect to foreign governments (5). 
Concerning sovereignty expressed as internal coherence, 
Kriegel argues that (6): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
"sovereignty is the power of a body closed in on 
itself, an interior life that fosters and maintains a 
consensus; it never openly challenges community, even 
if its definition remains uncertain when it meets with 
a hierarchical society that maintains a division of 
orders." 
KRIEGEL The state and the Rule of Law, OPe cit.-
p. 15 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
pp. 15-29 
p. 29 
p. 30 
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Supremacy of the law, with a consequent implicit limitation 
of sovereignty, is Kriegel's major theme (1): 
"In the absence of limitation, sovereignty would be no 
different from feudal domination. The limitations stem 
from the law in its three incarnations, divine, 
natural, and fundamental." 
She underlines the importance of the limitation of the 
state by law and argues that this limitation begins with 
the concept of human rights (2). Three conditions are 
necessary for a doctrine of human rights, she writes (3): 
"First, human beings as such must be recognized as 
having value. Second, this recognition must be given 
legal expression. Finally, this legal status must be 
guaranteed by political authorities." 
There are two discrete elements in the concept of human 
rights: human liberty and civil liberty. Kriegel gives the 
Latin terms to avoid ambiguity: status libertatus and 
status civitatus (4). 
The latter implies the classic liberal tenets of civil 
liberties, citizenship, political rights, property, freedom 
of opinion, of assembly and of association. The former, 
equally fundamentally, signifies the right to defend the 
integrity of one's own body. 
1. KRIEGEL -- The state and the Rule of Law, Ope cit. p. 
31 
2 • idem. p. 32 
3. idem. p. 34 
4. idem. p. 35 
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Kriegel argues that the idea of civil liberty was unknown 
in Roman law (1); although marriage and property rights 
were secure in ancient Rome, there was no right to 
individual security or of freedom to make one's own 
decisions. There was no guarantee of individual security, 
personal autonomy, freedom of conscience or freedom of 
assembly. 
The original inception of civil liberties as understood 
at the end of the twentieth century evolved in western 
Europe largely through the assertion of property rights by 
a landed aristocracy and commercial rights by mercantile 
classes several centuries earlier. This confirmed concepts 
of individual liberty. 
Kriegel contends that (2): 
"The idea of individual liberty was the grand 
innovation of the state under the rule of law, the 
foundation of the first body of law and politics that 
rejects slavery. In the ancient city, enfranchisement 
and emancipation were private affairs and events that 
occurred at the margins of society. The rule of law, 
by contrast, is embodied in general laws that modulate 
the exercise of power in the state. The guarantee of 
individual rights presupposes an anti-imperial and 
antidominal center of power committed to peace and 
respect for law. The first states under the rule of 
law gave neither power to the people nor political 
liberty to the citizen. They were neither democratic 
nor liberal." 
1. KRIEGEL The state and the Rule of Law, op. cit. 
p. 35 
2. idem. pp. 49-50. 
187 
The acceptance of the rule of law and the congruent 
political guarantee of a right of legal recourse 
represented a first step, she continues, because whenever 
and wherever the rule of law prevailed, servitude vanished. 
In summary, Kriegel argues that concepts of sovereign power 
and the assurance of the rights of individuals were at the 
heart of early modern juridical thinking. Subsequently (1): 
"[ ••• ] regulation of the social world would be viewed 
through the economic prism of liberal theory, which 
detaches the social world from the state". 
Rousseau affirmed the importance of finding (2): [ .•. ] une 
forme de gouvernement au-dessus de 1 'homme"; implicitly 
this means, of course, establishing a framework of law 
which will be beyond the ability of individuals to tinker 
with established institutions and in so doing succeed in 
imposing a minority will upon the majority. 
Kriegel recalls the fact that the law in a modern [Western] 
state has three primary sources: Greek natural law, Roman 
civil law and Jewish moral law (3) and maintains that the 
search for a link between morality and law culminated in 
Kant's critique of Practical Reason (4). 
1. KRIEGEL -- The state and the Rule of Law, OPe cit. 
p. 50 
2. idem. p. 51 
3 . idem. 
4. idem. p. 52 
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She feels that perhaps in contemporary society we do not 
take sufficient cognizance of the historical links between 
religion and politics and believes that "religion in 
general only passes into politics by means of a human go-
between, namely, morality"(l). Morality is a system of 
obligation which imposes duties and ideals (2). 
She distinguishes between the morality of law and the 
morality of faith: "The morality of laws secures national 
identi ty by means of transcendence" (3), whereas "The 
morality of faith is the proclamation of individual 
redemption". (4) 
Kriegel traces the idea of a lay legal order based upon 
reason back to Aristotle and its descent to Western 
civilization through st Thomas Aquinas (5). But law based 
upon reason is not always easy to reconcile with natural 
law. This created a problem for early modern political 
thinkers, seeking to reconcile the perceived equality of 
a state of nature with the reality of societies built 
around hierarchies and inequalities (6). 
1. KRIEGEL -- The state and the Rule of Law, Ope cit. p. 
52 
2. idem. p. 53 
3. idem. p. 54 
4. idem. p. 55 
5. idem. p. 56 
6. idem. p. 57 
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The growth of the modern state, Kriegel argues, resulted 
in "a transformation of the essence of politics" (1). 
Politics is about the exercise and control of power and 
modern political doctrine seeks to "juridify the political 
sphere" (2). Thus, in contemporary occidental society (3): 
"Law is no longer the coin of a politics of strength, 
and force and power are no longer to be regarded as 
brute facts. They are all henceforth subjected to law, 
while law itself becomes a power, a force. The state 
adopts the rule of law. To make politics an object of 
law is impossible without the sUbjection of power 
itself to the law, the juridification of proprietors 
as well as of property, of the powerful as well as of 
power." 
Against this background, Kriegel considers the inherent 
difficulties in France with the state regulation of law 
(4). She argues that, even through the revolutions of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the practice of 
politics in France contained elements of feudal forms of 
suzerainty alongside modern concepts of sovereignty. Citing 
Tocqueville, she argues that the centralization of 
administration in France had the effect of creating a 
unified state through the public function, at the expense 
of law (5). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
KRIEGEL -- The state and 
58 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
the Rule of Law, Ope cit. p. 
p. 63 
p. 78 
p. 79 
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Reverting to her more general argument, Kriegel writes (1) 
that during the latter half of the eighteenth and the early 
nineteenth century, "the doctrine of the state under the 
rule of law progressively declined, overtaken by the novel 
doctrines of liberalism and democracy". 
Gradually, as civil society as a whole was seen to be more 
important that" 1 'Etat", thinkers concerned themselves with 
the individual and with the associated rights of man. 
Kriegel argues that both physiocrates and philosophes saw 
liberalism as a gift of a state based upon the rule of law 
and as the only political form authorizing the affirmation 
of individual subjectivity and the autonomy of civic 
society (2). 
She signals what she regards as a paradox (1): liberalism 
may turn against the state. The limits of liberalism, she 
argues, are not confined to its predilection for economic 
problems; economic and political liberalism can coexist. 
She stresses that liberal political philosophy in her view 
concerns itself only with the individualist philosophy of 
the rights of man and liberal political concepts revolve 
around guaranteeing these rights. 
1. KRIEGEL 
2. 
3 • 
The state and the Rule of Law, op. cit. p. 
91 
idem. p. 92 
idem. 
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There simply cannot be, she affirms, a political doctrine 
which is both liberal and statist and she continues that 
liberalism has nothing to say on the question of "l'Etat", 
underlining the fact that liberalism is politically 
equivocal (1). 
Democracy, the alter ego of liberalism, arose in France as 
a consequence of revolution whereas in England it evolved. 
Kriegel argues (2) that liberalism grew out of civil 
society, which itself had evolved from the state based upon 
law, and that it prospered with modern capitalism. It was 
a product of a tacit division between power and property 
through which it was understood that it was possible to 
acquire property without seeking political power and, from 
the other side, the locus of political power would respect 
property rights. 
But as far as democracy is concerned, Kriegel, evoking its 
classical origins in ancient city states and its links to 
slavery, writes that (3): "Democracy's ancient legacy 
weighed heavily on its modern ideal". She continues that 
the ancient democratic ideal was based upon the community 
and not upon the individual and that the ancients 
recognized in democracy the potential for tyranny and 
dictatorship. 
1. KRIEGEL 
2. 
3. 
The state and the Rule of Law, Ope cit. 
p. 92 
idem. p. 93 
idem. 
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Both liberalism and democracy have, in Kriegels's eyes, 
their own antinomies (1): 
"The best thing about it [democracy] was that all it 
needed was the people's direct exercise of power. The 
worst was that it showed no concern for individual 
rights. Liberalism overlooked the state, whereas 
democracy neglected the individual." 
Recognizing that the political philosophy of the 
Enlightenment focussed strongly upon the problem of 
reconciling the liberty of the individual with the rights 
of the community, Kriegel argues that a result was a 
neglect of the state per se (2). Much of her subsequent 
work concentrates upon this lacuna. 
1. KRIEGEL -- The state and the Rule of Law, op. cit. p. 
p. 94 
2. idem. 
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La politique de la raison 
"Existe-t-il un ordre du politique, une sphAre de 
la politique distincte de l'economie? L'Etat de 
droit a-t-il une valeur transcendante au simple 
fonctionnement d'un appareil de contrainte? Tous 
les Etats se valent-ils? Les droits de l'homme 
sont-ils la creation aleatoire d tune culture, 
celle de l'Occident, et peuvent-ils veritablement 
valoir au-dela des frontieres de la civilisation 
qui les a inventes?" (1) 
Kriegel concentrates a sUbstantial element of her 
considerable oeuvre on seeking answers to the fundamental 
political questions set out above. Specifically, in her 
La politique de la raison, published in 1994, she brings 
together the ideas developed in a number of articles and 
papers written and presented during the time she occupied 
the Chair of Moral and Political Philosophy at the 
University of Lyon-Ill (2). 
In Part I of this work, "La politique des philosophes", she 
asks whether Descartes had concepts of political philosophy 
and goes on to analyse Kant's idea of a universal republic, 
Fichte's thoughts on nationalism, Heidegger and "political 
theology" (3), and ends by asking whether or not there is 
such a thing as a universal political development (4). 
1. KRIEGEL, Blandine La politique de la raison, 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
Editions Payot, Paris, 1994, Introduction, 
p. ix 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 270 
pp. 60-71 
pp. 72-78 
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Kriegel affirms (1) that our contemporary epoch and 
moderni ty in general demonstrate the existence of the 
possibili ty of a universal political development, with both 
Marxism and liberalism being manifestations of such a 
development. She argues, however, that both are currently 
discredited (2). 
"D'abord l'Amancipation purement sociale par la 
collectivisation des moyens de production et la 
prAtendue abolition de la lutte des classes n'ont 
apportA ni la propspAritA, ni la dApArissement de 
l'Etat, ni la libertA et, dans les sociAtAs 
socialistes, les lendemains n'ont pas chantA. Par 
ailleurs, l'instauration du marchA n'a pas 
entralnA, ipso facto, l' Adif ication de la 
dAmocratie qu'elle Atait censAe impulser dans les 
pays en voie de dAveloppement". 
This recognition leads her to ask whether a universal 
political system is an unattainable ideal. Kriegel writes 
that she does not think so, evoking Kantian precepts in 
her response (3). 
In Part 11 of the work under reference, headed "Histoire 
politique et culturelle" (4), Kriegel examines past 
concepts of the relationship between law and" l' Etat", what 
she calls "L'historicisme juridique" (5). 
1. KRIEGEL La polique de la raison, Ope cit. p. 73 
2 • idem. 
3 • idem. p. 78 
4 . idem. pp. 79-188 
5. idem. p. 185 
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In a concluding chapter to this Part, entitled "Histoire 
et droit a la fin de l'Ancien Regime" (1), Kriegel makes 
the point that for many centuries recorded history and 
archives were the principal methods of unifying law before 
comprehensive codification began. She refers to a 
consequent "lien de l'histoire et du droit" (2), a linkage 
which forms a significant element in her scholarly work. 
In the final Part of La politique de la raison, entitled 
"Droit politique", Kriegel looks at the first drafts of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and considers concepts of 
the liberty of conscience before ending with a 
consideration of what she calls "la crise de la 
ci toyennete" (3), an evocation of the fact that many people 
in contemporary France feel themselves "exclus". 
Kriegel argues that the French "Declaration", following 
Rousseauean precepts, tended to favour citizenship at the 
expense of human rights (4): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
"La conception selon laquelle la ci toyennete 
repose sur les lumieres de l'entendement et de la 
raison, et plus encore sur un acte de volonte, 
est a mon sens responsable de la production du 
grand nombre des exclus de la citoyennete. Car 
elle a une grandeur, qui est d'avoir contribue au 
developpement de la civilite par l'instruction, 
mais elle a aussi une limite, qui est dieter a 
une partie de l'humanite -- les femmes, les 
pauvres -- leur participation a la citoyennete." 
KRIEGEL 
pp.171/188 
La poli tique de la 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
p.' 184 
pp. 229/260 
p. 259 
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raison, op. cit. 
La cite republicaine 
In her La cite republicaine (1) Kriegel considers three 
aspects of contemporary French republicanism: questions of 
morality and rights; questions of citizenship; and the 
relationship of the Republic with the collectivity of the 
people, that is, the nation. 
Concerning morality and rights, she argues that the 
intellectual construction of human rights in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries represented a 
crossroads between considerations of ethics and of rights. 
Kriegel recalls that Kant held that this implied a high 
degree of humanity; such a conjuncture could only be 
attained in a universal republic (2). 
Kriegel contends (3) that if there are rules of behaviour 
for groups (communal rights, the rights of the state, the 
rights of a people) and for individuals and humanity 
(ethics), it becomes important to ensure that both rights 
and ethics preserve their autonomy. Neither the total 
coating of rights in a cloak of ethics, which would have 
the effect of turning rights into a sort of civic religion, 
nor the total juridification of morality, which would rule 
out any place for human freedom, is acceptable. 
1. KRIEGEL, Blandine -- La cite republicaine, Galilee, 
Paris, 1998 
2. idem. p. 18 
3. idem. 
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Again, she continues, that which is true for the 
relationship between individuals and groups is no less true 
for the relationship between universal transcendent norms 
(ethics) and the development of positive rights. The 
ethical considerations which underpin both the human and 
individual dimensions are at one and the same time both 
universal and specific. Similarly, the law which is 
inscribed into the constitution of a polity can neither 
ignore liberty nor rule out a degree of constraint. 
Thus republican society is called upon to make a continuing 
reajustment of the interface between civil law and moral 
imperatives. Kriegel summarizes (1): 
"Les hommes ne vivent pas que de pain •.. lIs vivent 
aussi de droits (loi civile) et de devoirs (loi 
morale). C'est la formation d'une cite republicaine 
moderne Oll l'autorite s'exerce par la loi (Aristote), 
Oll lIon reconnait aux individus pourtant marques par 
la finitude un role fondateur dans l'avenement de la 
liberte qui rend tous les jours necessaires la 
rearticulation du droit et de l'Ethique." 
Against this background, Kriegel was interviewed by the 
editor of Le Monde, Jean-Marie Colombani, on 30 June 1994. 
She reproduces the interview (2) under the rubric 
"Republique et ethique de droit". 
She was asked: 
"La notion d' Etat de droit est 
l'ideologie dominante. N'est-ce 
franyaise une idee recente 
radicalement contra ire a toute 
traditions?" 
devenue aujourd'hui 
pas dans l' histoire 
et n' est-elle pas 
une partie de nos 
1. KRIEGEL -- La cite republicaine, Ope cit. p. 19 
2. idem. p. 49 et seq. 
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Her reply was categoric: "Clest tout a fait exact." She 
recalled that, during the 1970s, ideas of social autonomy 
dominated political thinking. Ideologies normally at 
loggerheads - Marxism, liberalism, "gauchisme" - could 
agree at that time that "l'Etat" was the common enemy and 
could join in brandishing the slogan: "La Societe contre 
l'Etat!". Nobody was bothered by the fact that states were 
different; everyone could agree with the idea that 
excessive state intervention was the universal malady. 
At this time in France, the teaching of history moved away 
from wars and politics and embraced economic and social 
considerations. It was thought possible to reduce politics 
to a mere branch of economics and immerse social history 
in general anthropology. No one thought of a history of 
states per se; there was only a history of societies. 
NOw, twenty years on, Kriegel continued, in a spectacular 
somersault, intellectual opinion is at one on the need to 
invoke the rule of law. She reminded Colombani that she had 
introduced this concept with her L'Etat et 1es esc1aves, 
published in 1979. She contended that the new ideas being 
currently debated amounted to a renaissance of political 
philosophy and the end of the social paradigm, of a 
recognition that the social question is not everything and 
the entering on scene at the end of the twentieth century 
of what she insists is the fundamental question of 
political development. 
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Kriegel summarized this fundamental question (1): 
"[ ... ] l'Etat de droit, cette forme d'organisation qui 
arbitre le lien civil par la loi, garantit les droits 
individuels et soumet le pouvoir aux lois [ ... ]." 
She expressed concern that the French "Etat" is largely 
administrati ve, a state in which there is no genuine 
separation of powers and no independence of the judiciary 
at a time when the demand for justice is growing. 
Kriegel was asked subsequently in the interview (2): 
"Republique et democratie, certains les opposent. 
Peut-on les mettre sur le m!me plan?" 
She had no doubt that two two ideas were complimentary, 
noting the general popularity of the concept of the 
Republic in France, where it is identified with equality, 
with a political centralisation which has established 
national unity and defended the national integrity, with 
the separation of Church and State which has ensured 
laicity, and finally, with the welfare state. She cites 
Aristotle and summarizes (3): 
"Si seul le gouvernement du grand nombre peut vrairnent 
defendre l'inter!t general, cela signifie que seule la 
democratie peut veritablement instituer la 
Republique." 
1. KRIEGEL La cite republicaine, Ope cit. p. 50 
2. idem. pp. 55-56; see also p.43 supra 
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Considerations of democracy and republic lead Kriegel to 
consider parity and the principle of equality (1) and, 
specifically, the question of citizenship (2). She points 
out that citizenship per se is not defined in the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic but may be considered 
under three separate heads: political, civil and national. 
Definitions of citizenship appear in constitutional law, 
in the civil Code and in the Code of Nationality. On a 
philosophical plane, citizenship may be thought of under 
the rights of "L'Etat", of civil rights and of the rights 
of the people. 
The separation of the modern state from civil society has 
had the effect of creating two discrete aspects of 
citizenship, civil and political. Under the first is found 
the right of residence, the obligation to pay taxes, 
obligatory national service and the right to seek redress 
in the courts. Political rights include the right to vote 
and the right to stand for election to national, regional 
and communal assemblies. 
1. KRIEGEL -- La cite republicaine, op. cit. pp. 162-173 
2. -- idem. pp. 67-90 
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Kriegel believes that the question of citizenship presents 
a problem which goes to the heart of the concept of the 
rule of law (1). Given that the fact of representation is 
a part of modern democratic practice, she is concerned 
that: 
This 
"[ •.. ] le probleme pose a la ci toyennete est donc 
celui de la representation et du fondement, c'est-a-
dire de la capacite, de la qualification de la 
ci toyennete qui n' a pas encore trouve de solution 
veritablement democratique". 
problem, she continues, revolves around the 
possibility (or impossibility, she stresses) of reconciling 
considerations of solidarity with those of equality. In her 
words: 
"11 s'agit, on le voit, de la qualification 
(fondement), de l'inscription et de la limitation de 
la citoyennete. Celles-ci restent indeterminees et 
floues". (Emphases in original. JT). 
The final section of this work contains disparate essays 
written or copies of papers presented around the broad 
theme of "La Republique, les droits du peuple et les droits 
de la femme". Some of the main themes are developed in her 
Philosophie de la Republique, discussed below (pp. 201-
213) . 
1. KRIEGEL -- La cite republicaine, Ope cit. p. 83 
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Cours de Philosophie Politique 
Kriegel's Cours de Philosophie Politique (1) is the text 
accompanying a course she presented to the French 
University College in Moscow in 1991. Naturally, this work 
draws on her previously published work. She focuses upon 
her major theme ("l'Etat de droit") as well as upon human 
rights and political liberty and upon concepts of republic 
and democracy. 
She seeks also to relate her thinking to the wider concepts 
inherent in the European Union, especially on nations and 
nationalism and asks whether it is possible to reconcile 
the rights of states with human rights and with the rights 
of peoples. 
She concludes with an idea of modern liberty (2): 
"La liberte moderne est donc a la fois la liberation -
1 1 emancipation et non seulement la liberte prive - et 
11 acces libre de 11 homme a son loi de nature. La 
liberte moderne est le moyen de deployer, avec les 
droits de l'homme, l'humanite en l'homme." 
1. KRIEGEL, Blandine Cours de Philosophie Politique, 
2. 
Le Livre de Poche (Librarie Generale 
Franyaise), Paris, 1996 
idem. -- p. 140 
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Phi1osophie de la Repub1ique 
In the introduction to her most recent and, arguably, most 
significant work, Phi1osophie de la Repub1ique (1), Kriegel 
asks: "Qu'est-ce ce que la republique?" 
The systems of thought of recent generations in France, 
Kriegel writes (2) , can be given a threefold 
classification: the social revolution, liberalism and the 
conservative revolution. The first began with the 
Revolution and blossomed into socialism and then communism. 
The liberal idea, inspired by Montesquieu and the 
physiocrates, took on, in continental Europe, the cloak of 
restricted suffrage and a concern with property, both 
hostile to democracy, a fact which distinguished French 
liberalism from the British model. The conservative 
revolution began with political romanticism in France and 
in Germany and finished everywhere with fascism. 
Philosophically, she continues (3), it is necessary to ask 
where does the social revolution end and where does the 
republic begin? She answers her own question: "Ce sont 
[avec] les droits de l'homme et les libertes 
individuelles". 
1. KRIEGEL, Blandine -- Phi1osophie de la Repub1ique, 
Pion, Paris, 1998 
2. idem. p. 15 
3 • idem. p. 17 
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Obsessed with the exclusive idea of a social emancipation 
which would solve all known problems, thinkers in the past 
forgot that there is more to life than social 
considerations, Kriegel continues. If there is no rule of 
law, the alternative is a despotic state; if there is no 
recognition of human rights, then individuals have no 
autonomy. The point of rupture between conservative 
liberalism and the republic is the sovereignty of the state 
and the rule of law. 
However, she continues, even if Marxism and liberalism are 
not at one with the concept of republican political rights, 
they are not diametrically opposed to the republican idea. 
"Lib~raux et marxistes ne sont nullement des adversaires 
par principe de la r6publique". (1) 
Kriegel contends (2) that the domination of public opinion 
in France in recent years by socialism and liberalism has 
tended to make people overlook the fundamental 
institutional achievements of the Republic, specifically 
in education and in justice. 
1. KRIEGEL 
2. 
Philosophie de la Republique, Ope cit. p. 
18 
idem. 
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She continues that there is no point in looking for the 
fact of the return of the republican concept of the rule 
of law in either contemporary Marxist or neo-liberal 
thought (1): 
"On ne la trouvera ni chez Al thusser ni chez un 
penseur liberal comme Franc;ois Furet. Le retour a 
I' Etat de droit, qui est la forme moderne de la 
republique, implique en effet que soit recuse le 
paradigme commun au marxisme et au liberalisme qui est 
celui du primat de la societe et de l'economie". 
"What, then, is a republican state?" Kriegel asks again. 
"[ ... ] un Etat qui n' est ni totali taire ni despotique," she 
answers (2). 
We can no more accept that "l'Etat" should be all-powerful 
than we can accept that individuals should have 
untrammelled rights, she continues. Nor can we accept 
either the total annihilation or the total exaltation of 
the state, following Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. "Nous avons 
cesse d'adherer aces outrances et nous ne revendiquerons 
ni cet eloge ni cette indignite. Nous avons choisi une voie 
moyenne". ( 3 ) 
This consideration leads Kriegel to consider both the 
history and the philosophy of the rule of law. 
1- KRIEGEL -- Philosophie de la Republique, Ope cit. 
p. 18 
2. idem. p. 61 
3. idem. 
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As far as the history of the rule of law is concerned, she 
recalls that in ancient Rome, citizens and the state were 
equivalent: "Senatus populusgue romanus - SPQR." In the 
absence of a state, citizens could participate directly in 
government. Civil society in an ancient republic was one 
and the same thing as political society. (3) 
As far as the French Republic is concerned, its temporary 
apogee occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. It 
was gradually subsumed by the social revolution and, for 
a time, by the conservative revolution (2). 
Turning to the philosophy of the rule of law, Kriegel 
points out that the concept of the republican rule of law 
has become exceedingly complex; it includes not only 
constitutional and administrative law but also 
international public law. The modern state is at one and 
the same time a focal point for justice, for finance, for 
police and for welfare (3). 
She is concerned that, at the present time, insufficient 
thought is being given to the possible impact on the 
pristine idea of the rule of law emanating from a whole 
raft of national and European Union projects (4). 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
KRIEGEL Philosophie de la Republique, op. cit. 
p.63 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 74 
p. 75 
pp. 75-76 
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The only way to address this potential problem is through 
a reconsideration of the concept of sovereignty (1). 
"La pierre d'angle du droit de l'Etat est, aujourd'hui 
comme hier, la souverainete. Meme si le souverain, 
hier, c'etait le monarque, et qu'aujourd'hui c'est le 
peuple. Nous devons donc fa ire nos comptes avec la 
souverainete." 
What, then, is sovereignty, she asks? (2) 
She recalls that the emergence of the concept of 
sovereignty in France may be traced back to Bodin and to 
the first lines of his best-known work, Les six Livres de 
la Republique, "Republique est un droit gouvernement 
de plusieurs mesnages et de ce qui leur est commun avec 
puissance souveraine." (3) Further, sovereignty is "la fin 
principale de la Republique bien ordonnee". (4) 
Ultimately, the question becomes one of the use of, and 
control of the use of, political power. This power, as 
Kriegel emphasizes (5), is "[le] pouvoir absolu centralise, 
[le] pouvoir par excellence, [la] puissance telle qu'elle 
s'accomplit dans l'Etat, c'est l'enonce de la puissance de 
lEtat republicaine moderne [ ... ]". 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
KRIEGEL La Philosophie de la Republique, OPe cit. 
p. 76 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 77 
comes from 
Republique, 
idem. 
; the citation from Bodin 
Les six Livres de la 
L. 1, Ch • 1, P • 2 7 
idem. p. 77 
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Kriegel contends (1) that the foundation of sovereignty 
consists of two complementary elements: a norm (that is, 
that the principal attribute of sovereignty is the law) and 
a power of decision (that is, that the law is established 
by a decision of the sovereign). That is to say that there 
is an ambivalence in the concept of sovereignty, which 
remains a subject for debate; the law is a product of the 
will of the sovereign. 
She enunciates the essential problem and suggests that the 
solution is well known (2): 
"On sera d'accord pour garder l'indApendance et 
l'unitA politique, (principe d'autonomie), on ne 
mettra pas en cause l'attribution de la souveraintA au 
peuple (principe dAmocratique), et on ne discutera pas 
plus l'exercise du pouvoir par la norme (principe de 
juridification). L'obstacle n'est ni dans la puissance 
(1' Etat doi t etre fort), ni dans la ti tularisation 
dAmocratique (le peuple doit etre souverain)i non, il 
rAside dans la dAmiurgie. 11 faut dAployer le 
souverain non dans un seul sujet mais dans une 
plurali tA des suj ets. Or la solution a AtA trouvA 
depuis longtemps. Le vrai secret de la rApublique, dit 
Kant, est la sAparation des pouvoirs [ ... ]." 
From the moment of recognition that, in a democracy, only 
the people have the ultimate right of political power, it 
becomes essential to move on from the question of the 
legitimacy of this power to the problem of its legitimate 
use (1). 
KR1EGEL 
2. 
3. 
Philosophie de la Republique, Ope cit. 
p. 86. 
idem. p. 106 
idem. p. 112 
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Thus it becomes, Kriegel argues (1), a matter of re-
thinking the question of the rule of law and re-organizing 
the functions of "l'Etat". It is not merely a question of 
a sociological distribution of power among different groups 
- public services, associations of citizens, the middle 
classes, the trades unions, popular charities ("les soupes 
populaires") - ensuring that each has its little bit of 
power. No, she continues (2): 
"[ ••. ], il s'agit que plusieurs syst~mes de l~gitimit~ 
d~mocratique s' affrontent et se concilient en meme 
temps a l'int~rieur d'un Etat pluriel. Ce n'est pas un 
seul pouvoir qu'il faut ~riger sous l'autorit~ de la 
d~mocratie, c'est la d~mocratie qui doit humblement 
cheminer sous les pouvoirs". 
contemporary France has inherited a sovereign power which 
is firmly executive and legislative and which has almost 
succeeded in emasculating the judiciary. The result is that 
the executive, following the precepts established by the 
constitution of the Fifth Republic, has, in alliance with 
the administrative bureaucracy, often succeeded in leaving 
the legislature fallow (3). 
Kriegel argues with passion (4) that the evident need to 
reconstruct popular sovereignty in France does not mean 
surrendering independence or giving up political power, or 
simply scrapping national unity; it means simply 
democratising the republican "Etat". 
1. KRIEGEL Philosophie de la Republique, Ope cit. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
p. 116 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. pp. 119-120 
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The topical issue can be summed up in two words: 
sovereignty and democracy (1). If government means choice, 
then democratic government implies the involvement of an 
ever-increasing number of citizens in the political 
decision-making process, in defending minority rights, in 
keeping an eye on the practice of government, in ensuring 
an equitable distribution of power. This means sUbjecting 
political power to basic laws ("droit") and recognizing 
that sovereignty must be reconciled with the rights of 
individuals, human rights and the rights of citizens. 
Kriegel examines these rights, starting with human rights 
(2). She points out that, from the point of view of 
philosophy, the dominant doctrinal streams of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were in general hostile 
or at least indifferent to the question of human rights. 
From an ideological point of view, neither the conservative 
nor the social revolution, nor even continental liberalism, 
ever gave a genuine priority to human rights. Philosophers 
tabled many objections detrimental to the construction of 
a solid theoretical base. The first of these was a 
reluctance to accept a justification for human actions 
arising from human nature. The second had an 
anthropological bias: multi-cultural theories saw in the 
doctrine of human rights hegemonic occidental motivation. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
KRIEGEL Philosophie de la Republique, Ope cit. 
p. 120 
idem. pp .. 123-182 
idem. pp. 123-124 
211 
A third objection (1) was more circumstantial: there were 
so many claims to "rights" that the concept became blunted. 
Claimed rights included the rights of citizens, social 
rights and environmental rights, to cite only three. The 
result is well-known, Kriegel continues (2). Some two 
decades ago no discussion, no debate, no university course 
even, would consider directly the question of human rights, 
which had ceased to be of philosophical interest. Thus it 
became a question of defining the singularity of human 
rights in relationship to other individual rights. 
One attempt at defining this singularity resulted in what 
Kriegel calls a "vulgate" (3). According to this version, 
she wr i tes , the phi losophy of human rights rested upon 
three axioms: first, human rights were born in the 
revolution of 1789; second, these rights cannot be 
separated from the rights of citizens; and third, their 
conceptual base is derived from a philosophy of the 
subject. Thus, in the political order, according to this 
rationalization, the statement of human rights represented 
an expression of the recognition of the emergence of the 
individual, breaking from the theological age. 
1. KRIEGEL -- Philosophie de la Republique, Ope cit. 
p. 124 
2. idem. 
3. idem. p. 125. Kriegel comments: "De 
cette vulgate il existe, comme 
toujours, une version pour les simples 
et une version pour les doctes. A 
l'usage des uns, Marcel Gauchet s'est 
charge d'exposer les deux premiers 
principes a l' intention des seconds, 
Alain Renaut a developpe le troisieme." 
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Kriegel takes firm issue with this position (1): 
"Nous nous proposons de la dAranger dans sa double 
conviction chronologique et philosophique et de 
montrer que les droits de l'homme ne datent pas plus 
des rAvolutions du XVIIIe siecle qu'ils ne procedent 
de la philosophie de la libertA et de la volontA du 
sujet." 
She argues (2) that human rights per se comprise a number 
of elements - equality, security, liberty, the right to 
property - and that philosophical consideration of at least 
the first of these elements can be traced back to the neo-
thomist School of Salamanca. The philosophy of the Moderns 
concerned itself with, inter alia, questions of humanity 
and humanism, nature and the nature of man and law. Hobbes, 
Locke and Montesquieu, among others, made a contribution. 
The American Declaration of Independence pre-dated the 
French "Declaration des droits de I 'homme" by some 15 
years. 
As far as the rights of the citizen are concerned, Kriegel 
argues (3) that the separation of civil society from the 
state which marks the modern era has resulted in 
citizenship taking on two discrete aspects: the first 
comprises civil rights (residence, legal status, the right 
to seek redress in the courts) and the second political 
rights (the right to elect representatives to the 
legislature and to be a candidate oneself). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
KRIEGEL de la Republique, op. cit. 
p. 133 et seg. 
Philosophie 
p. 127 
idem. 
idem. 
this 
p. 190; see also p. 201 of 
thesis supra 
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Kriegel worries (1) about the political rights of citizens 
in contemporary France and, specifically, the question of 
representation and a nation with an historically powerful 
administration made up, very often, of an elite. She 
expresses her concern about (2): 
"[ ... ] le probleme de la legitimite des elites dans 
une democratie, eu egard au principe d'egalite [ ... ]. 
Dans une democratie, les elites sont-elles legitimes? 
On sait qu'il existe une tentation que nous appelons 
populiste et que les Grecs appelaient demagogique pour 
les refuser." 
What is the common root of populism and demagogy (3), she 
asks? She warns against confusing facts with values and 
recalls that egalitarianism never has time for heros any 
more than it has for an artist or a champion. This can have 
pernicious effects and can lead to: 
"[l]a negation de la performance, l'annihilation de la 
comprehension de la force particuliere des individus 
conduisent au developpement de la morale du 
ressentiment qui veut abolir toutes les merites, qui 
se refuse a toute admiration et donc a toute 
elevation". 
In summary, Kriegel argues (4) that the contemporary 
concept of citizenship has a number of different roots: the 
ancient Greek experience, the doctrine of human rights 
linked to the development of modern political thinking; the 
theory of representation associated with the division of 
the society and the state and concepts of nationhood. 
L 
2. 
3. 
4. 
KRIEGEL -- Philosophie 
p. 194 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
de la Republique, op. cit. 
p. 198 
p. 199 
p. 232 
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Kriegel summarizes her final "droit", that is, "le droit 
du peuple' (1): 
"si le developpement du principe des nationalit~s 
n' est pas distinct de I' irruption democratique des 
peuples, le droit des peuples est incontestablement le 
dernier volet du droit politique moderne". 
Further, she continues (2): 
"Dans son affirmation constitutionnelle mettant entre 
parantheses sa prehistoire, le droit des peuples se 
presente donc comme une reaction et comme une 
correction aux formulations classiques de la doctrine 
de l'Etat et de la citoyennete; une reaction 
democratique au droit de l'Etat [ ... ]". 
Kriegel summarizes and encapsulates her thinking in a 
lengthy Conclusion (3): 
"Apres la definition aristotelicienne, le droit 
politique republicain moderne, nous l'avons vu, a 
developpe quatre nouveaux chapi tres: les droi ts de 
l'Etat, les droits de l'homme, les droits du citoyen 
et les droits du peuple. Quatre volets differents dont 
il est impossible de construire l'ajustement et 
d'instaurer la coherence si I' on ne reconnait, au 
prealable, qu'ils sont heterogenes et irreductibles". 
These four "rights" are often incommensurable, as Kriegel 
reminds her readers (4). Some people argue that the State 
should be pre-eminent, others the primacy of the citizen, 
a third group affirms the importance of human rights above 
all else, a fourth that the nation must come first. 
1. KRIEGEL Philosophie de la Republique, op. cit. 
p. 238 
idem. p. 246 
3. idem. p. 311 
4. idem. p. 314 
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These differences are real and a first step in overcoming 
them is for each "right" to be evaluated dispassionately, 
recognizing that each one of the four does exist and that 
it has its own innate strength. 
Beyond this, Kriegel argues (1), what matters is a 
recognition that the law can never be infallible, that it 
is not sent from a divinity, nor yet enshrined in some holy 
set of stones, but that its creation is, and has been 
throughout history, a continuous human activity. 
From this position Kriegel asks (2): "Pourquoi la 
r~publique?" If man's end is not a tomb but a cradle, and 
if political power be anonymous and impersonal, then the 
general interest is embodied in the res publica, the 
"public entity". This has to be something which does not 
belong to an individual, but to the collectivity and which 
is a continuing process of creation by and for individual 
citizens. 
Kriegel would seem to be seeking to give the ideal of the 
Republic a transcendent value. 
KRIEGEL 
2. 
Phi1osophie de la Repub1ique, op. cit. 
p. 328 
idem. p. 334 
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summary 
It is perhaps inevitable that there should be a degree of 
repetition in the work of a scholar as prolific as Blandine 
Kriegel. However, a distinctive thrust may be perceived 
in the totality of her work. In a few words, she affirms 
the primacy of law over all other considerations in a 
modern, democratic republican state, and her starting point 
is a history of this state ("L'Etat") seen from the point 
of view of the evolution of concepts of rights and of law. 
For Kriegel, political theory has three key elements: a 
doctrine of power, a doctrine of individual rights and a 
political morality of law. 
She argues that concepts of political power can be 
encapsulated in one word: sovereignty. The idea of 
sovereignty embodies a threefold conception of the state: 
external independence, internal coherence and the supremacy 
of the law; sovereignty is limited by law and this 
limitation begins with a recognition that individuals in 
a given state have their own rights. These rights are 
twofold: human and civil. The use of force and the exercise 
of power must both be subject to the law. 
Equally, 
argues, 
there are dual concepts of morality, Kriegel 
a morality of faith and a morality of law. The 
latter is a major element in national identity. 
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Since the late eighteenth century, the essential idea of 
the state under the rule of law has become eroded, Kriegel 
maintains, by new concepts of democacy and political and 
economic liberalism. This presents a paradox: liberalism, 
described as a tacit alliance between the exercise of 
political power and the ownership of property, has powerful 
anti-statist elements. As for democracy, the concept has 
tended to suffer in the modern European era because of its 
legacy of an affirmation of the primacy of the community 
over the individual. 
This reality may also be expressed as a conflict between 
the two concepts. Political liberalism tends to ignore the 
state whereas democracy tends to ignore the individual. 
Kriegel devotes a considerable proportion of her writing 
to the concept of rights. She defines four discrete 
variations on the theme of rights: the rights of the State 
(always "1'Etat"), human rights (files droits de l'homme"), 
the rights of citizens and the rights of peoples. These 
rights can overlap and come into conflict, with one 
another. That there should be this conflict is an essential 
part of the contemporary democratic republican process, as 
is the conflict between the extremes of the essential rules 
of national and communal behaviour codified, often 
imperfectly, as "rights" and those relating to individuals 
and to humanity generally, contained in the concept of 
ethics. 
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A total codification of ethics into legal obligations would 
eliminate all human freedom and, equally, giving rights an 
inelastic ethical coating would be tantamount to creating 
a civil religion. 
These considerations underline the importance of 
representation in contemporary occidental democratic and 
republican societies. Naturally, Kriegel is concerned about 
France where she feels that, first, the de facto alliance 
between the higher levels of the bureaucracy and the 
political executive risk being at the expense of the rule 
of law. Second, given the increasingly heterogeneous nature 
of contemporary French society and the number of people who 
consider themselves tIles exclus", the system of 
representation cannot be considered to be perfect. 
This takes her back to considerations of the historical 
evolution of political thought in France. She argues that 
there have been three streams: the social revolution, the 
liberal idea, and the conservative revolution. Each came 
into conflict, in one way or another, with the essentials 
of sovereignty and the exercise of political power. 
The optimum solution, Kriegel implies, may be epitomised 
in the sovereignty implicit in the ethical idea of the 
Republic. This idea is that republican sovereignty consists 
of two complementary elements: a norm (the law) and a power 
of decision (the law is established by the sovereign, that 
is, the people). 
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Thus the law becomes a product of the will of the sovereign 
people. But this sovereignty can only be just if it 
incorporates an unambiguous separation of powers. 
Kriegel emphasizes that these concepts have to be dynamic. 
Law makers are human, and hence fallible. Laws do not come 
from a Divinity, nor can they be uncompromisingly and 
eternally codified in stone or in holy scrolls. The making, 
and re-making, of law is, and has been throughout history, 
a never-ending human activity, reflecting advances in 
knowledge and awareness as well as often rapidly changing 
conditions. 
-------000-------
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Chapter 6 
PIERRE ROSANVALLON 
Introduction 
"La formation des partis modernes, d~finis comme 
des organisations permanentes d'encadrement de la 
vie pOlitique et parlementaire, a en effet 
traduit une modification tres profonde des termes 
dans lesquels se formulait la question de la 
repr~sentation. Deux facteurs se sont mel~s dans 
cette histoire. Le premier est d'ordre presque 
technique: les partis ont correspondu a une 
n~cessite d'encadrement et d'organisation de 
l'activite electorale a l'age d'une d~mocratie de 
masse. Le second est de nature plus sociologique: 
le d~veloppement des partis a ~t~ indissociable 
de l'~mergence d'un nouveau rapport social au 
pluralisme. Dans les deux cas, c'est le monisme 
h~rit~ de la R~volution franyaise qui s'est 
trouv~ ~branli." (1) 
Pierre Rosanvallon, an historian, economist and journalist 
is currently (2000) a Director of Studies at the EHESS, 
having joined the School in 1978. Politically, he became 
close to Michel Rocard in the early 1970s, when he was 
acti ve in the trades union movement and editor of his 
union's journal CFDT aujourd'hui. He was an associate of 
Franyois Furet and collaborated with Furet and Jacques 
Julliard on the work published in 1988, La Republique du 
centre (2) (published under the banner of the Fondation 
saint-Simon) . 
1. ROSANVALLON, Pierre Le peuple introuvable: 
Histoire de la representation democratique 
en France, Gallimard, Paris, 1998, p. 173 
2. FURET, Franyois, JULLIARD, Jacques, et ROSANVALLON, 
Pierre La Republique du centre: La fin 
de l'exception franyaise, Calmann-Levy, 
Paris, 1988 
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Rosanvallon has concentrated on the history of the attitude 
to thinking about political liberalism in early nineteenth 
century France as epitomised by the career of Franc;:ois 
Guizot (1), as well as on the evolution and structure of 
the French state ("l'Etat) (2) and histories of suffrage 
(3) and political representation (4) in republican France. 
1. ROSANVALLON, Pierre -- Le Moment Guizot, Gallimard, 
Paris, 1985 
2. ROSANVALLON, Pierre L'Etat en France de 1789 i nos 
jours, Le Seuil, Paris, 1990 
3. ROSANVALLON, Pierre Le Sacre du citoyen, 
Gallimard, Paris 1992 
4. ROSANVALLON Le peup1e introuvable, op. cit. 
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Le moment Guizot 
In a general statement of his objective with Le moment 
Guizot and of his focus on developments in the practice of 
politics in the first half of the nineteenth century in 
France, Rosanvallon affirms that (1) these developments 
were the result of "une experience majeure: celle de 
l'histoire de France de 1789 A 1814" (emphasis in original. 
JT) • 
These developments make no sense, he continues, if the 
specific nature of this political and intellectual context 
is ignored and only the intrinsic movement of ideas from 
Rousseau to the theoreticians of the Republic or of 
socialism is considered. The Revolution was not only the 
first stage in a promise for the future; it represented 
also a rupture in the way in which both history and 
politics was considered. 
As a result, Rosanvallon contends (2): "[ ... ] la question 
cruciale que cherchent a resoudre toute une partie des 
auteurs 'liberaux' est celle des rapports entre le 
liberalisme et la democratie" (all emphasized in original. 
JT) • 
1. ROSANVALLON 
2. 
Le moment Guizot, op. cit. p. 13 
idem. 
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These authors set out to understand the conditions under 
which the democratic ideal of public participation in the 
affairs of the republic has turned so ferociously against 
liberty. In other words, they wanted to ensure that the 
citizen would not disassociate himself from the individual 
up to the point of causing the latter to disappear. 
Eighteenth-century philosophers, neither Montesquieu nor 
Rousseau for example, had ever really thought in these 
terms, nor were they ever confronted practically with the 
radical nature of this question to such an extent as to 
put it at the heart of their work. Rosanvallon argues that 
the introduction of universal suffrage in 1848 put a cloak 
of banality over the essential problem, thus creating the 
illusion that it had been resolved (1). 
The history of French liberalism cannot be followed unless 
this fact be recognized, Rosanvallon continues. This 
history differs from the history of English liberalism, 
which tends to be relatively unified and coherent, in spite 
of the differences found in the thinking of Locke, Hume, 
Smith and John Stuart Mill. The fact is that the gains of 
1688 provided a common base for their thinking. The problem 
of the linkage between democracy and liberalism was never 
posed in England, a country in which various successive 
political reforms were approved by parliament in 1832, in 
1867 and in 1884-85. The problem of the relationship of the 
individual to the citizen simply did not arise. 
1. ROSANVALLON Le moment Guizot, Ope cit. p. 14 
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This political "equilibrium", Rosanvallon argues (1), was 
a unique characteristic of the English experience which had 
no parallel in the wider European contect. Thus it is not 
possible to generalize about modern liberal thought during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the French example 
being particularly striking. A first reason for this is 
that, in France, the Revolution created a gulf, unknown 
in England, between the philosophers of the eighteenth 
century and the political thinkers of the nineteenth 
century; Rosanvallon cites Constant, Say, Guizot, 
Tocqueville, Bastiat and Prevost-Paradol as representing 
examples of the latter. 
The theoreticians of economic liberalism certainly followed 
the English example, but the distinction between economic 
and political liberalism, a distinction which made no sense 
in England, was fundamental in France. Montesquieu on one 
side of the divide and Guizot and Prevost-Paradol on the 
other were not seeking to reply to the same question. The 
historical context of their thought imposed a specific 
problem on each one of them. Against this background, 
Rosanvallon writes that his objective with Le moment Guizot 
is to (2): 
1. 
2. 
"constituer en objet specifique la philosophie 
politique fran9aise des annees 1814-1848 pour proposer 
une nouvelle lecture de l'histoire des idees liberales 
et democratiques au XIXe siecle". 
ROSANVALLON Le moment Guizot, op. cit. p. 14 
idem. p. 15 
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The fundamental task of French governments during the 
period 1814-1848, a task never achieved, was to have done 
with the spirit of revolution. But, Rosanvallon writes (1): 
"Pour clore, enfin, la R~volution, il faut redonner de 
l'intelligibilit~ a l'histoire, comprendre 1789 comme 
1793, d~couvrir pourquoi la France a ~t~ ballott~e 
entre autant d' abimes et de d~ceptions alors meme 
qu'elle pensait chaque fois etre arriv~e a bon port." 
For the politicians, both "ultras" and liberals, of the 
Restoration, stability mattered. All could agree that the 
immediate task was to build a new France, given that the 
old France had been destroyed in 1789, and with it, faith 
in the philosophers of the eighteenth century. Guizot 
summed up the opinion of his peers (2): "Le XVllle nous a 
beaucoup d~sappris." The preoccupation of all was to rid 
politics of passion. 
There were, Rosanvallon writes (3) three broad approaches 
to finding a rational and "scientific" basis for the 
desired new political stability. First, there was the idea 
of "social mathematics", the child of Condorcet, with 
contrib~tions from the scientists Lagrange, Lavoisier and 
Laplace; second, Cabanis had proposed "social physiology", 
an idea built around the concept that moral man could not 
be disassociated from physical man; finally, following the 
work of Jean-Baptiste Say, the link of politics with 
economics was argued. 
L ROSANVALLON Le moment Guizot, op. cit. p. 17 
2. idem. p. 18 
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In each case, the thinking was that a way could be found 
through "science" to guarantee liberty without destroying 
the social order. The objectives of government, and hence 
of those, like Guizot, involved in government were simply 
summarized (1): "Terminer la Revolution, construire un 
gouvernement representatif stable, etablir un regime garant 
des libertes fonde sur la Raison." 
Rosanvallon argues (2) that a study of the career and 
achievements of Guizot is obligatory for ensuring an 
understanding of the spirit of political liberalism which 
appeared in France with the Restoration. Guizot can be 
thought of at one and the same time as being representative 
of the period, both as an individual and as a member of a 
generation facing up to a sUbstantial problem. 
As interesting as Rosanvallon's account of Guizot's 
political life is, a detailed summary would distort my 
thesis substantially. In his final chapter, "Le pr oche et 
le lointain" (3), Rosanvallon argues for the relevance of 
an understanding of Guizot's career, both as a politician 
and as an historian, to contemporary France. 
ROSANVALLON 
2. 
3. 
Le moment Guizot, Ope cit. p. 26 
idem. 
idem. 
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We cannot accept today Guizot's concept, one shared by the 
founding fathers of the Third Republic, of a classless 
society progressing towards the ultimate disappearence of 
all fundamental antagonisms and concerned only with the 
functioning of social relationships. On the contrary, we 
have learned, Rosanvallon continues, sometimes at 
considerable expense, that the democratic idea cannot be 
disassociated from the reality of social divisions. Further 
( 1) : 
"[ ... ] nous ne pouvons [ ... ] concevoir [l'id6e 
democratique] que comme un travail permanent de la 
societe sur elle-meme, tache toujours a reprendre 
d'elucidation de ce qui constitue le lien social et 
l'institue en sa radicale fragilite, dans 
l'acceptation de son impossible mattrise du point de 
vue d' un savoir ou d' un pouvoir qui disposeraient 
souverainement de son essence." 
In conclusion, Rosanvallon argues that, as far as political 
philosophy is concerned, the period of the Restoration 
clearly represents a significant stage in the history of 
political ideas in France. In addition, its relevance to 
the present day is that the limits of the democratic model 
are currently being observed in contemporary France. 
1. ROSANVALLON Le moment Guizot, Ope cit. p. 373 
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The formulae of economic democracy and collective 
bargaining, instituted to strengthen universal suffrage, 
are proving themselves inadequate to meet the challenge of 
the social oligopoly of the present, nor is it proving 
adequate to face up to the facts of the crisis in the 
welfare state, the smothering of the social democratic 
model, the revealed inefficacy of Keynesian economics, the 
whole raft of conflicting new values. "Dans ces 
conditions", Rosanvallon writes, "nous sommes aujourd'hui 
obliges de reapprofondir les notions de democratie et de 
citoyennete." (1) 
He believes that much can be learned which is relevant to 
contemporary political problems from a study of the debates 
and considerations of the Restoration period and that of 
the July monarchy. It is not a question of re-reading 
Guizot in the hope of finding an answer to today's problems 
but a recognition that these problems require new thinking 
and a fundamental reappraisal, just as new thinkig and a 
reappraisal of basic issues was required by Guizot's 
generation. 
1. ROSANVALLON Le moment Guizot, op. cit. p. 375 
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L'Etat en France de 1789 a nos jours 
"[ ... ] l'Etat comme probleme politique, ou comme 
phenomene bureaucratique, est au coeur des 
passions partisanes et des debats philosophiques 
tout en restant une sorte de non-objet 
historique." (1) 
Rosanvallon begins his history of the French state by 
stressing the need for a clear definition of exactly what 
is meant by the word "state". He lists four imperatives 
(2): "deglobalisation", "hierarchisation", "articulation", 
and "totalisation" which, he contends, need to be 
considered in the evolution of an acceptable definition of 
(3) " 1 ' Eta t" . 
Of the first imperative, "deglobalisation", he argues that 
"L' Etat" is too often perceived as a block which is 
referred to only in the singular, as though it were a 
unified structure, a coherent "thing". Using the relatively 
easy statistical approach, measuring the entity which is 
the state by public expenditure for example, is conducive 
to an understanding in these terms. 
1. ROSANVALLON, Pierre L'Etat en France de 1789 a 
2. 
nos jours, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 
1990, p. 9 
idem. 
11-14 
L'Etat en France, Ope cit. pp. 
3. Following the usage so far in this thesis, "L"Etat" 
will be used when the reference is specifically to 
France, and "the state" when the argument is general. 
Inevitably, there are some borderline cases. 
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Such an approach may seem reasonably neutral, but amounts 
to in fact a gross over-simplification: the question of 
definition becomes only one of weight (emphasis in 
original. JT); it can be argued that, over a period of 
time, the institution has increased its size by this or 
that amount and its history thus becomes a statistical 
curve. 
Rosanvallon considers that such a definition has two major 
drawbacks. First, the weight of the state becomes confused 
with the degree of and the form of its fiscal intervention 
in society. On this basis there is no way to distinguish 
between a democratic state and a totalitarian state, given 
that all the characteristics of the institution are summed 
up in one discrete set of statistics; in essence, the cause 
has become lost in the effect. Economic growth tables 
become a measure of the effectiveness of the state. 
Such an approach leaves little room for history per se, 
Rosanvallon continues; rather, it reduces the focus to 
becoming one either of economics and the sociology of 
bureaucratic organisations or of philosophies of history 
linked, for example, to the Wagnerian concept of the 
"irresistible movement of civilisation" or to the Marxist 
theory of social change. Seeking clarification through such 
an approach leads rather to a certain degree of 
complication. 
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The pre-supposition of a simple history (emphasis in 
original. JT) tends to govern our approach to the 
phenomenon of the state. The modern state, Rosanvallon 
argues, is not a problem to be understood but only a 
heritage to be managed, a reality to be moulded or an issue 
to be fought over; the manner of this approach matters 
little. A recognition of this fact is not altered by an 
opinion which might extol overall a reduction in the weight 
of the state in the name of a necessary re-balancing of the 
equation state:civil society, or which might disassociate 
the errors of a reglementary state from the benefits of the 
state as an embodiment of the rule of law, or which might 
denounce the state as an institution in the service of the 
middle classes, or which might see in the state the only 
institution incorporating legitimately the general 
interest. 
A history of the French state in statistical terms is a 
straightforward affair, Rosanvallon continues: 150,000 
state employees at the dawn of the nineteenth century have 
become almost 3 million at the present time; a total of 6 
ministers in 1815 neared 30 a century and a half later; a 
national budget in which the contribution of "L'Etat" to 
the national product has almost quadrupled since the First 
Empire. A history of the state in such terms becomes a 
matter of a few graphs. 
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Such a history moreover would reveal that "l' Etat" has 
never ceased spreading its tentacles throughout society, 
that the administration has swollen inexorably, exercising 
a power which has become increasingly widespread. Such a 
history of "L'Etat" would become confused with a growth 
realised to the detriment of society. Rosanvallon 
summarizes his argument (1): 
"L"heritage colbertiste, la tradition jacobine et 
l'oeuvre napoleonienne en auraient constitue le 
ressort, nous enfermant dans une 'tradition 
etatique et centralisatrice' dont notre histoire 
sera it le produit. C'est avec cette vision trop 
globale qu'il faut rompre". 
Moving on to his second imperative (2), "hierarchisation", 
Rosanvallon avers that a principal difficulty in a history 
of "1' Etat" consists in bringing out what he calls the 
"intelligibilite comparative". This means, he writes, being 
able to take into account national specificities and break 
at the same time the continuing and homogeneous perceptions 
of the phenomenon of the modern state. This is largely a 
problem of perspective. 
1. ROSANVALLON -- L'Etat en France, op. cit. p. 13 
2. idem. pp. 13-14 
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If the state is only thought of as the modern state, of 
which the expansion is linked to the advent of the 
individual and the secularisation of politics, its history 
is limited to that of what Rosanvallon calls a "rupture 
unique", beginning in the West in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries. The only essential differences are 
comprised in those elements which were a part of the old 
feudal system. In such a case, history would become 
entangled with political philosophy to the extent that the 
purpose of the latter is to consider this founding break 
of modern society. But at the same time it would become 
difficult to come to precise grips with the specifics of 
the French, English or German examples if only the 
conditions for the break with the old order are considered. 
It is equally difficult to detail the difference between 
the nineteenth century state and that of the twentieth 
century if only because the long term relationship between 
the development of individualism and of statism extant in 
their common characteristics outweigh their peculiarities. 
It is the same if one begins with a different long-term 
approach, for example linking the development of the state 
to that of capitalism. 
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On the other hand, if one embraces a short-term view, for 
example only changes in regimes or in the political 
complexion of successive governments, elements of 
continui ty become indiscernable. Thus a history of the 
state is strongly constrained by this necessity for a 
precision of perspective which will permit the integration 
and ranking of the different levels of perception of the 
phenomenon of statism. 
Rosanvallon describes his third imperative (1) as being one 
of "articulation"; he writes that the state is not only an 
administrative mechanism, it is also an abstract political 
entity in so far as it incorporates the principle of 
sovereignty. It is an efficaceous form of social 
representation. For this reason, he continues, the history 
of the state must be above all the product of a linkage 
between history as a record of factual happenings and the 
history of ideas and of social representation. 
1. ROSANVALLON -- L'Etat en France, op. cit. p. 14 
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The state is a motive force of society at the same time as 
it is formed by the image which society has of it. It is 
not an object which has as an integral part of itself its 
own consistency, apart from society, but is in fact the 
result of a permanent inter-action with society. The state 
is thus both a solution and a problem: a solution because 
of its essential institutions, practices and rules, a 
problem because it only has consistency in relationship to 
an entity, society, a relationship which is always 
unstable, interminably taken up and debated. Thus a history 
of the state becomes a "crossroads history" ("histoire de 
carrefour"), and in no circumstances must be allowed to 
become a history of administration which only touches the 
state in so far as it has a defined purpose. Further, such 
a history becomes the privileged meeting place between 
political philosophy and history. 
Rosanvallon's 
"totalisation". 
final imperative (1) is that of 
If the various specialist areas of 
competence of the state -- the economy, social affairs, 
justice, police, defence, etc. are considered 
discretely, one loses sight of the overall motivation. 
ROSANVALLON L'Etat en France, Ope cit. p. 14 
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Such an approach leads to a purely instrumental approach, 
in other words, the state as a structure aside from the 
society which impinges upon it. Thus the history of the 
state is not simply a sum of sectorial or specialised 
histories; such histories can only make sense if they are 
set in an all-embracing framework. 
Rosanvallon's four imperatives lead him to conceive of a 
dynamic history of the state (1), a history which comprises 
an analysis of the conditions in which the elements which 
make up the basic relationship between the state and 
society have been formed. He writes that there can be no 
history of the state save a history which incorporates this 
relationship. He defines four basic concepts (2) making up 
this relationship: the state as a "Leviathan democratique", 
as an "instituteur de social", as "providence" and as the 
"regulateur de l'economie". 
He defines the "Leviathan democratique" as being "l'Etat 
dans son rapport a la societe comme puissance (rapport de 
constitution de l'Etat par la societe)". This concept is 
a product of the concept of a political contract embodied 
in a constitution which opens the door to political 
democracy and representative government. 
1-
2. 
ROSANVALLON L'Etat en France, op. cit. p. 15 
idem. -- pp. 15-16 
237 
Rosanvallon's second concept is that of the cohesive role 
of modern state as "L'instituteur du social" which, he 
writes, constitutes: "[ ... ] l'Etat en tant qu'il produit 
du lien social et de l'unite, met en forme la societe et 
constitue la nation (rapport d'institution)". This concept 
is particularly relevant with the advent of a society of 
individuals which has upset both the older relationship of 
"l'Etat" to society and to the idea of the nation. 
Citing Hobbes' definition of the state as being an 
institution for limiting the uncertainties of life, 
Rosanvallon considers his third concept, "La providence". 
The older idea of the state as a protector of its citizens, 
spurred by at least the economic and social elements in the 
idea of human rights, has been enlarged progressively into 
that of the welfare state. 
Finally, following what Rosanvallon calls the Keynesian 
revolution, economic affairs have become an element in what 
citizens expect of a state, leading often to a greater 
degree of regulation. 
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These four concepts become each a major part of the work 
of Rosanvallon under reference. He provides as an 
introduction a lucid statement of the problem for the 
French state at the dawn of a new millennium, a problem at 
the heart of the difficulties encountered by contemporary 
French scholars seeking to think through in an appropriate 
French intellectual discipline the impl ications of 
political liberalism for the modernization of the French 
republican and democratic model (1): 
"[ ... ]: alors que la societe civile souhaite 
faire de l' Etat un pur instrument, aux 
prerogatives limitees, ce dernier tend a devenir 
de plus en plus actif pour repondre aux attentes 
de cette meme societe civile. Pens er 
historiquement l'Etat est dans cette me sure un 
prealable a toute reflexion solide sur son 
avenir. Le volontarisme politique et les bonnes 
intentions resteront perpetuellement condamnes a 
I' echec tant qu' ils continueront a meconnaltre 
l'Etat reel" (emphasis in original. JT). 
The heart of Rosanvallon's L'Etat en France consists of a 
detailed exposition and historical analysis of the four 
concepts he def ines and leads him to seek to draw the 
threads of his argument together in some "Reflexions 
finales" (2) in which he asks a number of questions: 
" [ ... ]: ou sont les continui tes et les ruptures dans 
l'histoire de l'Etat moderne? Quelle est la specificite du 
cas franyais? Comment reflechir, a partir du cadre 
d'analyse qui a ete propose, l'avenir de la forme 
etatique?" 
ROSANVALLON L'Etat en France, Ope cit. p. 16 
2. idem. p. 269 
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Rosanvallon recognizes the difficulties inherent in finding 
a suitably consistent vocabulary to be employed in 
describing the state and its attributes. Even the term "the 
modern state", or simply "L'Etat", is one which qualifies 
so many different forms of public authority that simply 
bringing it into use confounds any attempt at precise 
clarification. In seeking a way around this problem he has 
confined himself in this work to considering specifically 
the significant issues in the relationship "Etat-societe" 
in France since 1789. 
In seeking to have a wider perspective on the political 
form of the state, Rosanvallon argues, it is necessary to 
maintain a conceptual distinction between the idea of the 
state and other types of public authority and also between 
the differing forms of Western state. He discerns three 
stages of development of the western state which he 
epi tomises as (1) " [1] e moment de la laIcisation du 
politique", "[l]e moment liberal" and "[l]e moment 
democratique". 
1. ROSANVALLON 
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L'Etat en France, Ope cit. pp. 272-
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The first emerged as a result of a double process of 
secularization and the acquisition of territorial authority 
emerging from the crisis of the imperial model, a model 
itself linked to Christianity and not recognizing any legal 
difference between spiritual and temporal authority, at the 
end of the Middle Ages. 
The state form appeared, Rosanvallon argues, during the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as a means of resolving 
the tensions created by the theologico-political 
universalism of the Empire, creating coincidentally a 
preponderant role for lay jurists seeking to legitimize and 
regulate political power. The acquisition of political 
authority over a specific territory concentrated and 
reinforced the nascent power of emerging states and the 
idea of sovereignty entered into political usage as an 
expression of the double process of a concentration of 
means and of a territorial limitation which characterised 
the formation of Western states. 
The liberal period followed. It was the result of a 
clarification of the juridical nature of the state and at 
the same time represented a deepening of the process of 
secularization of politics .. At first this secularization 
was external, in the sense that ruling authorities, 
generally monarchs, sought to limit or eradicate the power 
of the Church in their realms. 
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Beginning in the sixteenth century, and becoming an 
integral part of the Reformation, this process became 
internal, concerned with the relationships between what was 
public and what was private and recognizing the generally 
inviolate nature of the persona, the freedom of individuals 
to think, the slow divorce between religion and morality. 
At the same time, concepts of law, either natural or 
expressed as some form of social contract, entered into the 
political equation. out of this emerged what Rosanvallon 
calls "le moment lib~ral", in other words, the recognition 
of and protection of the natural rights of individuals in 
so far as these rights provided the basis for the social 
body. 
Rosanvallon I s third "moment", that of the emergence of 
democracy, is a recognition of the advent of representative 
government, or the determination of civil society to 
legitimize and control itself, which, he writes, marks the 
transformation of a state based on law into a democratic 
state. 
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It would seem therefore that the history of the development 
of the state is linked to that of democracy and the 
evolution of individualism, a reason for which this history 
will not be understood if it is confined to a history of 
capitalism, for example, or of domination, as was often 
customary during those years when a marxist-type 
intellectual tradition prevailed. 
As to the specific development of "l'Etat" in France, 
Rosanvallon argues that the application first of what he 
calls "pastorism"(1) and then of the principles of 
Keynesian economics have contributed for the last century 
to solidify the differences between the various states of 
western Europe. In France, the process of a conscious 
laicisation of politics began earlier than it did in both 
Britain and Germany. 
In France again, the concept of "L'Etat" preceded that of 
the nation, a reality which the Revolution served to 
accentuate; this was in direct contrast to the German 
experience, for example. 
1. ROSANVALLON L'Etat en France, op. cit. p. 274. 
The word "Pastorism" expresses an idea which lends 
itself to a range of translations, from a late 
nineteenth century sentimentalist notion of the state 
as a good shepherd caring for a flock to the late 
twentieth century cynical expression: "nanny state". 
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This had two consequences, Rosanvallon argues: first, 
liberal ideas in France were slow to develop before 1789, 
and second, in post-revolutionary France the expression of 
popular sovereignty was both more radical and more 
subjective. Hence the concept of the state as the 
"insti tuteur du social" became more pronounced than in 
other Western European countries. 
In England, as Rosanvallon points out, the three processes 
of the laicisation of politics, the acceptance of liberal 
political concepts and of representative democracy 
proceeded more or less simultaneously in parallel, taking 
the form of a natural evolutionary process. 
Thus, Rosanvallon concludes, the French state has its own 
specific history, a history which is neither linear nor 
progressive in the sense of making up an unbroken stream. 
From this position he is critical of the Tocquevillean 
thesis of continuity, specifically the concept of "L'Etat" 
being a firm rock throughout the history of France, 
incorporating a principle of management and dominance of 
society which was never seriousy challenged, the Jacobin 
experience being no more than a continuation of an 
inherited trend in government. 
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This position is only tenable if "L'Etat" is regarded as 
being no more than an administrative system and if the 
concept of "l'Etat" as a political entity is overlooked. 
If linearity and continuity characterise the history of the 
evolution of the administration, on the contrary the 
history of the state form per se in France is marked by a 
succession of major breaks. The Revolution marked a 
decisive break, a break which Tocquevi1le tended to gloss 
over, and in so doing downgraded the most significant 
specific event in the evolution of "L'Etat", that is, the 
assumption of the French state's role as lIinstituteur du 
social". 
The evolution of the form of Il'Etat" has been parallel to 
that of democracy in France. For the future, Rosanvallon 
maintains, a clarification of the links between the spirit 
of political liberalism and the exigencies of democracy 
will inevitably modify the society: 11 Etat" relationship far 
more than any variations in fiscal policy. Society's 
perception of "l' Etat" will be tied directly to the 
latter's degree of political legitimacy. 
The significance of Rosanvallon's thinking on the function 
of the state in a liberal polity, and specifically his 
consideration of the history of the evolution of 11'Etat" 
in contemporary France, is linked, I argue, to the fact 
that he signals the inherited ambiguity on the role and 
functions of "1' Etat", an ambiguity which still exists, 
even though its effects have been largely overcome. 
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The Problem of Popular Representation 
"Le dilemme de la politique moderne peut 
facilement etre resume [ .•. ] dans les termes 
simples: la separation du systeme politique et de 
la societe civile est une condition de la liberte 
des individus; mais cette separation productive 
risque en permanence de se transformer en 
distance negative. C'est pourquoi la coupure est 
en permanence revendiquee et denoncee a la fois." 
(1) 
Rosanvallon perceives three distinct aspects in the history 
of the development of democracy in France (2). The first 
was the establishment of a society of equals; this has 
meant making a place for the modern subject of democracy, 
the individual as an elector, that is to say, the citizen. 
The second concerned the forms of democracy, in other 
words, making the sovereignty of the people an effective 
reality. The third concerned the mechanics of 
representative government. 
Rosanvallon considered the first of these at length in his 
Le Sacre du citoyen: Histoire du suffrage universel en 
France, published in 1992. He is currently (2000) working 
on a history of the sovereignty of the people. Concerning 
representative government, his Le Peuple introuvable: 
Histoire de la representation democratique en France was 
published in 1998. 
2. 
ROSANVALLON, Pierre "Malaise dans la 
representation", in FURET, Franycois, 
JULLIARD, Jacques et ROSANVALLON, Pierre -
- La Republique du centre, Calmann-Levy, 
Paris, 1988, p.159 
ROSANVALLON -- Le Peuple introuvable, Calmann-Levy, 
Paris, 1998, p. 22 
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An aspect of the development of the practice of politics 
in France which worries Rosanvallon (1) is the impact of 
the elites of the nation -- both in government and in the 
world of business on the democratic process. The 
reality of alternance and cohabitation is that the 
traditional division between left and right has become 
blunted; the division instead is tending to be between the 
elites and the mass of the electorate. Thus, given the 
weakening of passion in the political process, government 
in France is tending to become the reign of a single, 
multi-functional class of experts. This may be acceptable 
for as long as this class of experts can demonstrate 
continuing sensitivity to the needs and future prospects 
of the people (2). 
The weakening of passion in politics is to be applauded, 
Rosanvallon maintains, but at the same time the erosion of 
the ideal of civic mobilization and of the active 
participation in public affairs by citizens is to be 
deplored. French society is (my emphasis. JT) more 
autonomous, more stable; Rosanvallon argues that the 
contemporary reality is akin to what Benjamin Constant 
called "la liberte des modernes", contrasting it with "la 
liberte des anciens" (3). 
1. ROSANVALLON -- "Malaise dans la representation", OPe 
cit. p. 142 
2. idem. pp. 143-144 
3. idem. p. 145 
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In other words, the contemporary situation may be summed 
up as "la poursuite de l'autonomie individuelle contre la 
participation a un ideal collectif et l'incorporation dans 
un tout social" (1) .This might be thought of as a sort of 
normalisation in France, making the national practice of 
politics approach the British and American political 
systems. Rosanvallon argues that there is no better example 
of this normalisation than the growing concern with human 
rights, which has been accompanied by the emancipation of 
the individual and the decline of the political relevance 
of the hitherto major political issues, capitalism and 
socialism (2). 
He contends that it is not possible to build a political 
sysytem around human rights (3): "11 est en effet 
impossible d'envisager l'avenir des societes democratiques 
du seul point de vue de I' autonomie indi viduelle et du 
respect des differences." The tension between the 
individual and the collectivity is a hallmark of modern 
societies, torn as they tend to be between a permanent 
enlargement of the private sphere and the inextinguishable 
concept of the public good and common interest. 
1. ROSANVALLON -- "Malaise dans la representation", Ope 
cit. p. 145 
2. idem. 
3. idem. 
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French politics during the decade of the 1980s, Rosanvallon 
argues, became at one and the same time both 
"desociologisee" and "desideologisee" (3). This process is 
no more than another aspect of the normalisation, even the 
banalisation, of the contemporary practice of politics. 
There is an ambivalence in contemporary democratic 
practices, Rosanvallon believes, as individuals seek at one 
and the same time to maximize their individual liberty and 
to maximize the protection that civil society offers them. 
This contradiction is, as Tocqueville pointed out (2), a 
recipe for banality but it is (3): 
"aussi une condition de la liberte. Un monde 
protecteur est un monde structure par des regles et 
des conventions. Les indi vidus ne cessent de 
s'insurger contre elles, de denoncer leur rigidite et 
de reclamer des arrangements, mais c' est pourtant 
cette impersonalite de la regIe, neutre et froide, qui 
est un gage de liberte. Les societes democratiques 
tendent inevitablement a la bureaucratie, au sens 
propre d' une regulation par des conventions et des 
regles formalisees: l'Etat de droit n'est pas autre 
chose en son essence". 
Rosanvallon contends that France still does have a specific 
political problem dating from the Revolution: the political 
culture which is the child of the Revolution has 
radicalized the relationship between the political system 
and civil society (4). 
1. ROSANVALLON -- "Malaise dans la representation", Ope 
cit. p. 149 
2 . idem. p. 160 
3. idem. p. 159 
4 . idem. p. 161 
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He points (1) to the Loi Le Chapelier (14 June 1791) as 
being a first legislative emanation of this modification 
of the relationship between "l' Etat" and the wider society. 
"L'Etat" was no longer the regulating peak and organiser 
of an articulated hierarchy of intermediate bodies; it 
became instead, as the principal agent of unification, the 
social motivator of a society of isolated individuals. 
"L'Etat" became (2) "la seule figure incarnant l'int6rAt 
g6neral en mAme temps qu' il resumait en lui la sphere 
publique". 
From this genesis, Rosanvallon argues, there developed two 
myths in French political culture, the myth of consensus 
and the myth of transparence (3). 
The first myth, consensus, dates from the Revolution and 
embodies the concept of a unified populace, "le peuple un" 
and is meant to symbolize the victory of the people over 
l'Ancien Regime. This had the advantage of contributing a 
certain mystique to the idea of "Nation" and at the same 
time simplified politics. But it also polarized politics: 
there was either consensus or there was civil war. Any 
opposition to a proposed course of action risked being seen 
as the beginning of a counter-revolutionary plot. 
1. ROSANVALLON -- "Malaise dans la representation", Ope 
cit. p. 161 
2. idem. p.162 
3 • idem. p. 166 
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Thus the nation became an abstract figure and there was a 
consequent refusal to see it as merely being the sum of a 
large number of specificalities. Thought of in such terms, 
the nation became politically irrepresentable, a fact which 
fired the multiplicity of debates around the concept of 
political representation during the revolutionary years. 
The echoes of this problem resounded well into the latter 
half of the twentieth century. The apparent ending of the 
problem in "la R6publique du centre" of the last decade of 
the century is illusory, Rosanvallon warns (1): 
"Nous sommes aujourd'hui dans une phase id~aliste. Les 
mots de consensus, de cohabitation et d'unit~ brillent 
au firmament de nos valeurs politiques. Nous sommes 
brutalement pass~s du fantasme de la guerre sociale a 
la c~l~bration mievre de l'unit~. Nous sortons 
naYvement de l'age id~ologique pour enter tout aussi 
naYvement dans un ersatz de maturite democratique". 
He believes (2) that the consensus of the decade of the 
1980s was a false consensus which contributed to the 
growing number of "exclus", people shut out of the 
political process. He argues that there is only one fact, 
one consensus, upon which unanimity is indispensable in a 
democracy: the mutual recognition of and respect for a 
democratic majority and an opposition which will alternate 
at the helm of political power. A consensus which goes 
beyond this basic position risks stifling all political 
debate and careful deliberation. 
1. ROSANVALLON -- "Malaise dans la repr~sentation", Ope 
cit. p. 168 
2. idem. 
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In parallel with the myth of consensus is that of 
transparence, Rosanvallon continues (1), but the image is 
inverted. In 1789 "[on] aspire a un pouvoir immediat et 
transparent de la volonte generale". Bureaucracy was 
regarded as being the practices of the monarchy in other 
clothes. At this time it was believed that the executive 
power should be no more than a simple mechanism of auto-
administration of the civil society and that all social 
problems and difficulties could be resolved by legislation. 
Rosanvallon sets out a concept which was simply not 
envisaged by the architects of the new society of the 
Revolution (1): 
"L'art de la politique, qui consiste a gerer l'imprevu 
et l'accident, n'est donc pas veritablement reconnu et 
pris en compte. cette double ambigu1te s'exprime de 
fayon tres specifique dans le contexte franyais, en 
se greffant sur la notion de souveraintete de la 
nation qui postule un rapport global et immediat entre 
le peuple et ses representants. De la provient la 
tendance permanente a gouverner en legiferant." 
Against this background Rosanvallon argues that the 
question of representation crystallizes what he calls 
"trois equivoques de la culture politique franyaise"(3). 
These are: first, a permanent tendency to confuse 
liberalism and democracy; second, a critical ambiguity at 
the heart of the instutionalization of politics; and third, 
a difficulty in conceptualizing political legitimacy. 
1. ROSANVALLON 
2. 
3. 
"Malaise dans la representation", Ope 
cit. p. 169 
idem. Pp. 170-171 
idem. -- pp. 175-176 
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The confusion between liberalism and democracy leads to a 
difficulty in distinguishing between the exigencies of 
political participation and the demands of a rule of law. 
The practice of politics in France, Rosanvallon argues (1), 
has the effect of reducing the democratic process to a 
mere positive process of political legitimation. Thus two 
contradictory objectives are apparent. The first gives 
political legitimacy to a government or an assembly by a 
formal transfer of sovereignty following a legislative 
election. The second is to ensure simply that one party or 
faction does not take over the government permanently. 
The criticism of the institutionalization of politics has 
at its heart a long-established concern about the role of 
the bureaucracy and, specifically, a sometimes loosely-
expressed popular mistrust of elitism in the higher 
echelons of the administration. 
Concerning legitimation, Rosanvallon (1) perceives a 
difference between what he calls "legitimation 
constitutionnelle" and "legitimation politique" (emphases 
in original. JT). The first concerns the observance of the 
regulations and procedures embracing the performance of 
their duties by the various public bodies whilst the second 
seeks always to found the principle of legitimacy on 
sociological or cultural realities. 
ROSANVALLON -- "Malaise dans la representation", Ope 
cit. p. 178 
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This difference has led to a mutual suspicion between 
French civil society and the political system. Rosanvallon 
believes that, as a result, (1): 
"La notion de volonte genera le est ballotee entre ces 
deux conceptions de la legitimite, renvoyant tant6t a 
l' une, tant6t a I' autre, montrant par la meme ses 
limites". 
Manifestations of these limits are exemplified by the 
relationship between public opinion polls and the formal 
electoral procedures, with the first tending to take away 
the importance of the second. Again, the frequent 
contradictions between the short term and the long term can 
result in excessive opportunistic power being given to a 
recently-elected government at the expense of the longer-
term interests of the nation. 
subsequently, some ten years later, Rosanvallon examined 
in considerable detail the history of democratic 
representation in France (2). In an introduction headed 
"Malaise dans la democratie" he asks about the causes of 
this "malaise" and points out that it is by no means a new 
phenomenon in France. 
1. 
2. 
ROSANVALLON -- "Malaise dans la representation", Ope 
cit. p. 179 
ROSANVALLON -- Le Peup1e introuvable, Ope cit. (p. 246 
supra) 
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In seeking an answer to his own question, Rosanvallon 
recalls the obvious fact: democracy means the power of the 
people. He continues (1): 
"L'imperatif est indissociablement poli tique et 
sociologique: il implique d'un meme mouvement la 
definition d'un regime d'autorite et d'un sujet 
l'exer9ant. Mais il est aussi pressant qu'obscur. si 
le principe de la souverainete du peuple fonde avec 
evidence la politique moderne, sa mise en oeuvre 
apparait fort incertain. Des son orlglne, la 
definition du regime moderne est marquee par une 
double indetermination, concernant tant la mode 
d'incarnation que des conditions de mise en forme du 
pouvoir democratique". 
In both these cases, he continues, the difficulties arise 
around the question of representation, a question which has 
two aspects, "mandat" and "figuration" (2). Further, there 
is a degree of conflict between the philosophical idea of 
democracy and the conditions of its institutionalization. 
One cause of the problem is that the power of the people 
is not exercised directly in the modern world. This power 
tends to be moulded by the media and by the procedures of 
representative government. 
1. ROSANVALLON -- Le Peuple introuvable, Ope cit. p. 10 
2. -- idem. -- p. 11. Rosanvallon signals a 
problem of semantics and argues that the 
German words Reprasentation (which he 
translates as "figuration symbolique") and 
stellvertretung ("mandat") make the 
distinction clearer. In English, I argue, 
the French word "figuration" in this context 
is faithfully rendered as the mechanics of 
representation; there is no ambiguity with 
the translation of "mandat". 
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In terms of the mechanics of representation, Rosanvallon 
argues that (1) "[l]e peuple est un maltre qui est a la 
fois impArieux et insaisissable". But, he asks, how is the 
concept of "the people" to be defined and recognized? 
There are two principles, the one political and the other 
sociological. The political principle focusses the power 
of a collective subject whilst the sociological principle 
tends to weaken this power and make it obscure. In the 
past, the notion of the sovereignty of the people had 
little difficulty in accommodating the resultant tension, 
especially if it were a question of opposing absolutism or 
facing up to an external threat. Difficulties arise when 
this sovereignty has to perceive itself as an active and 
institutionalizing force. 
These difficulties are accentuated by the imperative of 
equality in the modern world which serves to make each man 
and woman a subject before the law and a complete citizen 
and thus to make "man" a relatively abstract consideration, 
an autonomous subject. In other words, Rosanvallon argues 
(2): "c'est le sacre juridigue de l'individu qui conduit 
a rej eter comme archalque et insupportable toute 
apprAhension substantielle du social". 
1-
2. 
ROSANVALLON Le peuple introuvable, op. cit. p. 12 
idem. p. 13 
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Democratic society thus carries with it a radical rejection 
of all forms of organization and a permanent suspicion of 
any institution which might impede personal freedom or make 
mankind dependent upon an extraneous power. The 
requirements of equality and the conditions of autonomy 
impose their own imperatives! the only legitimate social 
ties are those which emanate from a volontary agreement 
between free individuals and which relate either to the 
demands of nature or the legacy of history. The 
contemporary reality is different. Modernity, Rosanvallon 
contends (1): 
"impose ainsi de desubstantialiser le social pour le 
ramener a une pure quotite: celle des conditions 
d'equivalence et de commensurabilite entre des 
indi vidus independants. Le social perd en ce sens 
toute consistence propre pour ceder la place a un 
principe formel de construction juridique. Substance 
et procedure se confondent [ ... ]". 
Thus in modern democracy, the concept of "the people" has 
no structure; it loses its corporate density and becomes 
simply "numbers", a force composed of equals, of 
individuals whose only equality is before the law. This is 
the reality of universal suffrage; society becomes no more 
than an arithmetical fact and the substance is lost in 
cyphers. The consequent contradiction between the nature 
of democratic society (a society without substance) and the 
presumption of democratic politics (constructing a 
representative fictional individual) engenders an endless 
fruitless search for an identity (2). 
1-
2. 
ROSANVALLON Le peuple introuvable, OPe cit. p. 13 
idem. p. 18 
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This search for an identity has, in the past, taken place 
in two separate ways: first, to give substance to "the 
people" but also to clarify the links between the 
representative and the represented. From this position, 
Rosanvallon argues that (1): 
"[l]es deux principes de figuration de la totalite et 
d'incarnation des particularites vont ainsi etre tour 
a tour convoques pour tenter de donner chair a la 
democratie". 
It is not enough, Rosanvallon continues, to describe the 
inherent malady of the democratic experience simply as a 
tension between the abstract and the concrete, or even as 
another, somewhat banal, example of the conflict between 
the ideal and reality. He stresses that it is the concept 
of the "peuple concret" which remains indeterminate; there 
is nothing upon which the imperative of the sovereignty 
of the people may be founded. It is not a question of 
simply locating or redefining this concept; rather, it is 
to be constructed. Thus the question of the mechanics of 
representation becomes one of prime importance. 
Rosanvallon traces the history of thinking about the 
problem of representation from the Revolution through the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, highlighting, inter 
alia, the thinking of Proudhon and such initiatives as the 
"Manifeste des soixante". 
1. ROSANVALLON Le Peuple introuvable, op. cit. p. 18 
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Drawing togther the threads of his argument, Rosanvallon 
contends (1) that the search for rationalization of the 
mechanics of representation risks leading to one or the 
other of two extremes: the political power may absorb 
society completely (the totalitarian threat) or the 
political structure may be fragmented into a large number 
of small units. Yet the problem of making the mechanics of 
representation effective lies somewhere between these 
extremes. Neither more effective political parties nor 
concepts of specialized second elected assemblies point 
towards a solution. 
In his formal Conclusion (2), he expresses a degree of 
pessimism (3): 
"11 est ainsi illusoire, desormais, de rever a une 
poli~ique qui prendrait commodement et solidement 
appu1 sur des corps intermediaries, exprimant des 
identi tes sociales evidentes. 11 est aussi vain de 
renouer avec l'utopie de reformulation des identites 
qui etait a l'oeuvre dans la vision originelle de la 
democratie des partis. La question de la figuration 
politique se pose maintenant de face, dans toute sa 
radicalite. La difficulte est devant nous, 
irreductible." 
Rosanvallon recognizes that there is no simple solution to 
the problem which he has analysed with such depth and 
elegance. 
ROSANVALLON 
2. 
Le Peuple introuvable, Ope cit. p. 
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idem. -- pp. 337-363 
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Summary 
Rosanvallon emphasizes the fundamental importance of taking 
into account the political developments in France over the 
entire revolutionary period (1789-1814) as a basis of 
understanding the subsequent evolution of French political 
thought. This period represented a break in the way in 
which both history and politics was considered. A crucial 
question, still not entirely settled, is the dichotomy in 
relationship between political liberalism and democracy in 
France. A major element in Rosanvallon's work, has been the 
exploration of the continuing reasons for this dichotomy 
or why the democratic ideal of public participation turned 
so strongly against the idea of individual liberty during 
much of the history of contemporary France. 
The revolutionary experience provided a major difference 
between the development of liberalism in France and in 
England. In England, this was a gradual experience over the 
centuries from 1688; in addition, any serious difference 
between concepts of economic and political liberalism made 
li ttle sense in English political thinking. The French 
problem of defining the relationship between the citizen 
and the individual simply did not arise in England. 
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Rosanvallon argues that his focus on the thinking and 
achievements of Guizot during the period of the Restoration 
and the July Monarchy is relevant to contemporary France 
in that, just as now (Rosanvallon was writing in the early 
1980s) the priority was to take the passion out of politics 
and, above all, to seek radically new solutions to the 
problems emanating from notions of democracy and 
ci tizenship. He signals what he regards as an error in 
Guizot's thinking: the concept that the democratic ideal 
might be disassociated from the reality of social 
divisions. 
Against this background, Rosanvallon considers the 
evolution of the modern state. He stresses the need for a 
clear understanding of exactly what is meant by the term 
"l'Etat". For him a comprehension of the term requires four 
essential and discrete elements. These elements are, first, 
a recognition that "1'Etat" is not monolithic and is not 
to be assessed by detailed economic data and statistical 
analyses; second, a sensitivity to the evolution of all the 
elements which have contributed to the development of a 
specific national state at a given point in its history is 
needed; third, a recognition that "l'Etat" has many facets, 
being at one and the same time a political reality, an 
administrative mechanism, a form of social representation 
and an image of the society which it represents; finally, 
due regard must be given to the multifarious character of 
"l'Etat" and the fact that it comprises a large number of 
differing areas of competence. 
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Rosanvallon constructs a matrix, as it were, of four 
functions of the modern state, which he names a democratic 
Leviathan, a social administrator, a source of charity and 
an economic regulator. 
He defines three stages in the evolution of this modern 
state: the emergence of political secularity, the advent 
of liberalism and the birth of democracy. Whereas in 
England each of these stages evolved one after the other 
over a period of centuries and thus seldom presented any 
serious problem of comprehension to the people as a whole, 
in France the whole process was telescoped into the 
Revolution, thus destroying linearity and continuity and 
providing a problem for popular comprehension. 
subsequently, Rosanvallon has concentrated his thinking on 
the problems associated with democracy and citizenship in 
the modern state, and specifically in contemporary France. 
He has considered both the history of and the current 
implications of modern democracy as being a society of 
equals, the question of the meaning of the sovereignty of 
the people (he seeks an acceptable definition of the conept 
of "the people") and the mechanics of respresentati ve 
government ("la figuration"). 
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A problem to which he gives considerable attention is the 
relationship between the implications of individual 
autonomy and the collective ideal and the effective 
incorporation of a solution to this problem into a social 
totality. He stresses that, in his view, it is simply not 
possible to build a viable political system around human 
rights. In contemporary occidental societies there is a 
contradiction between the desire of individuals to maximize 
their personal liberty and at the same time to exact the 
maximum benefit from the collectivity. 
Rosanvallon argues that the apparent political consensus 
in contemporary France is a false consensus in that there 
are far too many "exclus", people who feel themselves 
outside the democratic process. This is revealing of a 
substantial problem in the mechanics of political 
representation and, behind this problem, conceptual and 
philosophical difficulties with definitions of "the 
people". The extremes shuttle from the revolutionary 
concept of "le peuple Un" of the Revolutionary period 
(experience has shown that this is an invitation to 
totalitarianism, with the people being incorporated in the 
state) to an anarchic ideal of a large number of small 
units with no strong central unifying political entity. 
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In contemporary occidental societies, "the people" 
approximates to Hobbes' "multitude", a mere collectivity 
of numbers. Rosanvallon is concerned that opinion polls in 
such a perceived collectivity tend to weaken the essential 
democratic process and to encourage the primacy of short-
term considerations. 
He argues that the imprecision in the representation 
process and the consequent looseness of def ini tion of 
democracy leads, almost inevitably, to the strength of the 
bureaucracy; this is also an invitation to elitism. France, 
he feels, is tending to be governed by an elite in both the 
administration and in large corporations; this elite, 
having generally a common background, has little difficulty 
in finding common cause and in setting common objectives. 
-------000-------
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Chapter 7 
MARCEL GAUCHET 
Introduction 
"A commencer par la pr~supposition cardinale 
qu'il faut qu'une soci~t~ veuille etre pour etre, 
avec la cons~quence qui en decoule, l'union 
necessaire du gouvernant et des gouvernes grace 
A laquelle advient cet indispensable savoir de 
soi du social union dont la composition 
genera le et la coIncidence cIa ire des volontes 
individuelles au sein du souverain fournit la 
version la plus rigoureuse. Le plus moderne meme 
de la philosophie du contrat -- l'artificialisme 
individualiste -- prend tacite appui sur un 
reste de representation ancienne des conditions 
d' existence du lien social -- la coIncidence 
(consciente) de l'atome avec le tout et la 
conjonction (reflechie) de la communaut~ 
politique prise en corps avec son principe 
instituant. au pour le dire autrement, c'est A 
l'interieur toujours du modele de la societe 
assujettie que s'est operee l'invention du 
social-sujet." (1) 
Marcel Gauchet, an eminent scholar from a humble 
background, was appointed a Director of Studies at the 
EHESS in 1989. Claude Lefort, whom he met as a student in 
the University of Caen in 1966, was an important early 
influence. Subsequently, he worked with Cornelius 
Castoriadis and Miguel Abensour. 
with Pierre Nora, he became joint editor of Le Debat, in 
1980, a fact which established his professional reputation 
as a thinker. His thinking develops from the meeting point 
of history and philosophy. 
1. GAUCHET, Marcel -- Le desenchantement du monde: une 
histoire pOlitique de la religion, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1985, p. 251 
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Gauchet acknowledges his debt to Max Weber for the title 
of his first major work, Le desenchantement du monde. Weber 
used the expression "the disenchantment of the world" to 
mean "the elimination of magic as a salvation technique" 
( 1) • 
In addition to his Le desenchantement du monde, I consider 
in this chapter Gauchet's La Revolution des pouvoirs (2), 
published in 1995, as well as, briefly, a lengthy article 
on Tocqueville which appeared in the review Libre in 1980 
(3) and an editorial essay and analysis to a critical 
edition of the work of Benjamin Constant (4), also 
published in 1980. 
1. GAUCHET -- The Disenchantment of the 
English language translation by 
Oscar, Princeton University 
1997, p. 3 
World, 
BURGE, 
Press, 
2. -- idem. -- "Tocqueville, l'Amerique et nous" in 
Libre, Vol. 7, 1980, pp. 43-120 
3. CONSTANT, Benjamin De la liberte chez les 
modernes, Collection Hachette Pluriel, 
1980 
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Le desenchantement du monde 
The Universality of Religion 
Gauchet believes that a clear understanding of the 
importance of religion in primaeval societies is an 
essential prerequisite to an appreciation of the importance 
of an absence of religion from the current European 
political equation. "Pas d'entente de la pr~gnance 
d'autrefois sans un discernement exact de la d~prise 
d'aujourd'hui." (1) 
He argues (2) that in earlier polities in which religion 
was dominant, the principle that the will of the individual 
had always to be subservient to the principle of collective 
communal organisation was inevitably the most general 
characteristic: the dependency of individuals on the 
collectivity was paramount. In such societies there could 
be very little room for personal choice. He emphasizes that 
by "choice" he means the various ways in which it is 
possible to accept a specific number of elemental 
constraints; situations in which a choice is required for 
a fundamental reason to the extent that it is of the nature 
of these constraints to have "de leur teneur meme de ne pas 
se laisser rapporter a des causes qui d~cideraient de leur 
pr~valence" (3). 
GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. 
2. GAUCHET 
3 • 
"Pr~sentation", p. iv 
Le desenchantement du monde, OPe cit. p. 
18 
idem. "Pr~sentation", p. xiii 
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There is, Gauchet maintains, a core of basic possibilities 
governing the relationship of individual men and women with 
themselves, with their peers and with the wider world. 
Briefly, and in other words (1): 
"[ ... ] il y a du transcendantal dans l'histoire, et il 
est de la nature de ce transcendantal de menager la 
latitude d'un rapport reflechi au travers duquel 
1 'espece humaine choisi t de fait entre un certain 
nombre de manieres possibles d'etre ce qu'elle est." 
He argues (2) that the acceptance by some ancient societies 
of the idea of a personal god was a development of 
fundamental significance. Such a belief tended to exclude 
any perceived need for institutional intermediation 
(through a priestly caste, for example) and was to lead, 
eventually, to a degree of religious individuality, a 
concept which was still, however, far from any idea of the 
individual as a social or a political entity. 
GAUCHET 
2. 
Le desenchantement du monde, 
"Presentation", Ope cit. p. xiv 
idem. p. 77 
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Making a case for what he calls the "historici te du 
religieux" (1), Gauchet avers that the religious element 
is found constantly, even invariably, in the development 
of human societies. Calling this reality a primordial and 
an essential precondition for the survival of human society 
which may be traced back to the earliest recorded history 
of our species, he maintains that religion is a "Phenom~ne 
originel, qu'on trouve aussi loin qu'on puisse remonter 
dans le temps des hommes, phenom~ne universel, auquel on 
ne connalt aucune societe qui ait echappe [ •.. ]"] (2). 
There is very often a considerable satisfaction to be found 
in Gauchet's prose and specifically in some of his more 
felicitous phrases. Thus in describing the place of 
religion in our society, he writes that (3): 
"Le religieux, c'est le principe de mobilite mis au 
service de l'immobile, c'est le principe de 
transformation mobilise pour garantir l'intangibilite 
des choses, c'est l'energie du negatif tout entiere 
retournee au profit de l'acceptation et de la 
reconduction de la loi etablie. La est tout le mystere 
de notre histoire, que dans son rapport conflictuel 
avec lui-meme l'homme ait commence par repousser cela 
precisement, cette verite discordante de lui-meme, 
cette incertitude de son insertion dans le monde et sa 
feconde instabilite d'etre du mouvement. La religion, 
en ce sens: l'enigme de notre entree a reculons dans 
l'histoire. " 
1. GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
9 
2. idem. 
3. idem. p. 11 
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In other words, a significant element in the political 
history of religion in accidental societies is tied to the 
fact that mankind in these societies has sought to 
rationalise and to understand the Christian religion. In 
the pre-Christian era, it could be said of Greek mythology, 
for example, that the power of the gods was greatest when 
people believed wholeheartedly in them and that this power 
vanished with the knowledge that natural phenomena and 
human triumphs and disasters did not have a divine origin; 
in short, the gods existed for just as long as people 
believed in them. 
Thus for Gauchet (1): "Des religions primitives au 
christianisme moderne, le trajet est celui d'une 
reapprobation de cela, la source du sens et le foyer de la 
loi, qui a ete initialement rejete, et radicalement, hors 
de la prise des acteurs humains." 
1. GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, OPe cit. p. 
12-13 
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Gauchet believes that the ubiquity of religion in one form 
or another throughout the human race and its history makes 
it possible to identify the essential elements underpinning 
the need for mankind to establish and codify behavioural 
rules (1). Religion in a pure state puts, in Gauchet's 
words, (2): "[ ... ] le present dans une absolue dependance 
envers le passe mythique [ ..• ]". 
All major religions by their very character are radically 
conservative and demand an unstinting conformity (3) as 
well as representing a desire for mankind to return to 
nature (4). He introduces the idea of a rule of 
reciprocity, a more elegant way of describing an Old 
Testament concept (5). Gauchet's prose is unambiguous (6): 
2. 
3. 
4. 
"11 Y a, dans ce qui attache constitutivement l'homme 
a ses semblables, le ferment d' une indetermination 
conflictuelle. La loi de reciprocite, c'est, dans la 
paix de l'echange consenti comme dans le dechainement 
restitutif de la vengeance, l'inquestionnable 
religieux du fondement mis en forme de rapport social, 
la prevalence unanime des raisons dernieres assuree 
en acte contre ce qui engage les individus les uns 
envers les autres, libre deliberation ou mortelle 
opposition." 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
13 
idem. p. 15 
idem. 
idem. p. 17 
5. Exodus, 21:23: "Life for life, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 
burning for burning, wound for wound, 
stripe for stripe." 
6. GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
19 
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The rule of reciprocity is, of course, closely allied to 
concepts of choice (1); a major consideration in religion 
as a code of social behaviour is to ensure that the process 
of choice is qualified. In short, at the heart of religious 
attitudes is the acceptance, Gauchet avers, of (2) "[ .•. JIg 
dehors comme source et l'immuable comme regle" (emphasis 
in original. JT). 
He develops his argument (3) and closes it (4) by 
identifying two major cultural elements in primaeval 
religion: first, an unshakeable conservatism expressed as 
a determination to hold on to existing beliefs and, second, 
the claimed conformity of collective experience to these 
beliefs. All subsequent evolution of religions questions 
these tenets. 
1. GAUCHET 
2 • 
3 • 
4 . 
Le desenchantement du monde, op_ cit. p. 
20 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
pp.20-21 
p. 25 
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The Emergence of the state 
Gauchet argues that a development of fundamental 
significance for the ultimate emergence of men and women 
as autonomus individuals, but a development which at first 
sight seems paradoxical, was the gradual emergence of the 
state ("l'Etat") as an authoritarian institution imposing 
a hierarchy and illiberal and inegalitarian codes of 
practice by coercion. Such a state was almost invariably 
allied with established religion and became, in Gauchet's 
words, a "transformateur sacral" (1). Thus, in essence: 
"Les dieux s'~loignent, ce bas-monde se scinde de l'autre 
monde qui le d~termine et le comprend, mais en meme temps, 
l'inquestionnable institue entre de plus en plus dans le 
questionnable, comme s'affirme la prise des hommes sur 
l'organisation de leur propre univers." (2) 
The emergence of the state was one of three crucial 
consecutive developments, Gauchet argues, which, taking 
place over a period of three or four millenia, constituted 
"major upheavals" (3). The second such development was the 
appearance over a period of some 600 years (Gauchet, citing 
Karl Jaspers, says 800 to 200 BC) (4) the idea of an extra-
terrestial divinity, and the third the advent of 
Christianity. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
GAUCHET 
26 
Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 27 
p. 28 
p. 42 
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Gauchet regards the first of these upheavals as being the 
most important, with religion becoming embodied in the 
state as part of a mechanism of domination (1): "Dominants 
et domines, ceux qui sont du cote des dieux et ceux qui ne 
le sont pas". 
The idea of divinity thus became translated into the 
politics of human domination and coercion (2): 
"[ ... ] l'essentiel est qu'il y aura desormais au coeur 
du visible et de l'accessible un repondant de 
l'ailleurs instituant, et des hommes absolument 
differents de leurs semblables dans la mesure ou ils 
participent directement ou indirectement de 
l'invisible foyer sacre ou s'alimente l'existence 
collective. 11 en est qui parlent et ordonnent au nom 
des dieux, qui ont la maltrise des rites ou renalt le 
sens originel des choses, en la chair des quels on 
touche, litteralement, au principe superieur qui 
commande le monde." 
Gauchet outlines three discrete dynamics of transformation 
wrought by the development of the state and its 
institutional apparatus: the creation of a hierarchy, the 
fact of domination and, following on from a need for 
domination, a desire for conquest (3). 
1. GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, OPe cit. p. 
42. 
2. idem. p. 30 
3. idem. p. 32 
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By hierarchy he understands (1): "[ ... ] l'incorporation de 
l'alterite du fondement dans la substance meme du lien 
social et sa diffusion ou sa refraction tangibles a tous 
les niveaux". Domination through coercive tension ensured 
that a tyrant, either individual or institutional (2): 
[ ••• ] garde [le reste de la societe] fidele a sa loi et en 
harmonie avec les forces de l' uni vers" . And conquest 
carried the ultimate implication and perspective of (3): 
"[ .•• ] une domination universelle, de l'unification 
derniere du monde connu sous la ferule du plus puissant 
parmi les puissants". 
The second "upheaval", that of the evolution of the concept 
of religion as being built around an extra-terrestial 
divinity, gave rise to what Gauchet summarizes as the (4): 
"Ecart de l'ici-bas et de l'au-dela, subjectivation du 
principe divin, universalisation de la perspective de vie: 
ce sont les resultantes fondamentales de la subversion 
1 ,' [J" re 19leuse . . . . 
1. GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
32 
2. idem. p. 36 
3. idem. p. 38 
4 . idem. pp. 42-43 
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This led to the third "upheaval"; the concepts and 
practices of Christianity; the search for a meaning in 
human life no longer depended on a divine gift but could 
be found in this world within each individual (1). Gauchet 
does not mention st Luke's "The kingdom of God is within 
you" (2), but it would seem that this is the idea he is 
wishing to convey. 
In any event, the ultimate realisation by mankind of the 
essential indifference of "the gods" to human endeavour and 
human suffering is a major milestone along the road of 
genuine independence and hence of individual autonomy. As 
Gauchet says, inimitably, a (3): 
"[ ... ] ligne de partage s'etablit autour de la 
fracture de fond impersonnalite 
immanente/subjectivisme transcendant, meme 
ultime/autre separe et comment, plus 
particulierement, ce que nous nommons rationalite 
depend quant a sa naissance d I un mode determine de 
subjectivation et de separation de l'Autre qui fait 
etre." 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
48 
2. st Luke, ch. 21 
3. GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, p. 49 
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This awareness caused in turn the evolution of a communal 
code of behaviour which could deviate from then-current 
perceptions of what the Creator intended and which hence 
could create a potential dichotomy of loyalty between 
divine law and the law of the community (1). As Gauchet 
explains (2): 
"Reste qu' il y a desormais autre chose, qu' elle ne 
saurait epuiser le champ de bonne harmonie entre la 
regIe de ce monde et les necessites de l'autre, leur 
desemboitement et leur ecart irreductible fondent un 
conflit toujours possible. Par-dessus les pouvoirs 
terrestres, toujours concevable d'en appeler aux 
exigences plus elevees d'un au-dela excluant par 
nature qu'on parvienne a totalement s'arroger sa 
representation souveraine ici-bas." 
Refuting the common suggestion of religion as an 
"instrument of legitimation" (3), Gauchet argues that the 
more a divinity is respected for its omniscience, the less 
it will be the subject of dark and superstitious fears. He 
suggests a precept which might be termed a law of human 
emancipation through divine affirmation (4): "[ ... ] plus 
les dieux sont grands, plus les hommes sont libres". 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
50 
2. idem. 
3. idem. p. 52 
4. idem. p. 53 
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He is thus distinguishing between pure religion, which 
might be thought of as an innate love and respect for a 
di vini ty on the part of mankind, and any expression of 
religion as dogma, which, he has no doubt, has had the 
effect throughout history of being a coercive instrument 
for enforcing submission. Thus for pure religion (1): "En 
sa teneur derniere, la croyance devient socialement 
incontrolable par quelque instance regulatrice que ce 
soit". The evolution of a recognition of a growing 
dichotomy between the temporal and the spiritual gave 
increasing power to the temporal state, which, in Gauchet's 
words, is (2): 
"[ ..• ] ramassant en lui, avec le principe actif de la 
cohesion collective -- ce qui continue de tenir la 
societe ensemble ,le droit general 
d' administration inherent a 1 'autosuff isance de la 
sphere terrestre". 
The inevitable result was the subversion and ruin of the 
system of ecclesiastical hierarchy (3). But at the same 
time the temporal state was sowing the seeds of its own 
enfeeblement by encouraging independence and autonomy among 
individuals. In Gauchet's words, the state (4): [ ••• ] 
produit suicidairement l'independance des individus quand 
il continue de supposer le primat de l'ordre social comme 
assise". 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
GAUCHET 
52 
Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
idem. 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 65 
p. 66 
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Thus, he continues (1): "[ ... ] la restitution du lien de 
societe a la puissance des hommes est-elle au bout de ce 
grand mouvement de depli de la dualite ontologique dont 
c'est l'originalite unique de l'histoire que d'avoir ete 
le theatre." 
In summary (2), he argues that the hallmarks of western 
religion are rationality, freedom for the individual and 
an assumption of the right of mankind to exploit his 
natural environment. 
Gauchet considers that Calvin' s idea of a City-church 
marked a stage in the evolution of the individual in 
western society, even though Calvin' s vision was of a 
complete fusion between the spiritual and the temporal. 
Calvin's concept of individualism was some way from the 
modern conception of a society of independent and self-
sufficient equals. Geneva under Calvin was more a social 
collectivity with imposed communal homogeneity than a 
society of free individuals. Cal vin believed that the 
individualism of its citizens could be, and should be, 
expressed in personal quests for spiritual salvation 
through worldly activity (3). 
2 . 
3. 
GAUCHET 
67 
Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 73 
p. 77 
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It was not until a central political authority, the state 
("l'Etat") became completely secular that religion could 
become a matter of a personal and private faith for each 
individual man or woman, an expression of his or her own 
code of values. Gauchet maintains that the nature of the 
bond between civic society as a whole and individuals 
changed with the emergence of the modern state, an 
institution receiving its political legitimacy from a 
specific act of delegation by sovereign individuals rather 
than from a claimed divine authority. The result was a 
freeing of the individual from obligation towards the 
central political authority; the political and 
administrative institution became the state and autonomous 
human beings gained control of themselves (1). 
He summarizes the logical outcome of western religious 
experience, that is, the principle of individuality: (2): 
1. 
2. 
"Ainsi l'histoire du principe d'individualit6 se 
confond-elle avec le proces d'expression et de 
transcendance: il 6merge avec elle, sous forme timide 
d'int6riorit6i il passe dans les faits en fonction 
absolument seul devant un dieu absolument hors de ce 
mondei le citoyen seul et libre devant l'incarnation 
dans l'Etat souverain de l'autonomie humaine: mutation 
de rapport a l'autre monde et r6volution de rapport 
entre les cr6atures de ce monde, deux figures 
comp16mentaires du mouvement religieux occidental a 
son terme." 
GAUCHET 
79 
Le desenchantement du monde, OPe cit. p. 
idem. pp. 79-80 
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Upon this basis, there were two developments unique to 
Christian western Europe which shaped subsequent political 
evolution: the growth of the state (ll'Etat") as a discrete 
and autonomous entity, and the proliferation of economic 
activity built around production rather than trade, 
changing communal economies from a basis of sUbsistence to 
a market orientation national in extent as western mankind 
assumed for himself the right to exploit his natural 
environment. Gauchet describes both as elements in 
religious rejection (1), as religious indebtedness to a 
Divine Authority evolved into, remarkably, a duty to create 
(2). This provided what he calls "l'energie du changement" 
(3), specifically as far as man's relationship with nature, 
that is, with his environment, is concerned. 
The outstanding characteristic of the application of this 
original and decisive lIenergie de changement" was (4): "sa 
dimension economique ou dynamique, 
liberation-mobilisation 
correspond". 
de forces 
l'extraordinaire 
laquelle il 
1- GAUCHET Le desenchantent du monde, Ope cit. p. 82 
2. idem. p. 92 
3 • idem. p. 90 
4 . idem. p. 91 
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In addition, Christianity's specificity, as compared to 
Buddhism or Islam (1), was that it rejected what Gauchet 
calls stabilizing solutions, amounting to either the lack 
of involvement of Buddhism in the affairs of this world or 
the complete submission to the Divine will of Islam. Rather 
for Christian western Europe, Gauchet argues, there could 
be (2): 
"Ni doctrine radicalement escapiste, ni morale de la 
parfaite soumission, ni vraie possibilite de pur 
renoncement meme si l'option a durablement 
represente une tentation majeure." 
In short, Gauchet argues, in Christian Western Europe 
secular economic efficacy came to be identified with 
spiritual virtue (3), thus providing a solid base for the 
evolution of more or less autonomous individuals (4) and, 
for these individuals, the concomitant (5): "[ ... ] liberte 
d'organiser son labeur en laquelle s'esquisse cette 
anteriorite de la relation aux choses sur le lien de 
societe qui constituera le coeur de l'individualisme 
economique des modernes [ ... ]". 
1- GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. 
pp. 93-95 
2. idem. p. 96 
3. idem. p. 99 
4. idem. p. 114 
5. idem. p. 116 
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with this evolution, the nature of political power changed, 
resulting in the genesis and birth of the modern state. 
What was needed by a society in which economic expansion 
through efficient markets was, in Gauchet's words (1) "[l]a 
perpetuite collective". Primacy was given to effective 
administration and the maintenance of an ordered 
environment in which contracts were honoured and legal 
redress was obtainable at the expense of military glory, 
conquest and domination. 
Gauchet considers this development to be of fundamental 
importance. He maintains that (2): 
1. 
2. 
"[ ... ] 1 'emergence de l'Etat apparait clairement comme 
I' ev€mernent maj eur de l' histoire humaine. Elle ne 
marque pas une etape dans un progres continu de 
differenciation des fonctions sociales et de 
stratification des statuts. Elle ne represente pas un 
surgissement inexplicable venant abolir par 
malencontre un ordre plus nature 1 et plus juste. Elle 
correspond a une gigantesque remaniement des 
articulations consti tuti ves de l' etabl issement huma in, 
a une transformation, au sens strict du terme -- tous 
les elements du dispositif d'avant se trouvent dans le 
dispositif d'apres, autrement repartis et lies." 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
117 
idem. p. x ("Presentation") 
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Describing modern man as "homo oeconomicus" (1) and modern 
individualism as economic individualism, Gauchet summarizes 
the achievements of what he calls the Christian revolution 
and avers that this revolution had three main components 
(2) : 
"Un changement d' assiette du pouvoir poli tique par 
delocalisation du souverain incarnateur, une 
transformation de la sociabilite religieuse a la fois 
par la specification d'une communaute de salut, et par 
l'elargissement de l'autorite sacerdotale en fonction 
de la necessite d'une hermeneutique du mystere divin, 
une reforme de l'etre-au-monde, enfin, de fayon plus 
generale, par division des imperatifs et 
l'impossibilite de hierarchiser de fayon stable entre 
consentement et refus, independance et soumiss ion: 
telles nous paraissent etre les trois composantes 
fondamentales de la revolution chretienne." 
Thus, Gauchet argues, the two strands which make up the 
dominant features of contemporary Western civil societies, 
that is, the power of the state and national productive 
economic activity built around a market economy, have their 
origins in the unique nature of the evolution of 
Christianity in Western Europe over several centuries. As 
these strands developed over the centuries, they were 
accompanied by a concomitant -- and inevitable in the 
circumstances -- fundamental reassessment of the nature 
of the union between the governing and the governed, the 
peak of which is reached with what Gauchet calls (3) "la 
coIncidence claire des volontes individuelles au sein du 
souverain". 
2. 
3. 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
126 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 202 
p. 251 
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A prime element in Gauchet' s basic thesis is that the 
sacral element of devotion to a concept, which used to be 
removed from day-to-day human activity, is now 
reincorporated in this activity, not for the glorification 
of a deity, as in the past, but for the glorification of 
the individual (1): 
He 
"A savoir [ ... ] que l'originalitA radicale de 
l'Occident moderne tient toute a la reincorporation au 
coeur du lien et de l'activitA des hornmes de l'elAment 
sacral qui les a depuis toujours modeles du dehors." 
maintains that the evolution of contemporary 
individualism rests intellectually on a foundation evolved 
from ancient society and is based upon a sUbjective 
relationship (2): 
"Le plus moderne meme de la philosophie du contrat -
l'artificialisrne individualiste prend tacite 
appui sur un reste de representation ancienne des 
conditions d'existence du lien social la 
coIncidence (consciente) de l'atome avec le tout et la 
conjonction (reflechie) de la communaute politique 
prise en corps avec son principe instituant. Ou pour 
le dire autrernent, c' est aI' intArieur toujours du 
modEHe de la societe assujettie que s' est operee 
l'invention du social-sujet." 
1. GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p.i 
("Presentation") 
2 . idem. -- p. 251 
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The consequence of this "artificialisme individualiste" in 
contemporary France may be seen from a double viewpoint: 
the social implementation of sovereignty as being freedom 
for individuals to evolve and the political implementation 
as being a generalization of the role of the state (1). 
1. GAUCHET The Disenchantment of the World, 
Princeton, 1997, p. 182. The original 
French text is (p. 264): "11 r~sulte 
deux choses de cette ~volution 
associant l'exercice social de la 
souveraint~ comme libert~ du devenir 
et son double politique comme 
g~n~ralisation du role de l'Etat: une 
transformation de la figure de l'avenir 
et une transformation du dispositif au 
travers duquel son souci prend corps." 
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The separation of civic society and the state 
Gauchet emphasizes the acceptance of this freedom of 
individuals to evolve and links it to the role of the 
modern state; he distinguishes "l' Etat" from the wider 
civil society in a development which might be thought to 
be at the heart of the evolution of "liberalisme" in France 
in the last decades of the twentieth century. civil society 
retains the element of a collective self-presence in a 
rapidly changing social, economic and political 
environment; the state is no longer the agent of 
immutability. 
This, Gauchet insists, is a remarkable development (1). 
1. 
"Le remarquable, en regard, avec la subjectivation 
occidentale de l'etre collectif, c'est de faire naitre 
l'immuable du changement meme. Plus des agents 
visibles non seulement se succedent a travers le 
temps, mais innovent, ajoutent, apportent, brisent 
avec les formes etablies et les renouvellent, plus ils 
confirment l'inalterable identite a soi qui conserve, 
a distance, I' englobant immortel cense les reunir, 
plus ils en alimentent l'invisible individualite, plus 
ils en certifient la perpetuite transcendante. D'ou, 
soit dit au passage, la pertinence particuliere que 
conserve envers et contre tout la notion de progres 
s'agissant de designer cette maniere de presence 
immobile de l'etre collectif a lui-meme au milieu des 
bouleversements d'un univers materiel par ailleurs en 
expansion." 
GAUCHET Le desenohantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
270-271 
He emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
separation of the state from civil society, what he calls 
the (l) "autonomisation de la societe civile, cela veut 
dire liberation d 'un pole pratique de mouvement par rapport 
a un pole transendant de stabilite," as part of the culture 
of change which marks contemporary society, specifically 
contemporary France. 
In France scarcely more than half a century ago, Gauchet 
points out (2), the counter-revolutionary political 
grouping which had as its objective the re-establishment 
of traditional and hierarchical "order" lost its political 
credibility. The same has now happened to what used to be 
thought of as the political allegiances of the future, the 
revolutionary parties. Gauchet insists that this 
development does not constitute any sort of potential 
crisis, but is in fact the recognition of a normal state 
of affairs. These political ideologies might be thought of, 
Gauchet argues, as the last vestiges of religion (3): 
2. 
3 • 
liCe qui se delite avec les ideologies, c'est la forme 
derniere, vestigale qu'aura revetue le religieux en 
notre monde -- I' ul time recomposi tion a avoir ete 
possible de l'image d'un ordre social laYc en terms 
d'ordre du dehors, soit par decalque du contenu 
(eschatologie) , soit par emprunt de structure 
(eternite 'bourgeoise' de rapports sociaux simplement 
soumis a progres, de l'autorite familiale aux lois du 
marche, en passant par l'obligation politique)." 
GAUCHET Le Desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
272 
idem. 
idem. 
p. 266 
p. 267 
Gauchet signals the importance of understanding apparently 
contradictory elements in contemporary relationships 
between civil society and "l'Etat", what he calls (1) 
"cette double dynamique si diroutante au premier abord de 
la libiralisation et de l' etatisation". civil society 
becomes the sphere of individual autonomy and social change 
(2) "devient en un sens pro fond le mouvement des 
individus". 
A principal element is the economic role of the state. 
Although Gauchet does not use the expressions, this might 
be thought of as a recognition by the state of its general 
inefficacy in micro-economic matters and the concomitant 
recognition that its role can be little more than one of 
macro-economic "fine-tuning" in an international market 
economy. He sets out the consequences (3): 
2. 
3. 
"Il en risulte notamment la separation de l'economie, 
avec la dissolution de tout plan corporatif fixant a 
l'avance, au nom des intirets superieurs de la chose 
publique, la ripartition des taches et l'adjustement 
des fonctions. Sly substitue la libre dynamique d'une 
division du travail social reglee par les seules 
necessites internes du proces de production-
consommation, nicessitis elles-memes individuellement 
assumies (liberti d'entreprendre) et anonymement 
regulees (la 'main invisible' du marche)." 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
268 
idem. p. 275 
idem. p. 273 
This represents, for Gauchet, a development of prime 
importance. What is important now in contemporary French 
society is the future, not the past, which means that any 
element of control becomes (1): "le r~gne du temps d'avant 
contre la regulation par apr~s". The market brings an 
anonymous collective order resulting from the actions of 
individuals in a situation in which no single individual 
has the power to impose his will on the collectivity. The 
result is that Western societies in general manifest a 
certain ambiguity, being at one and the same time (2) "les 
plus en proie a un bouleversement de tous les instants et 
les mieux solidement ancrees dans la permanence". 
This is a result of the political neutralization of 
economic power, Gauchet avers (3). This neutralization of 
economic power is a mark of the state's success; 
entrepreneurs know that they cannot control the political 
process. Accepting that the future is more important than 
the past, there is a general acceptance that the role of 
the state amounts to a guarantee to individuals of their 
right to be individuals, that they do not have to conform. 
GAUCHET 
2. 
3. 
Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
274 
idem. 
idem. p. 276 
This situation is what Gauchet calls (1) "la legitimation 
par l'avenir", which might be thought of as another way of 
describing market forces. The effect of the spirit of 
market forces on political conflict means that the 
erstwhile quasi-revolutionary confrontation in the French 
polity has ceded place to what Gauchet calls (2) 
"institutionalized conflict". The classic French political 
confrontation, echoing the schisms of the Revolution, had, 
Gauchet insists, little to do with democracy. Effective 
democracy has to move beyond mere broad intellectual 
consensus and become an (3) "[ ... ] etroite association au 
sein d' une volonte collective pleinement consciente d' elle-
meme". 
This leads to the contention that modern effective 
democracy can no longer be an affair of class conflict and 
of conflicting economic interests. Gauchet has no doubt 
that contemporary political conflict (4): 
1. 
3. 
4. 
"[ ... ] est ni plus ni mains l'equivalent formel, au 
plan de I' organisation de la societe pal i tique, du 
marche comme principe de structuration de la societe 
politique, et le pendant necessaire, a l'interieur du 
systeme politique, de l'impersonnalite du pouvoir". 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
277 
idem. p. 279 
idem. 
idem. p. 280 
If "market forces" in the widest sense are to govern the 
practice of contemporary politics, if the present is to be 
considered as being controlled by the future with its 
attendant unforeseen events, then the impact of the market 
in this sense on the practice of democracy is a matter of 
fundamental concern. Gauchet would appear to be optimistic 
(1) : 
"Le developpement democratique moderne se sera de la 
sorte deroule de bout en bout sous le signe de 
l'imprevisible et de la surprise. Nullement sous celui 
de l'invention (emphasis in original. JT). Deux 
siecles de mouvement historique n'ont pas ajoute un 
seul principe de base, une seule regIe fondamentale a 
ceux et celles que I' on connalt depuis le XVIIle 
siecle. Les projets politiques les plus extremes 
d'aujourd'hui --le conseillisme ou l'autogestion -- ne 
font que porter a leurs dernieres consequences des 
possibles contenus dans les premisses, a savoir les 
droits de l'individu. A ce titre, par tout un cote, la 
democratie est entree dans les faits en pleine 
connaissance de cause, en stricte conformi te, d' un 
bout a l'autre, avec ses principes de depart." 
Thinking about "liberalisme" in late twentieth century 
France cannot avoid a consideration of the role and the 
power of "l'Etat". At the same time it might be thought 
that any major work analysing the political dimension of 
the evolution of religion would also have to take into 
account the relationship between "l'Eglise" and "l'Etat" 
in French history. 
GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
282 
Gauchet has no doubt about the development of the state at 
the expense of the Church (1): "[ .•. ] on a eu un 
deve10ppement de la separation de l'Etat dans les 
proportions defiant toute anticipation", a development 
which he calls: "[ .•. ] le passage d'un syst~me de 
l'exteriorite a un systeme de la separation." 
In other words, Gauchet says, the impingement of "l'Etat" 
on the social scene in France meant that this institution 
became an integral part of day-to-day life, acting with 
detachment and indifference. Whereas the all-pervading 
influence of the Church as a spiritual power in an earlier 
period was patently outside everyday affairs, the power of 
the state was temporal, immanent and transcendent (2). 
This was a development of very great significance; 
according to Gauchet (3): 
"L'entree dans la modernite politique, en effet, c'est 
l'appropriation monopolistique par l'Etat de 
l'institution du lien de societe et l'irrestistible 
dessaisie des anciens ilots se socialite de leur 
dimension publique." 
1. GAUCHET -- Le desenchantement du monde, op. cit. p. 
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2. idem. p. 285 
3. idem. 
The minutely organized, all-pervasive, omni-present power 
of the state assures citizens a day-to-day equanimity which 
was formerly, in theory at least, emanating from a divine 
authority. Perversely, perhaps, as far as the state is 
concerned, the result for civil society became (1): 
"FatalitA de la dAsymbolisation du monde: elle appelle son 
administration." 
The state's role became a major social determinant, to the 
detriment of ideologies and religious faiths (2): "C'est 
1 'administration du dAtail, pourtant, qui I'a ernportA pour 
finir sur la sublirnitA des doctrines." Yet, paradoxically, 
there operates what Gauchet calls (3): "[ ... ] une loi de 
dAveloppernent de l'Etat en dAmocratie [ .•. ]". The role and 
the influence of the state seems to grow as the state 
itself becomes less intrusive, or, as Gauchet summarizes: 
"[ ... ] autre maniere de dire qu' il gagne en difference 
pratique ce qu'il perd en extArioritA symbolique". 
GAUCHET 
2. 
3. 
Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
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Gauchet's summary bears witness to the characteristic 
elegance of his prose (1): 
" [ ... ] le pouvoir moderne [est] le plus formidable 
agent de connaissance qu' on ai t vu, mais dans la 
mesure Oll ce n' est pas sa science qu' il essaie de 
faire prevaloir; le plus omnipresent, le plus obsedant 
les legislateurs, mais pas que ce n'est pas sa regle 
qu'il pretend imposer. C'est que la depossession est 
ici l' instrument de I' approbation: tout ce travail 
immense d' extraction du savoir et de redef ini tion 
generalisee des normes n'a autre necessite que 
d'assurer au corps collectif comme tel sa souveraine 
determination de lui-meme. Insistons-y: au corps 
collectif comme tel, c'est-a-dire a personne en 
particulier d' entre ses membres, les detenteurs du 
pouvoir pas plus que les simples citoyens, le 
processus s'accomplissant au travers de l'action des 
uns et des autres dans une egale indifference a leur 
conscience." 
In other works (2) Gauchet traces the historical 
development of thinking about" liberalisme" in France since 
the Revolution. In these works, he expresses ideas relevant 
to the development of liberal, pluralistic democracy in 
contemporary France. 
1. 
2. 
GAUCHET Le desenchantement du monde, Ope cit. p. 
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GAUCHET, Marcel (ed.) -- CONSTANT, Benjamin -- De la 
liberte chez les modernes, Collection 
Pluriel, Livre de poche, Paris, 1980 
and idem. -- "Tocqueville, L'Amerique 
et nous" in Libre, vol. 7, 1980, pp. 
43-120. See also my bibliography. 
He argues that Tocqueville was mistaken to postulate 
democracy as being a profound agreement of minds arising 
out of the conflict of opposing ideas. Rather, he says, as 
far as the historical development of democracy in France 
was concerned, the conflict of opposing ideas opened a 
long-irreconcilable schism between "le pass~ hi~rarchique 
et le pr~sent ~galitaire". Thus democracy came to mean (1) 
"l'existence de l'inconciliable au sein de la soci~t~". 
He maintains that the irreconcilable elements of the schism 
were (2): 
"[ .•• ] d'un cot~ la sphere des interets pr1ves et des 
regroupements collectifs que leurs convergences et 
divergences entrainent, et de l'autre cot~, bien 
distincte au plan symbolique, la sphere de la 
repr~sentation l~gitime des divisions du corps social, 
de la traduction en termes de pouvoir s'appliquant a 
l'ensemble de la soci~t~ du jeu de forces mouvant qui 
travaille celle-ci". 
This fundamental difference underlined the essential 
philosophical problem of the men who sought to implement 
the Revolutionary ethic: this ethic held that the locus of 
political power had to be sited in society as a whole, "la 
volont~ g~n~rale", in which there could be no room for 
parties and factions and no recognition of any difference 
between the people collectively and their representatives. 
1. 
2. 
In "Tocqueville, l'Am~rique et nous", Libre, Ope cit. 
p. 64 
idem. 
La Revolution des pouvoirs 
In an introductory chapter to a work which must be regarded 
as being complimentary to his overall perception of 
societal relationships to the state (1), Gauchet analyses 
the evolution from the hitherto apparently irreconcilable 
conf 1 ict inherent in French democracy into the modern 
democratic pluralism of the Fifth Republic, an evolution 
which, he says, forms a case study (2): 
"Le devenir politique fran9ais depuis deux siecles en 
offre le cas d'ecole: l'implantation de la democratie 
contre les democrates memes, contre les valeurs, les 
prejuges et les conceptions des heritiers republicains 
de la Revolution, y compris lorsqu'elle s'est 
accomplie au travers de leur action." 
This "implantation de la democratie" in late twentieth-
century France involved a reconciliation between principles 
and practice and involved a step, apparently simple from 
the point of view of outsiders, but of fundamental 
significance for French republicans, that is, giving 
primacy to the executive at the expense of the legislature. 
As Gauchet summarizes (3): 
"Le phenomene reste pour l'essentiel a penser. Faire 
la theorie de la democratie aujourd'hui, c'est 
expliquer en quoi ce pouvoir de decison et d'action 
est au moins autant, sinon plus 'representatif', par 
sa nature meme, (emphasis in original. JT) que le 
pouvoir d' expression de la volonte generale qui se 
materialise dans llediction des lois." 
1. GAUCHET, Marcel -- La Revolution des pouvoirs: La 
souveraintete, le peuple et la 
representation, 1789-1799, Gallimard, 
Paris, 1995 
2. idem. p. 13 
3. idem. p. 16 
This amounts to a pragmatic dilution of the principles 
enunciated at the time of the Revolution and firmly 
defended subsequently. This dilution manifests itself in 
the recognition and acceptance of the need for a plurality 
of political powers in the society-state relationship, a 
(1) : 
"[p]luralite des pouvoirs qui suppose elle-meme comme 
sa cle de voute l'existence d'un pouvoir tiers d'une 
nature tres speciale, que de fortes et contradictoires 
contraintes de definition enferment dans le role de 
gardien de la constitution". 
Gauchet outlines three phases in this development (2): the 
acceptance of the idea of plurality itself, the concomitant 
and linked development of a quasi-independent (at least on 
constitutional interpretations) judiciary with an informed 
and powerful public opinion, and the unambiguous 
recognition that ultimate sovereignty does belong with the 
people. This last underlines the gradual divorce of the 
hitherto apparently omnipotent "Etat" from the wider civic 
society. 
1. GAUCHET -- La Revolution des pouvoirs, Ope cit. p. 26 
2. idem. pp. 27-51 
Gauchet outlines the reasons for past French uneasiness 
wi th the concept of a plurality of political forces, 
essentially reasons emanating from the universalist monism 
descended from the Revolution (1). The plain fact, now 
widely recognized, was that the classic French republican 
model had become anachronistic; it could not ensure 
effective government in the market place of the global 
economy and, in addition, the rapid urbanization of France 
had had the effect of weakening, if not destroying, 
traditional communal solidarity. As Gauchet explains (2): 
.. [ ... ] la division du travail social atteint un degre 
critique qui tend a rendre indechiffrable la 
coordination d'ensemble des activites. Et, parmi 
celles-ci, la reorganisation de l'economie, sous les 
traits de la grande entreprise dependante du marche 
financier, confere a la prophetie de l' uni verselle 
soumission aux lois d'airan du capital un angoissant 
surcroit de credibilite. Tandis que, dans le creuset 
de l'indifference urbaine, l'individu acheve de se 
desincrire et se delier, la communaute se delite en 
foule anomique. Autant de derives grosses d'un peril 
de dislocation face auquel les regimes deliberatifs 
semblent condamnes par leur incurable faiblesse." 
Gauchet considers the political transformation of the 
France of the Fifth Republic as being little short of 
miraculous (3). No longer did France have to think in terms 
of an imposed unity, of a planned authoritarianism or of 
corporatist organization. 
GAUCHET 
2 . 
3 • 
La revolution des pouvoirs, Ope cit. pp. 
29 
idem. p. 30 
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The evolving society is based upon an informed awareness 
of national issues, an acceptance of the need for a 
coherent economic strategy related to France's place in the 
global economy, and of the recognition by politicians and 
bureaucrats of the need for openness in government (1). 
In short (2): "C'est cette incorporation massive du social 
dans la politique qui explique, d'ailleurs, la maniere dont 
le systeme representatif a trouve son equilibre durant 
cette phase decisive de consolidation." As a result, 
"l'Etat" is seen as being less omnipotent and more agnostic 
vis-a-vis civic society and the practice of politics has 
matured. At the same time, thanks largely to the 
universality of television, the political process and 
"l'Etat" have lost any arcane features they may once have 
had. Men and women aspiring to power have to ensure that 
their message is audio-visually communicable and public 
opinion has become a reality, another aspect of the divorce 
of "l'Etat" from civil society. Concomitantly, the public 
exercise of its responsibilities by the Conseil 
constitutionnel is seen by French citizens as providing a 
necessary and respected brake on the activities of 
politicians; Gauchet calls this duality (3) "le couple de 
l'opinion et du juge". 
2. 
3. 
GAUCHET La Revolution des pouvoirs, Ope cit. p. 
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Gauchet continues (1): 
"C'est a une double exteriorisation que nous avons 
assiste, avec l'affirmation de l'opinion comme 
instance globale, au-dela de la societe concrete et 
des stratifications, et avec l'elevation du juge comme 
pouvoir du dernier ressort, au-dela de la tache 
gestionnaire des pouvoirs de gouvernement. L'opinion 
comme mise en image et en signes, comme mise en 
representation de I' independance de la societe par 
rapport aux pouvoirs. Le juge comme rappel de l'action 
publique a sa regIe, comme renvoi reflexif de l'action 
conduite au nom du peuple aux principes par rapport 
auxquels elle prend sens." 
The effect of the operation of public opinion and an 
independent judiciary (at least as far as monitoring the 
operation of the constitution is concerned) is, Gauchet 
maintains, of a double control on the political executive, 
a control from above and a control from below (2). The 
power of public opinion is a disengaged power; it is the 
power of those who have no opinion as well as being that 
of those who do and (3) " [ ••• ] c ' est du cote de ce 
desengagement qu'il faut chercher le secret de sa 
puissance." 
1. GAUCHET 
2. 
3. 
La Revolution des pouvoirs, Ope cit. p. 
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Public opinion underlines and confirms citizenship; it 
provides a link between individuals and the wider society, 
a fact which has led to (1) "[ ... ] l'irrepressible montee 
de sa legi timi te, en depi t -- ou a cause de son 
caractere insaisissible". Gauchet argues that the political 
elevation of the judiciary has its origin in the same 
sources as that of public opinion, that is (2): [ ... ] par 
I' affirmation de l'individu, sous 1 'aspect de la 
revendication de ses droits". In contemporary France, he 
continues, it is this (3): "[ ... ] individu etabli dans son 
independance grace a la collectivisation des risques de 
dependance en vient a regarder les creances qu'il tire sur 
le collectif comme autant de droits individuels et 
universels". 
This strengthening of the political position of the 
individual leads Gauchet to his third point, that of the 
new-found effectiveness of popular sovereignty. This 
affirmation of popular political power is a product of the 
operation of the Constitutional Council and the voice of 
pUblic opinion ( 4) • "Les barrieres que le juge 
constitutionnel oppose aux entreprises des gouvernements 
sont bien reelles, et la press ion de l'opinion sur leur 
conduite n'est pas a demontrer." 
2. 
3. 
4. 
GAUCHET La Revolution des pouvoirs, op. cit. p. 
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Yet over and above this undeniably significant development 
is a new awareness of the ultimate power of the people. 
Gauchet emphasizes the topical awareness in France of a 
principle which the architects of the Revolution, and those 
who followed them for almost two centuries had difficulty 
in understanding (1): "Le peuple n'est souverain que s'il 
est expressement marque qu'il l'est, et pas seulement dans 
les textes". 
1. GAUCHET La Revolution des pouvoirs, OPe cit. p. 
49 
Summary 
Gauchet argues that religion is a universal, world-wide 
phenomenon, a phenomenon which ensured in the past, inter 
alia, that the will of the individual was always 
subservient to the principle of the primacy of the social 
collectivity in the name of religious conformity. 
A development of great historical signif icance was the 
emergence in some communities of the concept of a personal 
god, a concept which had the effect of lessening the 
political power of a theocratic priesthood. This is a 
concept which is unknown in Buddhism and Islam, for 
example. It has led, in occidental societies, to a 
sustained philosophical effort on the part of mankind to 
understand and rationalise the relationship between man and 
God, an effort epitomised by the endeavour of mankind to 
establish and codify rules of social behaviour based upon 
religious principles. In Gauchet's view, this amounted to 
creating an absolute dependence by the present on the 
mythical past and hence to an unshakeable conservatism and 
determination to conformity. 
Early state forms were an authoritarian alliance of 
temporal and spiritual powers determined to impose an 
illiberal and inegalitarian social hierarchy by coercion 
and domination. 
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Christianity, by maintaining that individual men and women 
were equal before God, created an idea of pure religion, 
in other words, the concept of an innate love and respect 
for the divinity by individuals which was not related to 
religious dogma. Out of this evolved the characteristics 
of occidental mankind: rationality, individual freedom and 
the right to exploit the natural environment. 
From these roots there emerged in western Europe the 
evolution of the state as a discrete and autonomus entity 
and at the same time the proliferation of economic activity 
built around production as well as around trade. This led, 
in turn, to economic efficiency and material welfare being 
equated with spiritual values. 
The ultimate consequence was that the state, instead of 
seeking aggrandizement and expansion through domination and 
conquest, gradually assumed a role of ensuring the optimum 
operation of markets through efficient administration and 
the maintenance of an ordered environment, thus encouraging 
economic expansion and national wealth. 
This has led to a development, described by Gauchet as 
being remarkable: the separation of civil society from the 
state with the primacy of the former over the latter. 
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As a result, instead of the older concept of the present 
being in thrall to the myths of the past, the emergence of 
free market economics as a prime social motive force means 
that the present is controlled and given legitimacy by the 
future. Economic power has become neutral and entrepreneurs 
cannot control either the political or the social process. 
For contemporary France, Gauchet maintains, the implication 
of this development is that market forces have replaced the 
older institutionalized conflicts of the Third and Fourth 
Republics built around class conflict and opposing economic 
interests. This means an unambiguous acceptance of 
pluralism, an acceptance which has only been possible 
because of constitutional developments introducing a quasi-
independent judiciary, because of an informed and powerful 
public opinion and because of an ultimate recognition that 
political sovereignty does belong with the people. 
-------000-------
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Chapter 8 
Lue FERRY AND ALAIN RENAUT 
Introduction 
Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut are both Professors of 
Philosophy in the University of Paris, Ferry at Paris-VII 
and Renaut at Paris-IV Sorbonne. 
They achieved a certain fame, even notoriety, in 1985 with 
the publication of their joint La pensee 68 (1). This 
sometimes polemical but essentially closely-argued 
deconstruction of the French political thinking of the 
1960s and early 1970s, thinking based on the work of Marx, 
Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger, had a catalytic effect on 
French political thought when it was published in 1985. In 
it, Ferry and Renaut analyse what they call "le 
nietzscheisme franyais" through the work of Foucault, 
"l'heideggerianisme franyais" through the work of Derrida, 
"le marxisme franyais" (Bourdieu) and "le freudisme 
franyais" (Lacan). 
1. FERRY, Luc and RENAUT, Alain -- La pensee 68, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1985 
Subsequently, they have written jointly Des droits de 
I'homme a I'idee repubIicaine (1), the third and final 
volume of PhiIosophie politique (2), the first two volumes 
of which were written by Ferry. Each writer has a 
significant oeuvre to his credit (see bibliography for 
details) . 
In this chapter I consider only La pensee 68 and Des droits 
de I'homme a I'idee repubIicaine in order to make the task 
manageable. This selection allows me to concentrate on the 
political content of their work as distinct from the more 
purely philosophical elements. 
1. FERRY, Luc and RENAUT, Alain -- Des droits de l'homme 
a I'idee repubIicaine, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1985 
2. FERRY, Luc Philosophie politique, Presses 
Universitaires de Paris, 1985 
La pensee 68 
A critical analysis of post-structuralist philosophy, and 
especially its anti-humanist elements, form the subject 
of Ferry and Renaut's La pen see 68 (1). Dosse maintains 
that Ferry and Renaut are mistaken in correlating the 
structuralism of the 1960s with the events of May 1968 
(2). In fact, they begin their analysis with a disclaimer: 
they write that, in spite of their title, the subject of 
their work is the "philosophie franyaise des annees 68" 
(3), in other words, a specific aspect of structuralism, 
sometimes referred to as post-structuralism. 
Ferry and Renaut specifically exclude the thinking of 
Emmanuel Levinas and of Paul Ricoeur as well as the efforts 
of Jean Beaufret in introducing the thought of Heidegger 
into France, all three of whom were philosophers active in 
the decade of the 1960s. 
1. FERRY, Luc and RENAUT, Alain -- La pensee 68: Essai 
sur l'anti-humanisme contemporain, Gallimard, 
Paris, 1985. 
2. DOSSE -- Histoire du structuralisme, Vol. 1., op. 
cit. p.450. 
3. FERRY and RENAUT La pensee 68, Ope cit. p. 11. 
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Their analysis embraces, inter alia, the published works 
broadly synchronous with the year 1968 of Michel Foucault 
(Les Mots et les choses, 1966 and L'Archeoloqie du savoir, 
1969), Louis Althusser (Pour Marx, 1965, the first volumes 
of Lire le capital, 1965 and Lenine et la philosophie and 
Marx devant Heqel, 1969), Jacques Derrida (L'Ecriture et 
la Difference and De la qrammatoloqie, both in 1967, 
Jacques Lacan (Ecrits, 1966) and Pierre Bourdieu (Les 
Heritiers, 1964 and La Reproduction, 1970). These works 
constitute, for Ferry and Renaut, "la pensee 68"; the two 
philosophers maintain unequivocally that this thought is 
anti-humanist; "la philosophie franQaise des annees 68, 
elle, a resolument choisi le parti de l'anti-humanisme" 
( 1) • 
Ferry and Renaut argue that "la question de l'humanisme 
[ •.. ] est sans doute la question centrale de la philosophie 
contemporaine," (2). They give two reasons for this claim: 
first, it is necessary in contemporary France to ensure 
clarity of the concept of the subject and the possibility 
of giving specific values ("valorisation") to mankind, and 
second, even if it is not possible to go back to the values 
of the philosophy of the Enlightenment , it is equally 
impossible to scrap these values completely, as was the 
wish of "la pensee 68". 
1. 
2. 
FERRY and RENAUT -- La Pensee 68, Ope cit. p. 18 
idem. -- p. 22 
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In short, they are seeking a non-metaphysical definition 
of humanism; they recognize that "la pensee 68" had a 
virtue in that it did bring into question the metaphysical 
basis of what they call "traditional and naYve humanism". 
Ferry and Renaut set out four discrete characteristics of 
what they persist in calling "la pensee 68": a. the theme 
of the end of philosophy; b. the paradigm of philosophical 
lineage ("le paradigme de la geneologie"); c. the collapse 
("dissolution") of the idea of truth; and d., the 
historicisation of categories which implies the end of all 
reference to the universal (1). Each one of these 
characteristics had at its heart a denial of humanism. 
The theme of the "death of philosophy" was common to 
structuralist thinking. There were many variations of the 
theme, but two were dominant, reflecting the two principal 
deconstruction models of the time, Marxism and the 
Nietzschean/Heideggerean lineage. For Marxists, for example 
Althusser, classical philosophy was "petit-bourgeois 
ideology", a path which led nowhere, a pointless exercise; 
science was the true philosophy, replacing classical 
philosophy and ideology. 
FERRY and RENAUT -- La Pensee 68, Ope cit. chapter 
I, --"Le Type ideal des 'sixties' 
philosophantes", pp.27-37 
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The second, expounded by Derrida (following Heidegger) in 
his De la qrarnmatoloqie, maintained that the deconstruction 
of metaphysics would permit thought to be released from 
its captivity "in this period of onto-theology, in this 
philosophy of the presence" and that classical philosophy 
had very little to say that mattered. The only task which 
continued for philosophy as such lay in a deconstruction 
of the history of philosophy; thus philosophy became a 
dubious activity, condemned to ensure its survival only by 
the continuous celebration of its own death. 
The theme of the paradigm of philosophical lineage, common 
to Marxism, to the philosophy evolved from the work of 
Freud and to the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition, was 
that philosophical activity should stick to the method of 
philosophical lineage in the sense understood by Nietzsche. 
According to Nietzsche, the fundamental philosophical 
question would no longer be "what is it that ... ?" but "who 
is it who ... ?", an idea taken on board by Foucault, among 
others. In other words, in examining any discourse, it is 
more important to find out about the external conditions 
leading to the production of the discourse rather than to 
the discourse itself. These might be thought of either as 
a product of historicism, or of a pre-determined 
unconsciousness or from the subconscious, depending on 
whether the interpretation is Marxist, Nietzschean or 
Freudian. 
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The rationalist Marxist lineage, which follows Hegel' s 
Phenomenology of the spirit, holds that the historical 
process is a result of the deployment of reason which finds 
itself ultimate justification in absolute knowledge ("le 
Savoir absolu"). 
The Nietzschean lineage is antinomically opposed to this 
rationalist concept, as is in part that of the Lacanian 
psychoanalytical concept derived from Freud. It holds that 
any human action is capable of an infinite number of 
variations. In other words, there is nothing but the 
"signifiant", and there is no way to come back to the 
original position of a "signifier". 
As to the collapse of the idea of truth, traditionally 
truth has been defined as the appropriateness of the 
subject to the matter and as being non-contradictory, or 
coherent. Nietzsche, followed by Heidegger, pointed out 
that if there is no benchmark, appropriateness loses all 
sense; in addition, an insistence upon coherence rules out 
any possible hypothesis relating to the unconscious. 
Marxism has long had difficulty in taking a position 
between these two concepts of truth, the traditional and 
what might be called the "Heideggerian". Either there is 
an idealist myth, part of the "tissue of errors" or 
"theoretical deviation" belonging to pre-history inherent 
in the traditional concept, or it is necessary to accept 
the Heideggerian position that a given discourse may be 
conditioned and determined by history. 
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The final characteristic, that of the historicisation of 
categories and the end of all reference to the universal, 
has also two contrasting positions. These are, first, 
rational historicism (following the precepts of Hegel) 
which holds that categories are historic and that their 
deployment follows a perfectly systematic logic. Second, 
the historicism of Nietzsche and Heidegger holds also that 
categories are historic, in that they are intrinsically 
linked to time, but refuse to accept a causal chain of 
linkage. 
These four characteristics of "la pensee 68" were the 
forerunners of significant effects, including what Ferry 
and Renaut call "stylistic effects" ("les effets du 
style"). By this they would appear to mean self-conscious 
philosophical attitudes. They outline two of the most 
apparent: first, the cult of paradox together with an 
insistent claim to complexity, and second, deliberate 
marginality and conspiracy. 
In summary, Ferry and Renaut maintain that "la pensee 68" 
had little lasting significance. What is important, 
however, is an analysis of the arguments behind the four 
characteristics which they have defined. This analysis 
requires a recognition of the intellectual debt owed by the 
French philosophers behind "la pensee 68" to German 
philosophers, specifically, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and 
Heidegger (1). 
1. FERRY and RENAUT La Pensee 68, op. cit. p. 46 
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Ferry and Renaut make clear that, in making this point, 
they are not implying a criticism of their French 
colleagues. They argue that French thought has radicalised 
(emphasis in original. JT) the themes taken from German 
philosophy and that it is from this radicalisation that the 
anti-humanist content of "la pensee 68" was born. 
Foucault (1) never ceased to acknowledge his intellectual 
debt to Heidegger and, through Heidegger, to Nietzsche. An 
analysis of his major work Histoire de la folie a l'age 
classique suggests that Foucault viewed the emergence of 
classical reason as coinciding with a rej ection of the 
irrational (therefore of the mad) in the name of 
rationality. His thinking was thus in tune with the anti-
normative ideas of the events of May 1968: it would be 
sufficient to abolish norms in order to get rid of the 
problems they create. Evoking figures from the past 
regarded as outstanding examples of madness (Goya, Sade, 
Nietzsche), Foucault postulated the unfettered exercise of 
violence as the free exercise of man's sovereignty over and 
against nature. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- La Pensee 68, op. cit. chapter 
Ill, pp. 105-164 
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Overcoming reason means that the irrationality of madness, 
or unreason, will have triumphed over those who would deny 
it. If the history of madness is related to the history of 
the internal contradictions of liberal economics, with its 
alternating phases of crisis and growth, Foucault's 
analysis is not too far removed from that of Marx, in that 
it points to an absurdity in bourgeois society and in the 
domination of one class over another. It is also 
characteristic of French philosophy of the period in that 
it evokes constantly two scenarios: that of a "nietzsch~o­
heideggerienne" critique of reason in the name of "without-
reason", of the irrational even, and that of a critique of 
bourgeois rationality in the name of another rationality. 
Integral to most of the variants which made up "la pens~e 
68" was a denunciation of reason as the instrument of 
power. 
In an interview published in 1984, Foucault asked himself 
the question: "Is it necessary to put reason on trial?" His 
answer is revealing: "To my mind, nothing would be more 
sterile. First, because the field to be covered has nothing 
to do with guilt or innocence. Then, because it is absurd 
to dismiss reason as the contrary entity to non-reason. 
Finally, because such a trial would condemn us to play the 
arbitary and tedious role of rationality or irrationality." 
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Ferry and Renaut maintain that Foucault's Histoire de la 
folie is an inaugural work in the totality of "la pens~e 
68" and points to its essential anti-humanism, not in the 
sense that it might seem to be liberating unbridled 
violence but in the sense that Foucault's view of 
subjectivity destroys all possibility of a genuine dialogue 
between consciences which might be ready to think through 
their differences on the basis of individual identity. For 
Foucault, "the other" becomes "the total other", the "bar-
bar". This link between his critigue of subjectivity and 
his rejection of the problem of communication, his denial 
of the possibility of consensus (a position which he 
softened somewhat later in his career), marked his 
contribution to "la pens~e 68". 
Turning to the work of Derrida and its links to 
"L'heideggerianisme franQais" (1), Ferry and Renaut stress 
that they are focussing on Derrida' s interpretation of 
Heidegger and hence exclude the work of, for example, 
Beaufret, who, in the 1950s, was the first to introduce 
Heidegger's thought into France. They also argue that in 
so far as they are concerned specifically with the 
philosophy of "the sixties", they have chosen Derrida 
rather than Lyotard for their analysis, because the 
latter's close links with Heidegger' s thought did not 
become fully apparent until the publication of his Le 
Differend in 1983. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- La Pensee 68, Ope cit. Chapter IV 
pp. 165-197 
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In essence, Ferry and Renaut argue, through concern with 
linguistics and through his ingenious word games, 
specifically his idea of "la difference" and "la 
differance" ( "La differance semble nous ramener a la 
difference ontologique" and "la differance est ce qui rend 
possible la presentation de l'etant-present") Derrida 
questions the possibility of the authority of presence 
which has existed throughout the history of metaphysics and 
which cUlminates in the accession of subjectivity, that is 
to say, in modern humanism. 
Ferry and Renaut propose a formula: "Derrida = Heidegger 
+ le style de Derrida" , which means, of course, that the 
essential problems they find in Heidegger's thought 
continue in that of Derrida. These problems are twofold: 
those of fact and those of principle. 
The problems of fact revolve around the challenge to and 
elimination of reason and of individual will in human 
actions implicit in the thought of both Heidegger and 
Derrida. Heidegger considers the idea of giving specific 
values ("valorisation") to mankind a blasphemy; Derr ida 
wrote in his positions (1972): "That which has seemed to 
me to be necessary and urgent, in our situation in history, 
is a general determination of the conditions of the 
emergence and the limits of philosophy, of metaphysics and 
of all that which bears upon them and of all that which 
they mean." 
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As to the problems of pr inciple, these spr ing from the 
problems of fact. It is necessary either to accept these 
difficulties of fact, which means recognizing that no 
discourse between reason and will is possible, and thus 
accepting a gloomy view of the future of thought, or not 
to see (or to pretend not to see?) this difficulty, and 
simply seek an "ecriture de la differance". 
In short, "l'heideggerianisme franQais" is to be regarded 
as anti-humanist because of its insistence upon the 
"destitution du sujet". 
As to "le marxisme franyais" (1), Ferry and Renaut explain 
that they have chosen the sociology of Bourdieu to 
illustrate their thesis rather than the oeuvre of Al thusser 
for three reasons. First, they aver, Bourdieu's work is 
particularly representative of the attitude of "les annees 
68" which consisted of proclaiming the death of philosophy 
and of celebrating its handing on to another type of 
discourse. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- La Pensee 68, Ope cit. Chapter V, 
pp. 199-235 
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In this sense, they argue, the sociology of knowledge is 
to Bourdieu what cultural history (or the history of 
morality) is to Foucault, the writing of the non-book to 
Derrida or a renewal of the curative practice of Lacan. In 
each of the four cases, an approach partly animated by one 
or several philosophies has tended to develop over and 
above philosophy, independent of all philosophies, against 
philosophy, or in the margins of philosophy. 
In the case of Marxism, this concept clearly takes on a 
specific form: that of the break between philosophy and 
science which one can assuredly analyse in Althusser I s work 
just as much as in that of Bourdieu. However, in so far as 
Bourdieu sets out to theorise and to practice "le metier 
de sociologie", he is using philosophy to argue the case 
for the end of philosophy. 
second, it is through the work of Bourdieu that French 
Marxism of the 1960s continues to maintain an intellectual 
place, whereas the work of Al thusser, even among his 
disciples, has become very dated. Finally, Bourdieu I s 
influence has meant that French Marxism has been able to 
survive the crisis of international Marxism. 
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The nature of the Marxism of Bourdieu, analogous to the 
heideggerianism of Derrida or even to the Nietzscheanism 
of Foucault, is profoundly representati ve of the 
intellectual style of the 1960s. In each case, what 
characterises this style (and ensures its French character) 
is that the reference to the founding father tends to 
become an euphemism and takes on a certain distance, even 
open criticism, in order to give the appearance of a new 
and original position. One of the traits of French 
philosophy of the 1960s consisted, in many cases, in 
forgetting its theoretical identity. 
Bourdieu's general position could be summarised as being 
a generalised materialism, described as "une variante 
distinguee du marxisme vulgaire" (1)", or as a marxism 
denied, and it is as such that it makes up a component of 
"la pensee 68" with which it shares the themes of an end 
of philosophy or of the death of the subject in the 
exacerbation of its genealogical lineage. 
In an interview in 1984 published in Le Nouvel Observateur 
on the occasion of the publication of his Homo Academicus, 
Bourdieu made clear his attitude towards philosophers, 
describing them as "ces gens qui parlent sans cesse de 
doute radical, d'activite critique, de deconstruction 
] " [ . . . . (2) 
1. FERRY and RENAUT, op. cit. p.217 
idem. P. 228 
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Turning to Lacan, his contribution (1) to "la pensee 68" 
lies, Ferry and Renaut maintain, in his attitude to the 
theory of sUbjectivity. They consider this central to their 
argument for two reasons. First, there is the need to 
relate Lacan's thinking to the question of humanism which, 
very explicitly, Lacan questions in the context of his own 
doctrine of the subject. Second, arising directly from the 
first, Lacan himself indicated that the theory of the 
subject, and specifically, the opposition of "the subject" 
and of "the self" ("du moi") made up the central axis from 
which it was appropriate to reconstruct the work of Freud. 
In his seminaire, (Vol. 11), Lacan opined that everything 
that Freud ever wrote was aimed at re-establishing the 
exact perspective of the eccentricity of the subject in 
relationship to the "moi"; it is around that idea that 
everything must arrange itself. (The originality of Lacan' s 
thought tended to be matched by the opacity of his literary 
style. ) 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- La pensee 68, Ope cit. Chapter VI, 
"Le freudisme fran<;:ais", pp. 237-261 
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In a concluding chapter, "Retour au sujet" (1), Ferry and 
Renaut revert to their basic theme: that the anti-humanism 
integral to the structuralism of the 1960s was antipathetic 
to fundamental thinking on human rights and the status of 
the individual in contemporary French society. They are not 
seeking to defend a status quo but rather to mount a strong 
philosophical argument against the anti-humanism derived 
from French developments emanating from the thought of Marx 
and Heideggerj this anti-humanism, if accepted, would deny 
the possibility of rational, pluralist philosophical 
debate. The denial of the possibility of human autonomy 
(and hence of humanism, which they define as the desire to 
make such an idea the distinctive feature of mankind) they 
regard as being particularly serious. 
The two philosophers maintain that the sum of the arguments 
of "la pensee 68", if accepted, would amount to two 
distinct ideas of the death of man as a philosopical 
concept and thus two distinct anti-humanisms. For Marxists, 
Ferry and Renaut argue, the idea of an individual autonomy 
in the thoughts and actions of man (even allowing for some 
minor exceptions in the sociology of Bourdieu) has always 
been denounced as a pure and simple hoax. For orthodox 
Marxism, they continue, the "subject" was no more than a 
machine which one could take apart and examine the working, 
in other words an object. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- La Pensee 68, Ope cit. Chapter 
VII, pp. 263-285 
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Following the Heideggerian perception, the constituent 
autonomy of the subject was seen also as an illusion, being 
at one and the same time due to a lapse of memory and as 
an obstacle to be overcome. 
Ferry and Renaut conclude that the notion of post-
modernism, which takes away all sense from an idea of 
mankind which had constituted the genuine contribution of 
modernity, thus takes on the strange allure of a 
regression. The effect is one of substituting the Kantian 
idea, set out in the critique of Practical Reason, of 
nature being subject to the will of man, to the pre-modern 
idea of a nature to which the will of man is subject. 
In a final summary (1), Ferry and Renaut ask whether there 
is not a certain paradox, even a certain contradiction, in 
the fact that they have stressed as being essential the 
individualist component of May 1968. Further, they ask, 
does not this contradiction extend to their designation 
under the rubric "la pen see 68" those philosophies, as 
diverse as they may be (apart from their denial of 
humanism), which have appeared to have had little sympathy 
for the mass consumer society in which the reign of the 
individual would appear to be limitless? They argue that 
their book in its entirety constitues a response to this 
point. 
FERRY and RENAUT La Pen see 68, pp. 287-289 
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However, they summarise in a few words a concept which 
would seem to be of fundamental importance in any 
consideration of the import and reality of a plurality of 
incommensurable ideas. Ferry and Renaut say (1) that the 
critique of truth in the sense of an Absolute Knowledge, 
when it is not completed by a reflection on the regulatory 
value which the demands of reason, in the name of an ideal, 
may nevertheless keep and may be in agreement marvellously 
with the individualist pathos so well expressed by the 
formula: "To each his own truth". 
I argue that the importance of Ferry and Renaut's La Pensee 
68 in the overall context of thinking about democracy and 
its values in contemporary France is that it pronounces the 
end of anti-humanism and at the same time a return to the 
philosophy of the subject with all that that signifies in 
terms of incommensurable human values. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- La Pensee 68, Ope cit. p. 287: 
"[ •.. ] la critique de la veri te au sens du savoir 
Absolu, lorsqu'elle n'est pas completee par une 
reflexion §YI la valeur regulatrice que peuvent 
neanmoins conserver, ~ titre d'ideal, les exigences de 
la raison , peut merveilleusement s'accorder avec le 
pathos individualiste si bien exprime par la formule: 
'A chacun sa verite'" (emphasis in original. JT). 
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Les droits de l'homme 
"C'est fondamentalement le libAralisme qui, en donnant 
ses cadres institutionnels a l'individualisme 
democratique, crAe les conditions a la fois sociales 
juridiques et politiques du developpement de l'Etat 
providence." (1) 
Following the student demonstrations of 1986, Ferry and 
Renaut brought out a work that their publisher's blurb 
calls "Un essai de philosophie immediate." (2) 
Of the three-volume Philosophie politique, the first two 
volumes were written by Ferry and he shared the authorship 
of the third volume, "Des droi ts de l' homme a l' idee 
republicaine", with Renaut. This work takes the evolution 
of the complementary concepts of subject and individual 
through the acceptance of hUman rights to the idea (and the 
ideal) of republican government. 
1. FERRY, Luc and RENAUT, Alain 68-86: Itineraires de 
l'individu, Gallimard, Paris, 1987 
2. idem -- back cover 
3. FERRY, Luc -- Philosophie poli tique: Vol. 1 "Le 
droit" and Vol. 2 "Le systeme des 
philosophies de l' histoire" ; (wi th 
RENAUT, Alain) Vol. 3 "Des droits de 
1 'homme a l' idee republicaine" 
Quadrige (Presses universitaires de 
France), 1996 
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Citing Marcel Gauchet (1), Ferry and Renaut begin their 
exposition with a warning: "Les Droits de l'homme ne sont 
pas une politique". This is a warning against any tendency 
to regard the principles set out in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the citizen of 1789 as an unqualified 
alternative to totalitarianism (2). 
They point out the fundamental problem in equating the 
rights of the individual with those of a wider community 
(3) : 
1. 
2. 
3. 
" [ ••. ] la rhetor ique des dro its de 1 ' homme , 
historiquement issue [ ... ] de la tradition 
individualiste (emphasis in original. JT) du droit 
naturel mod erne dans son effort pour construire la 
communaute a partir de l'individu et en faisant fond 
sur l'individu, n'est-elle pas condamnee par 
definition a se heurter a de serieuses difficultes des 
lors qu'elle aborderait le probleme proprement 
politique (emphasis in original. JT), soit: le 
probleme de l'organisation d'une collectivite, 
(emphasis in original. JT) avec la reconnaissance 
qu'il implique d 'une necessaire negation, au moins 
partielle, de la souverainete personnelle des 
individus (emphasis in original. JT)?" 
GAUCHET, Marcel -- "Les Droits de l'homme ne sont une 
politique" in Le Debat, July-August 1980 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", OPe cit. p. 9 
-- idem. 
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Ferry and Renaut pose a question of considerable importance 
(1): do human rights and democratic values together make 
up a consensus or a dissensus? They recall (2) that the 
Preamble of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
proclaims the attachment of the French people to the 
declarations of the rights of man as set out in the 
Declaration of 1789 and as confirmed and completed by the 
Preamble to the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. 
But, they continue (3): 
"[ •.. ] si la definition des valeurs democratiques 
offre a ce point matiere a discussion, une reflexion 
s'impose, quelque penible qu'elle puisse etre, sur la 
faible consistance de l'idee democratique dans notre 
imaginaire politigue. Certes, l'on s'accorde 
aujourd'hui pour relier etroitement 'le premier 
developpement de l'Etat democratique et l'institution 
des droits de l'homme' [(4)] et pour considerer les 
droi ts de I' homme comme 'consti tutifs de la 
democratie' [(5)]. Mais ~ guelle idee des droits de 
l'homme, mieux, ~ quels droits de l'homme associe-t-
on ainsi l'idee democratique? (emphasis in original. 
JT) 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de I' homme a l'idee 
republicaine" Ope cit. -- idem. -- p. 13 
2. idem. p. 16, Note 
3. idem. p. 16 
4. and 5. Ferry and Renaut are citing here LEFORT, Claude 
L'invention democratique, Fayard, Paris, 
1981, p. 63 
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Thinking through precisely what human rights should be 
associated with the democratic ideal brings Ferry and 
Renaut to perceive (1): "L'equivoque fondamentale de la 
reference democratique" which is, they aver, the fact that 
modern political liberalism cannot readily encompass the 
aspirations of the popular masses whilst modern socialism 
has the greatest difficulty in thinking of rights and of 
law ("le droit") as themselves constituting intrinsic 
values. It could be said that Ferry and Renaut are 
suggesting a variation on the theme of the liberal dilemma 
(2), when they point to the subtle distinction between the 
principle of the sovereignty of the people and the 
temptation to bow to popular demands (3). 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de I' homme a l' idee 
republicaine", Ope cit. p. 19 
2. 
3 • 
idem. p. 22 
I would argue that recent European history is not 
short of examples of governments having to resist 
popular pressure to introduce recriminatory or 
excessively coercive legislation following a wave of 
popular emotion engendered by an extraordinary event 
and fanned by dramatic media coverage. 
329 
Ferry and Renaut allude to the past difficulties in finding 
a compromise between the (1) "deux grandes traditions" 
inherent in the French polity since the Revolution and 
especially since 1848 (2): 
" [ ... ] aveuglement congenital de la tradition 
socialiste aI' egard de la portee proprement 
democratique des droits les plus formels, 
reticence congenitale de la tradition liberale a 
prendre en compte certains des exigences (notamment en 
matiere de justice sociale) que semble vehiculer avec 
elle l'affirmation de la souverainete du peuple 
[ ... ]". 
They sum up (3) the different concepts as representing 
social democracy and political democracy, a corollary 
embracing the dichotomy in the idea of "human rights" 
between which might be termed permissions ("droits-
libertes") and entitlements ("droits-creances"), in other 
words, that which individual citizens are allowed to do by 
law and that which they expect the collectivity to provide 
for them. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT "Des droi ts de l' homme aI' idee 
3. 
republicaine", op, cit. p. 25 
idem. 
idem. 
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pp. 25-26 
p. 26 
This dichotomy, they maintain (1), underlines the equivocal 
nature of the recent democratic process in France, a schism 
between a liberal tradition noted for its reluctance to 
take too much note of popular demands (" les droi ts-
creances") and a socialist tradition characterised by the 
devaluing of individual rights ("les droits-libertes") at 
the expense of a belief in historical inevitability. 
According to Ferry and Renaut, the political extension of 
subjectivity and individualism into the concept of codified 
human rights needs to be the subject of three discrete 
questions (2): 
"l. si leur proclamation ne constitue 
politique, quel statut accorder cependant au 
des droits de l'homme par rapport aux 
pOlitiques qui s'y referent? 
pas une 
discours 
theories 
"2. Quel contenu attribuer par ailleurs a ce discours? 
L'integration des droits-creances, a cote des droits-
libertes, temoigne-t-elle d'une equivoque politique 
insurmontable de la reference aux droits de l'homme, 
susceptible d'etre mobilisee aussi bien par la 
tradition liberale, au nom des libertes, que par la 
tradition socialiste, au nom des creances? 
"3. Quelle portee, enfin, reconnaltre a la 
proclamation des droits de l'homme, si l'on per90it 
que, par le biais du probleme de la realisation du 
contenu des Declarations, l'humanisme juridique risque 
de charrier avec lui des configurations 
intellectuelles (le volontarisme ethique, 
I' historicisme) qui portent en elles les germes de 
radicales negations du droit?" 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", OPe cit. p. 31 
idem. -- p. 39 
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supplying definitive and detailed answers to these three 
questions leads Ferry and Renaut into an exposition of the 
philosophy of human rights (1). They admit the attraction 
of a return to the classical concept of right (2) but have 
no doubt that modern juridical humanism is incompatible 
with this ancient concept (3). If human rights are to 
underline the power of the individual, it being recognized 
that modernity is defined by the evolution of the 
individual, then such a concept is incompatible with 
classical ideas of right in which: [ ••• ] le droit 
apparaissait au contra ire comme une limite imposee par la 
nature des choses (par l'ordre du monde) au pouvoir de 
l'individu (la loi contre l'hybris de l'homme)"(4). In 
summary, they argue for (5): 
1. 
2. 
3 
4. 
5. 
" [ ... ] une defense philosophiquement non naIve de 
l'humanisme c~ntre les objections qu'on peut lui 
opposer au nom de naturalisme des Anciens". 
FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", op. cit. pp.43-69 
idem. pp. 47-55 
idem. p. 55 
idem. pp. 59-60 
idem. p. 61 
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Ferry and Renaut conclude by maintaining that juridical 
humanism, in other words, the concept of man-made human 
rights, does not automatically negate all classic ideas of 
what constitutes right. It is conceivable that man-made 
human rights could be subverted to the object of a 
momentary consensus reflecting merely the spirit of a 
narrowly-defined epoch (1). Such "antihumanisme radical" 
(2), or a conflict of what ought to be with what is, 
remains a stumbling block in any political expression of 
human rights. Being critical of historicism or of 
totalitarianism does not lead one automatically to a theory 
of human rights nor of a revalorisation of these rights 
(3) • 
1. FERRY and RENAUT "Des Droits de l'homme ~ l'id~e 
r~publicaine" -- OPe cit. p. 68. In this context 
it is possible to envisage a referendum in 
Germany 1n the autumn of 1936 (that is, 
immediately following the Berlin Olympics) having 
demonstrated massive popular support for strongly 
anti-humanist measures. 
idem. 
idem. -- pp. 69 
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Any consideration of the historical evolution of the 
concept of the rights of man will come eventually to 
Rousseau. Ferry and Renaut aver that it was only with the 
emergence of the modern problem of the state and the social 
contract that the concepts of legitimacy and subjectivity 
became inextricably mixed (1). Out of this conjuncture 
there appeared two essential conditions giving SUbstance 
to the idea of human rights (2): "[ ... ] sUbjectivisation 
du droit dans le droit naturel moderne, apparition de la 
problematique des rapports Etat-societe comme centre de la 
theorie politique [ .•. ]". 
Rousseau's thinking marks a watershed between classical and 
modern political ideas. Ferry and Renaut write (3) that for 
partisans of the classical tradition, Burke, for example, 
Rousseau seemed to epitomize modernity whilst for modern 
liberals contemplating the separation of society and the 
state he tends to be classified as belonging to the 
classical stream. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", Ope cit. p. 71 
idem. p. 72 
idem. p. 85 
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This leads them to make a point of no little importance 
(1) : 
"[ ..• ] l'opposition du liberalisme au 
rousseauisme [ ... ] laisse ouverte une question 
qu'il nous faut ici prendre en compte: si l~ 
theorie rousseauiste de la volonte generale 
marque bien l'apogee de la rupture avec la pensee 
antique du droit, si elle est, comme telle, l'une 
des representations fondatrices de notre 
modernite, que reste-t-il du rousseauisme apres 
sa critique liberale?" 
Ferry and Renaut expand this point by maintaining that the 
modern concept of human rights takes for granted the 
discrediting of naturalistic or psychological doctrines of 
sovereignty, simply because this modern concept embraces 
the idea that (2): " [ •.. ] l' homme est suj et de droit 
implique en toute rigueur une conception conventionnaliste, 
subjectiviste, de l'origine et de la legitimite du pouvoir 
politique". 
However, the moment this concept of human rights becomes 
accepted, the dichotomy between "droits-libertes" and 
"droi ts-creances" appears, and leads ineluctably to a 
second dichotomy, that between society and the state. Thus 
even though modern concepts of human rights have their 
genesis in the contrat social, these concepts have moved 
on considerably from Rousseau's political environment (3). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'hornme A l'idee 
republicaine", Ope cit. p. 85 
idem. 
idem. pp. 85-86 
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Putting this essential point into their own inimitable 
prose, Ferry and Renaut argue that (1): 
1. 
2. 
"[ ... ] si la volonte generale de Rousseau n'apparalt 
en aucune des theories pOlitiques comme une 
description, adequate sociologiguement, de ce qui 
constitue la realite des societes modernes et qui, 
sans nul doute, a quelque chose a voir avec le couple 
societe-Etat, il reste que l'unite sociale et 
politique Vlsee dans la doctrine de la volonte 
genera le comme lieu de la souverainete continue a la 
fois de fonder et d'animer toute la pensee pOlitique 
moderne, meme lorsqu'elle prend explicitement la forme 
d'une critique du jusnaturalisme. Face a la prise en 
compte des divisions reelles qui travaillent la 
societe, la volonte generale, loin d'etre releguee au 
musee des archalsmes, devient l'idee regulatrice de la 
philosophie politique moderne. Philosophiquement 
thematisee, l' emergence du couple societe-Etat, en 
tant qu'il va conduire a preciser la notion des droits 
de l'homme, et a y susciter le conflit majeur des 
libertes et des creances, comprend donc deux moments: 
un moment liberal, qui s' exprime au mieux dans la 
critique constantienne [(2)] de Rousseau, et un moment 
qU'on pourra qualifier de kantien, par ou la division 
etant prise en compte, la volonte genera le devient une 
Idee d~nt il faut indiquer comment les diverses 
approches sont constitutives de la pluralite des 
theories politiques modernes" (emphases in original. 
JT). 
FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", op. cit. p. 86 
Ferry and Renaut are referring to CONSTANT, Benjamin -
- De la liberte c:hez lea modernea (Edition Le 
Livre de poche, Paris, 1980) and, specifically, 
to the lengthy introductory preface by Marcel 
Gauchet to this work. 
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Following Gauchet's prefatory analysis of Constant's 
thought (1), Ferry and Renaut set out and analyse the four 
elements in Constant's argument against Rousseau (2) . These 
are, briefly: first, that the confusion between "la volont~ 
g6n6rale" and "la souveraineti du peuple" is an invitation 
to tyranny; second, the interpretation by the men of 1793 
of the contrat social showed that Rousseau had not escaped 
from the idea inherent in the ancien regime of a dirigiste 
government; third, political power is not, and must not be, 
either a transcendent cause (that is, belonging to a 
prince) or an immanent cause (that is, coming from "la 
volont6 g6n6rale"), but an effect; finally, Rousseau could 
not comprehend any division between society and the state, 
both being fused in "la constituant". 
They maintain that a signal element in Constant's thought 
is his appreciation of the reality of individualism (3); 
for all that, they believe that Constant's criticism of 
Rousseau goes too far and that what he (and others who have 
used his arguments) ignore is that (4): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
"La doctrine de la volonte genirale, par les bornes 
qu'elle impose a la loi, est donc aussi, en un sens, 
une theorie des limites de l'Etat [ ... ]". 
See note 2 on the immediately preceding page; also 
page 21 supra. 
FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'id6e 
republicaine", Ope cit. pp. 87-91 
idem. 
idem. p. 91 
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The foundation of modern political theory comes from 
Rousseau via Kant, Ferry and Renaut affirm (1), citing 
specifically at the outset Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason. 
They summarize by setting out what they maintain to be the 
three possible types of political theory based upon human 
rights. These are (2): the liberal discourse, which reduces 
human rights to "droits-libert6s" only and which sees in 
these rights the basis for a limitation of the powers of 
the state ("l'Etat"); the Marxist-inspired socialist 
discourse which gives primacy to "droi ts-cr6ances", whence 
to state intervention to assure these rights, with "droits-
libertes" being of secondary importance; finally, the 
anarchist discourse, which has no time for either form of 
human rights on the grounds that both pre-suppose in one 
way or another a central authority (3). 
1. 
2. 
FERRY and RENAUT --
republicaine" 
"Des droits de l'homme a l'id6e 
OPe cit. p. 96 
idem. pp. 101-102 
3. On page 51 supra, a reference is made to an article by 
Ferry and Renaut in which they cite Kant's 
critique of Pure Reason and aver that Kant sets 
out three structures of philosophy: dogmatism, 
scepticism and criticism. 
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In a lengthy second section of the work under reference, 
Ferry and Renaut analyse these three discourses (1). In an 
introductory "Liminaire" they outline their arguments (2). 
They argue that it is reasonable to begin their analysis 
with the events of 1848 in France for two reasons: first, 
it was during the debates in the National Assembly on the 
right to work being formalized in the Constitution that the 
distinction between "droits-libertes" and "droits-creances" 
emerged as a major issue, a fact which opened the schism 
between the liberal thinkers and the socialist thinkers of 
the time; second, over and above this difference, the 
republican ideal with its inbuilt dedication to human 
rights provided a reference point, admittedly fragile, for 
the unification ("rassemblement") of the nation. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droi ts de l' homme a l' idee 
republicaine", op. ci t. pp. 105-181: "Anarchisme, 
socialisme, liberalisme: les trois theories 
politiques face aux droits de l'homrne" 
2 • idem. pp. 105-107 
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Ferry and Renaut consider together in a single chapter (1) 
"La division de la societe et de I' Etat cornme probleme: 
critique anarchiste et critique marxiste des droits de 
1 'homrne". Both these political philosophies contest any 
distinction between society and "l'Etat". Proudhon had no 
time for any form of central authority and saw political 
organization as a loose federation of autonomous 
communities. For Marx, civil society had to be incorporated 
into the state as a necessary pre-condition for the 
withering away of the state. According to Ferry and Renaut, 
both anarchism and Marxism have pronounced totalitarian 
elements, if it be admitted that totalitarianism be defined 
at least as representing a denial of any distinction 
between the state and society (2). 
1. 
2. 
idem. 
idem. 
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pp. 109-129 
p. 107 
As for "liberalisme" and human rights (1), Ferry and Renaut 
spell out a fundamental characteristic (2): 
"Si la tradition liberale, quelles qu'aient Q en etre 
les diverses inflexions de Constant a nos jours, s'est 
definie sans cesse par le refus d'une reconciliation 
entre societe et Etat qui supposerait la disparition 
de l'un des deux termes, il est evident qu'il lui 
fallait, pour garantir la difference ou la distance 
entre la majorite des membres de la societe et la 
minorite qui exerce le pouvoir, autrement dit 
I' appareil de I' Etat, mettre I' accent sur un 'cran 
d'arret' infranchissable, capable de prevenir les 
risques d'une confusion totale (totalitaire) entre le 
civil et le politique." 
After considering Tocqueville's intervention on the 
question of a right to work enshrined in a constitution (3) 
and Guizot's concern about republican democracy becoming 
despotic (4) and engendering nothing but social strife, 
Ferry and Renaut turn to the work of Hayek. They cite (5) 
the thought that the idea of social justice is illusory as 
being a principal element in Hayek's Law, Legislation and 
Liberty and, specifically, in the first volume "The Mirage 
of Social Justice". They refer to Hayek's view that 
socialist ideas of social justice would lead to a 
totalitarian system in which there could be no personal 
freedom (6). 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine" -- OPe cit. pp. 130-155 
idem. p. 130 
idem. -- pp. 131-135 
idem. -- pp. 135-138 
idem. -- p. 139 
idem. The reference here is to 
the second volume of Hayek's work, p. 77 
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Ferry and Renaut point out that, although a reading of 
Hayek's case might suggest that he is dismissing modern 
concepts of human rights in favour of a return to classical 
concepts of natural order and natural law, in fact what 
Hayek is arguing is the case "de l'ordre et des lois du 
marche" (emphasis in original. JT) (1). 
According to Ferry and Renaut, Hayek dismisses the 
unrealistic notion of a market based on a complete 
availability of information by producers and consumers and 
prefers to think in terms of a market in which there is a 
continual and continuing exchange of information between 
prospective buyers and prospective sellers. The information 
exchange obviates any need for an outside planning or 
regulatory authority. This presupposes a political system 
in which (2): 
1. 
"L' Etat sera par consequent avant tout le defenseur 
des libertes individuelles: le seul pouvoir legitime 
d'un gouvernement consistera a preserver les droits 
formels de l' indi vidu comme tel, 'droi ts negatifs' 
dont la proclamation consiste seulement a interdire a 
quiconque d' interdire a I' indi vidu I' usage de ses 
libertes dans la me sure Oll elles sont compatibles avec 
celle d'autrui". 
FERRY and RENAUT 
republicaine" --
"Des droits de l'homme a 
Ope cit. p. 141 
l'idee 
-- idem. -- p. 142. In this context 
Ferry and Renaut draw attention to the works of 
Raymond Aron: Essai sur les libertes (see my 
bibliography, p. xxx) and Etudes politiques 
(Gallimard, Paris, 1972) 
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Ferry and Renaut argue that Hayek maintains that the 
political error creeps in when governments seek to add 
"positive rights", that is, economic and social rights, to 
this formal negative right of individual liberty, an 
addition which carries the implication that governments 
have an obligation to underwrite these rights for each 
citizen. Hayek's basic point is that the free and 
spontaneous operation of market forces cannot carry any 
implicit denial of social justice; who has been unjust to 
whom? The idea that an authority should seek to decide such 
a question is, to Hayek, anathema (1) and inequality of 
conditions is an essential element in a process ensuring 
equality of opportunities (2). 
Hayek defends the operation of a free market, Ferry and 
Renaut say (3), precisely because it offers the greatest 
benefit to all and ensures equality before the law, an idea 
which is, after all, at the heart of the modern concept of 
rights. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- ""Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", OPe cit. p. 143 
2. 
3. 
idem. p. 144; this concept 
is, of course, at the heart of pure economic 
liberalism. 
-- idem. pp. 146-147 
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Yet Hayek's model is unsatisfactory; according to Ferry and 
Renaut (1): 
"[ ••• ] si c'est l'autodeveloppement du marche qui est 
'profitable a tous', toute initiative politique qui 
corrigerait les effets de cet autodeveloppement est ~ 
droit impossible ~ legitimer; si, face aux 
difficultes, non exclusivement d'ordre moral (cf. 
l'objection construite par Aron des 1965), auxquelles 
exposerait un rejet total du probleme de la justice 
sociale, on est force d'accorder une prise en compte 
minimal des exigences qui se sont incarnees dans la 
notion des creances, il reste alors a renvoyer la 
solution aux initiatives individuelles, relevant donc 
de la bienfaisance" (emphasis in original. JT). 
The theme of charity, touched upon, Ferry and Renaut say 
(2), in Tocqueville's speech to the National Assembly in 
1848 on the question of the right to work and underlined 
by Guizot in his De la democratie en France on the problem 
created by the concept of "droits-creances", emphasizes the 
fact that the liberal solution to the problem is decidedly 
non-political. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idce 
republicaine", Ope cit. p. 148 
2. idem. p. 149 
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This leads them to a detailed theoretical analysis of 
Hayek's work (1). While recognizing that Hayek' s main 
objective was to counter Marxism, of which he was a fierce 
opponent, Ferry and Renaut contend that the difficulties 
inherent in (2) "[ ... ] un modele liberal dont la version 
hayekienne, par son caractere hyperbolique, grossit 
certaines virtualites" means that Hayek does not provide 
a genuine theoretical alternative to marxist-inspired 
socialism. 
They summarize their position vis-a.-vis Hayek (3): "On dira 
qu'Hayek, dans la tradition liberale, represente un 
extremisme de mauvais aloi et que les conclusions atteintes 
a partir d'un tel exemple sont excessives." For all that, 
they continue, it is the very hyperbolic nature of Hayek's 
thought which makes it attractive to provide an alternative 
way ahead after the collapse of socialism. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", OPe cit. pp. 149-155 
2. idem. p. 149 
3 • idem. p. 153 
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Concluding their analysis, Ferry and Renaut maintain that 
( 1) : 
"11 n' est donc pas si aise, pour qui voudrait se 
reinscrire aujourd 'hui dans la tradition liberale , 
d'ecarter les pretendus exces auxquels se serait 
abandonne Hayek: l'hyper-liberalisme hayekien revele 
une pente historiciste et economiste du liberalisme le 
plus classique, et par consequent, selon cette ligne 
de plus grande pente, il n' est pas certain que le 
discours des droits de l'homme puisse echapper ici a 
une nouvelle, et plus insidieuse, evacuation". 
This problem leads Ferry and Renaut to their main theme 
(2), alluded to in the title of their joint work: providing 
an intellectual framework to permit moving on from the 
concept and acceptance of human rights to the 
synthesization and endorsement of a solution to the dilemma 
of ensuring both "droits-libertes" and "droits-creances", 
or combining the hitherto antinomial republicanism and 
social democracy, in a stable modern polity. 
1. 
2. 
FERRY and RENAUT 
republicaine"--
"Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
Ope cit. p. 155 
idem. -- p. 156 
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Their synthesis, they write, is based largely on French 
experience, for obvious reasons, but they also acknowledge 
the contribution of Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), the 
German philosopher of social democracy, especially because 
of Bernstein's links to Kantism (1). They reaffirm the view 
that the Revolution of 1848 forms an appropriate starting 
point because the debates around this revolution underlined 
the split between socialists and liberals. In addition, 
French democratic socialism contains a number of 
significant ambiguities, perhaps the most outstanding of 
which is the difficulty it has in escaping from its past. 
Finally, if in the case of Bernstein these ambiguities are 
less in evidence, they do not in any case invalidate the 
real nature of their synthesis, that is, the republican 
project. 
French socialism, Ferry and Renaut argue, owes a 
considerable debt to Jaures, and specifically to an article 
which he wrote in 1901 analysing critically the communist 
Manifesto of 1848 and maintaining that although a great 
merit of the work of Marx and Engels was to bring together 
the socialist ideal and the workers' movement, for the most 
part Marxist ideas were out of date. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT 
republicaine" --
"Des droits de l'homme 6 l'idee 
Ope cit. p. 156 
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According to Ferry and Renaut (1) Jaures maintained that 
the problem with Marxism was that it postulated a worst-
case scenario, in other words, that the revolution would 
only happen when the misery of the proletariat reached a 
peak. Further, Marx and Engels did not understand the 
capacity of capitalism to accept a compromise with the 
proletariat. 
As far as the ambiguities in French democratic socialism 
are concerned, Ferry and Renaut summarise an explanation 
(2) : 
1. 
2. 
"Integrant les valeurs liberales, plus reformiste que 
revolutionnaire, profondement humaniste tout 
devait, semble-t-il, conduire le socialisme 
democratique franyais de tradition jauressienne a 
loser paraitre ce qu'il etait' et a operer une 
conversion semblable a celle que connut, sous 
11 influence de Bernstein, son cousin allemand. Et 
pourtant la tradition socialiste franyaise reste sans 
nul doute, au moins jusqu'a une date recente, marquee 
par de serieuses ambiguYtes touchant son attitude a 
l'egard des droits de l'homme et, plus generalement, 
des valeurs de la democratie formelle." 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine" Ope cit. p. 159 
idem. -- p. 162 
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They argue (1) that French democratic socialism is in fact 
staunchly legalist, not only in the exercise of power but 
in its strategy for taking political power whereas in 
theory it continues a revolutionary discourse. This 
equivocal attitude, manifested by Blum in 1936 for 
understandable political reasons at the time, gave rise to 
an opacity in so far as "droits-libertes" were concerned, 
even though there was never any genuine plan to suspend 
such rights. 
This leads Ferry and Renaut to consider (2) "1 'idee 
republicaine". Citing Nicolet (3), they touch upon the 
evolution, of this "idee", or, rather, this "raison 
republicaine", described as a complex mixture of ideas and 
sentiments which in fact meant very much more than might 
be thought from a casual study of the history of the Third 
Republic (4). 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme a I'idee 
republicaine", Ope cit. pp. 164-165 
idem. pp. 166-181 
NICOLET, Claud -- L'idee republicaine en France: essai 
d'histoire critique, Gallimard, Paris,1982 
FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a I'idee 
republicaine" -- Ope cit. p. 166 
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"RApublicanisme" in this sense, they continue is first of 
all the desire to accept and enrich the spirit embodied in 
the heritage of the various Declarations of the Rights of 
Man and the citizen of the Revolutionary decade. If the 
intellectual framework which defines republicanism allows 
an anti-historicist affirmation of the Declaration and its 
implications, it becomes important to understand precisely 
what interpretation of human rights is integrated into the 
republican tradition (1). 
Ferry and Renaut put the question (2): "Quelles sont, en 
effet, pour les rApublicains, ces valeurs juridiques dont 
la sphere leur apparait irredictible a leurs conditions 
d'emergence?" They point out that the texts of the 
Declaration accompanying the Constitutions of 1793 put the 
concept of the "bonheur commun" alongside "droits-libertAs" 
and cite Constant's wry aphorism (3): "Que l'autorite se 
borne a Atre juste: nous nous chargeons d'Atre heureux". 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
rApublicaine" Ope cit. p. 168 
2. idem. 
3. idem. 
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The necessary linkage between "droits-libertes" and 
"droits-creances" (the latter intended to assure "le 
bonheur"), according to the republican creed, is provided 
by a third "droit", that is, "droit-participation". Ferry 
and Renaut emphasize that the genuine rights of man are the 
rights of the citizen expressed as a political right to 
participate in the exercise of power, essentially by 
universal suffrage, a fact which pre-supposes "droi ts-
libertes" and, on the other hand, guarantees the taking 
into account of the demands of solidarity and fraternity 
(1) • 
Philosophically, the republican idea is to be considered, 
Ferry and Renaut argue (2), in the Kantian tradition, 
specifically in that part of Kant's thought which 
distinguishes between I' entendement and la raison. The 
development of the republican idea in the second half of 
the nineteenth century through the concept of "droi ts-
participations" is seen as a synthesis at one and the same 
time both humanist and anti-historicist (3). 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droi ts de I' homme a I' idee 
republicaine" OPe cit. pp. 174-175 
idem. p. 175 
3. 
idem. p. 177 
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specifically, the antinomy between "droits-libertes" and 
"droits-creances" may be described philosophically as 
emanating from a confusion between political entendement 
and political raison, which leads them to affirm that the 
liberal thesis, to ensure its own legitimacy, must be 
prepared to defend entendement against droit as Tocqueville 
did in his 1848 address to the National Assembly on the 
question of the right to work being enshrined in the 
constitution (1). 
In summarising the synthesis, Ferry and Renaut argue that 
(2) : 
1. 
2. 
"L'Idee republicaine, pour sa part, fournit clairement 
la solution de l'antinomie elle est 
indissolublement, mais sans confusion metaphysique, 
politique de l'entendement (ce par quoi elle integre 
le libera1isme) et politique de la raison (ce par quoi 
e11e assigne a l'Idee socia1iste des creances la place 
qui lui revient: celle d tune tache infinie, ou, si 
lIon prefere, d'un principe de la reflexion" (emphases 
in original. JT). 
FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", Ope cit. p. 177 
idem. p. 178 
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The humanist element in the development of the republican 
idea is, Ferry and Renaut maintain, that of the modern 
humanism of the Enlightenment, in other ~ords, simply the 
right to be different (1) (see below). The recognition of 
human rights in turn underlines the essential anti-
historicism of the republican ideal (2): 
"[ ..• le] caractere suprahistorique de certains 
valeurs. Les droits de l'homme, certes, apparaissent 
a un moment histor ique determine, et pourtant, une 
fois declares, ils contiennent en eux une telle 
exigence d'universalite qu'ils ne paraissent plus 
reductibles a l'histoire." 
In a post face to the third edition of this work, Ferry and 
Renaut pick up the expression, the "droit a la difference" 
(see above) and affirm that, although superficially akin 
to human rights, this concept represents in fact a complete 
antithesis. They emphasize their concern with republican 
universalism, not liberal differentiation (3) and stress 
the importance of tolerance (4). Whereas in private 
individuals are entitled to their own beliefs, in the 
public sphere, and above all in politics, it is not a 
matter of whether an individual is a member of this or that 
community; what is important, according to the republican 
creed, is that he or she is a human being. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", Ope cit. p. 179 
2. idem. p. 179 
3. idem. p. 183 
4. idem. p. 184 
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This is why, Ferry and Renaut continue, the French state 
has always looked askance at the wearing of religious 
emblems. Thus the "right to be different" in the public 
domain can obscure the republican ideal and create a risk 
of the republic becoming racist or fundamentalist (1). 
In conclusion, Ferry and Renaut repeat their argument that 
( 2) : 
1. 
2. 
"[ .•• ] l'idee republicaine se presente 
indissolublement, mais sans confusion metaphysique, 
comme politique de l'entendement (ce par quoi elle 
fait justice a la pensee liberale) et po1itique de la 
raison (ce par quoi e11e assigne a l'idee des 
creances, correctement con9ue, la place qui lui 
revient: celle d'une tache infinie, OU, si lion 
veut,d'un principe regulateur pour la reflexion et 
l'action po1itiques qui trouve neanmoins a s'incarner 
dans ses 'traces symbo1iques' bien ree11es). C'est en 
ce sens que, sans constituer par eux-memes une 
politique -- ce qui est l'evidence -- les droits de 
l'homme continuent de fournir le cadre des 
revendications qui donnent leur dynamique aux societes 
democratiques." 
FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine", op. cit. p. 184 
idem. p. 189. See also page 
319 supra. 
354 
Summary 
Ferry and Renaut examine and seek to refute the arguments 
of those who deny humanism and sUbjectivity. Specifically, 
these were Marx, who saw the individual as no more than an 
element in an inevitable class struggle, Nietzsche, for 
whom the will to power of the individual created a state 
of chaos which dominates all other considerations, and 
Freud, for whom the human sub-conscious played a greater 
role than the conscious in human endeavour. 
Heidegger, whose influence on mid-twentieth century French 
intellectuals was profound, offered a technocratic and 
anti-humanist condemnation of subjectivity. critics of the 
concept of subjective humanism point to the barbarities of 
the middle years of the twentieth century committed in the 
name of humanism and the ultimate projection of the spirit 
of the Enlightenment. 
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Renaut and Ferry together take this concept into 
consideration when looking at the history of liberal ideas 
and human rights in France since 1848, signalling the 
schism between what they term the liberal and the socialist 
attitudes to human rights. The liberal idea of human rights 
put liberty first, emphasizing the primacy of personal 
freedom; the socialist idea put social justice (lIegalite ll ) 
first. From 1848 to 1958 the proponents of these two major 
traditions -- the one encapsulating the idea of liberal 
democracy, the other of republican social democracy -- in 
the French polity had serious difficulty in finding common 
ground and thus made something of a mockery of the various 
declarations of the rights of man prefacing some 
constitutional documents. 
The problem became one of a political extension of ideas 
of subjectivity and individualism into a codified 
expression of human rights, given that a mere statement of 
human rights could not, per se, make up an effective 
policy. Again, the consideration becomes complicated by the 
dynamic of economics, and especially by the fact that 
economic forces have now attained global significance, with 
the world-wide operation of free market forces reducing the 
possible effectiveness of democratically based domestic 
political authorities. 
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Historically, political authorities, either princely or 
based upon a perceived form of la volonte generale, have 
tended to be the causes of political activity. In 
contemporary Republican France, political activity is an 
effect of a constitutional form which, Renaut and Ferry 
maintain, offers an optimum solution to the Kantian 
antimony of the liberal "politique de l'entendement" and 
the source of socialist political ideas, the "politique de 
la raison". In this context, la volonte generale is not an 
anachronism; removing the myth of infallibility makes the 
concept synonymous with contemporary "public opinion", 
measurable by the device of opinion polls. 
This constitutional position does not represent, of course, 
an abstract, obj ecti ve value. Renaut and Ferry added a 
postface to a later edition of their joint work touching 
upon the idea of individuals and groups in a contemporary 
polity claiming the right to be different. Extreme 
expressions of this right, they argue, can subvert the 
liberal Republican ethic and risk a resurgence of racism 
or religious fundamentalism. 
-------000-------
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PART III 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 9 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF AGONISTIC VALUE PLURALISM (1) 
The thought of the seven scholars whose work is considered 
in this thesis was described by Lilla as manifesting (2) 
"the almost universal abandonment of the Hegelian, Marxist, 
and structuralist dogmas that nourished intellectual 
contempt for liberalism after the war". To conclude from 
this statement that each one of the selected seven might 
be considered politically "liberal" would be, I contend, 
jejune and misleading. 
1. John Gray, in his Enlightenment's Wake (London, 1995, 
p. 68 et seg.), recalls that the word 
"agonistic" has a Greek origin: the word 
agon, which can mean either a contest, a 
competition, or a rivalrous encounter or the 
conflict of characters in tragic drama. 
contemporary geneticists use the word to 
describe the encounter of cells which meet 
and react positively together. The essential 
idea is of productive conflict; the antonym 
is antagonistic, or destructive, conflict. 
2. LILLA, 
As Gray points out, "value pluralism" is a 
concept introduced by Isaiah Berlin. 
Mark New French Thought: Political 
Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 
1994, p. 15; see also p. ix supra 
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It can certainly be argued with confidence that present-
day French political thought is taking place in a generally 
more liberal intellectual environment than in the past. The 
belief, current in previous years, in ultimate revolution 
(or in the possibility of being able to "complete the 
Revolution") no longer has credibility. In contemporary 
France political debate on questions of political and 
social principle and basic human values is encouraged and 
the exposition of conflicting views is respected. In 
another, more recent, work Lilla describes the consequence 
of this major change and argues that the relationship 
between individualism and modernity is the most important 
theme in the development of French political philosophy 
over the last three decades (1). Considerations of this 
relationship involve debates regarding def ini tions of human 
rights and concepts of humanism in contemporary France. 
This is in marked contrast to the three decades following 
the Liberation and, indeed, is in general contrast to the 
attitude towards political debate over substantial periods 
in France since the Revolution of 1789. Intellectually, the 
revolutionary, monist thought descended both from Du 
oontrat social and from the Marxist canon could not accept 
that political values might be incommensurable and hence 
could not reconcile itself to the concepts of agreeing to 
differ or of accepting dissenting views. 
1. LILLA, Mark -- "L'humanisme en questions" in RENAUT 
(Ed.) -- Histoire, Ope cit. p. 28; see als~ 
p. 8 supra 
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There were times, especially during peaks of revolutionary 
and reforming fervour, when arguments against an excess of 
zeal (the Terror provides an extreme example of such 
excess) were regarded as being dangerously counter-
revolutionary, even heretical, and hence might attract a 
draconian response; the case of Condorcet provides an 
excellent early example of this and that of Raymond Aron 
a less drastic later one. 
A salient fact of the contemporary debate in France about 
political principles is that this debate is topical and 
related to today's polity. Over the period from the end 
of World War II until the late 1970s (and, arguably, for 
several decades previously) there was often a sUbstantial 
divide between the thinking about politics and the reality 
of the practice of government (1). 
For as long as there was a belief in the possibility of 
forging a political and social utopia through revolution, 
the exponents of this ideal held that, by and large, 
present-day politics had little relevance because the whole 
edifice which they underpinned would be swept away in the 
inevitable revolution. 
1.. LILLA in "L'humanisme en questions" Ope cit. p. 19; 
see also p. 8 supra 
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The contemporary debate is about the nature of democracy 
and its values (1). France, an economically rich nation, 
has been a property-owning society for most of its modern 
history and also a nation with a strong dirigiste 
tradition. In present-day France, the post-Revolution 
preponderance of small rural proprietors has been replaced 
by a large group of small urban proprietors; I contend that 
the well-known apophthegm that the historic "fin des 
terroirs" has evolved into a progressive embourgeoisement 
loses nothing in repetition. Pleas for a recognition of 
"1 'exception fran9aise" have yielded to a recognition of 
the imperatives of the global market place. 
Furet sums up the consequent re-orientation of popular 
French perceptions of the priorities of governments (1): 
"[ •.• ] l'opinion a perdu le gout de la reglementation 
bureaucratique et de la tutelle administrative sur les 
professions ou l'activite economique. Elle n'est moins 
egalitaire que naguere, mais la revendication 
d'egalite ne passe plus par la revolution jacobine ou 
par la demande d'un contr61e de l'economie par l'Etat; 
el1e est prise en charge a travers l'idee des droits 
des individus, notamment des droits sociaux." 
1. RENAUT (ed.) -- Histoire, Vol. V. Ope cit. p. 5 
2. FURET, Francois 
Fran90is, 
Pierre 
p. 31 
"La France unie .. in FURET, 
JULLIARD, Jacques and ROSANVALLON, 
La Republique du centre, OPe cit. 
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Each of the seven scholars whose work has been considered 
in this thesis has demonstrated a sensi ti vi ty to this 
contemporary reality. There is an awareness of the salience 
of the issues of the rights of individuals and of social 
rights in the present-day French polity. He or she has 
approached the seeking of an understanding of the nature 
of the contemporary socio-political problem through a 
demonstration of a deep awareness of the history and 
evolution of political ideas. 
For Dumont, Kriegel and Gauchet, the history of ideas has 
to be traced back to the early Christian, pre-Christian or 
Classical past and represents a continuing process or 
evolving stream of thought. For Manent, Rosanvallon, Ferry 
and Renaut, the history of contemporary political ideas 
begins with the advent of the modern age, broadly the 
Renaissance, and is equated with the recognition of 
individualism. 
For each of the seven, the thought of Rousseau 
(specifically Du contrat social) and the Revolution 
together form benchmarks of major significance in the 
evolution of French political thinking. 
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Each of the seven is concerned with various aspects of 
human rights as seen from the point of view of the question 
of the relationship of the autonomous individual to 
modernity, with a recognition that this individual is a 
prime inspiration for values in contemporary society and 
that the values of individuals are becoming increasingly 
measured as aspects of short-term satisfaction, either 
commercial or hedonistic, at the expense of what in the 
past have been regarded as transcendent moral values or an 
accepted greater common good. Regarding contemporary French 
civil society, it can be argued that individual values tend 
to have primacy over collective values. This tendency, 
sustained by demands for "rights" by sub-groups, is 
creating a challenge to more traditional democratic values. 
This essentially fragmentary nature of contemporary 
society, which may be thought of as the ultimate 
manifestation of Kantian heteronomy, is tending to erode 
more traditional communal democratic values without 
necessarily replacing these values wi th a viable 
alternative. 
Thus, for contemporary French society, any concept of ~ 
volonte generale will be a veritable kaleidescope of of ten-
conflicting and incommensurable individual and sub-group 
values, far removed from the Rousseauean concept of a 
homogeneous and autonomous whole, predicated upon a concept 
of infallible and like-minded individuals motivated solely 
bY vertu. 
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An acceptance of this reality is at the heart of the 
thinking of the seven scholars whose work is considered in 
this thesis. Each is concerned about the establishment of 
an intellectual base upon which a topical, credible, 
realistic and sustainable development of a framework of 
humanist democratic values respecting the rights of 
individuals may be constructed. Without exception, all sce 
this base as emanating from history, either the history of 
occidental ideas (Dumont, Kriegel, Gauchet) or the shorter-
term history of occidental individualism and modernity 
(Manent, Rosanvallon, Ferry and Renaut) • 
Dumont is the only one of the seven to give a place to 
economic history (1), although Manent, Rosanvallon and 
Gauchet consider the impact of contemporary economics on 
social values and Ferry and Renaut consider Hayekian 
laissez-faire concepts. 
1. DUMONT -- Homo aequaIis Il Gen'se et 6panouisaement 
de l'ideoloqie economique, OPe cit. 
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Whereas Dumont's analysis of the evolution of the 
individual takes early Christianity (the schism implicit 
in "rendering unto Caesar •.• ") as a starting point, his 
analysis of occidental economic thinking begins in the 
eighteenth century (Locke, Mandeville, Quesnay, Adam smith) 
and continues to its "flowering" with Marx. 
Gi ving due recognition to Marx' s thought and to his 
argument that history would demonstrate that economic 
forces would prove to be more significant than political 
forces, Dumont none the less signals what he regards as a 
fundamental failure by Marx to envisage a possible future 
development: the democratisation of the ownership of 
property. This situation, one in which a large segment of 
the erstwhile proletariat has a great deal to lose through 
violent political upheaval, is strongly anti-
revolutionary. In addition, Dumont argues, the fact that 
many of the followers of Marx have made a quasi-religion 
of his thought has had a detrimental effect on much of its 
significance. 
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Manent categorizes (1) three dominant forms of political 
thinking in the late eighteenth century: absolutism, 
liberalism and the thought of Rousseau. Both absolutism and 
the thought of Rousseau represented extremes. Libera 1 
thought occupies what might be considered an amorphous 
centre ground, without precisely-defined boundaries; at its 
heart is a recognition of the ultimate sovereign power of 
the people and an unambiguous dichotomy between society and 
the state. In a liberal intellectual environment, personal 
endeavours or individual initiatives in creativity, 
commerce, exploration or science were not discouraged. 
The society of Du contrat social was utopian and monist, 
premissed upon a belief in the ultimate infallibility of 
mankind. La volonte genera le of Rousseau could not admit 
minority opinion, government was minimal and in thrall to 
the legislature, and the realities of economics 
commerce, industry and trade -- were simply not considered. 
Nor was there any overt question of the acceptance of 
differing ethnic, gender and sexual values. 
1. MANENT -- Histoire intellectuelle du lib6ralisme, OPe 
cit. p. 152; see also p. 157 supra 
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There could be no place for individualism in the society 
of Du contrat social, Manent argues. The social values of 
the inherited Rousseauean ideal were based upon the primacy 
of the community and a supposed human infallibility. Upon 
this was grafted the Jacobin belief in revolution as the 
ultimate cathartic socio-political act for the achievement 
of the perceived nirvana of social justice. On this 
foundation was Hegelian, Marxist and structuralist 
determinism built. 
Rousseau's ideal society was intensely egalitarian; in 
that fact, it differed from the hierarchical traditional 
societies studied by Dumont. In so far as the totality of 
the idealized society of Du contrat social was greater than 
the sum of its individual parts, such a society could be 
described by Dumont's epithet "holist". 
Rousseauean society was also, by implication, a static 
society in which social evolution arising from the 
achievements and results of individual endeavour in 
scientific, economic or geographic exploration simply would 
not happen. 
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Dumont argues that, as far as traditional pre-rnodern 
occidental societies were concerned, the social evolution 
consequent upon successful exploration undermined 
traditional and inherited patterns of political authority 
and created a dynamic which resulted in a dichotomy between 
the essential civil society and the necessary political 
authority ("the state") which administered the affairs of 
this society. Out of the consequent conflict arose an 
associative concept between society and the state, a 
concept upon which the formal creation and acceptance of 
laws could be based. 
Manent traces three phases in this development of modern 
political thought: initially a "natural law" based upon a 
mutual necessity governing the society-state relationship; 
then, the perceived inadequacy of natural law, which 
induces a crisis and the consequent emergence of history; 
finally, what he calls "radical historicism". 
He signals two conflicting streams in this evolution: the 
one realist, recognizing necessity, focusing on "what is"; 
the other idealist or utopian, seeking to conceive "what 
should be". It could be argued that Kant pointed this out 
with his distinction between verstand and Vernunft. 
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These conflicting streams were evident in the 
constitutional debates, and those surrounding the various 
early "Declaration[s] des droits de l'homme" of the 
Revolutionary years. The relationship between the values 
of "liberte" and "egalite" could not be defined in precise, 
unambiguous terms and in any case tended to be hyperbolic. 
The device of "fraternite" was intended to provide an 
acceptable link between sets of values which could, and 
often did, come into conflict (1). 
I argue that late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century 
concepts of "fraternite" have evolved into more sharply-
focused considerations of "les droits de l'homme" at the 
end of the twentieth century. Thus a major thrust of the 
work of each of the seven scholars is to define what might 
be regarded as the contemporary equivalent of "fraternite" 
in the values of the idiom of the present day, that is to 
say a degree of social responsibility in individuals, and, 
specifically, in terms of what human rights might mean in 
France. For Manent, this definition is the expression of 
modernity embodied in an ultra-realist accent on the 
ultimate power of market forces. 
1. See JAUME Les Declarations des droits de l'homme, 
1789, 1793, 1848, 1946 OPe cit. p. 299; 
see also p. 46 supra 
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Gauchet shares this idea; he argues that market forces 
have the effect of giving the future a power and a 
legitimacy over the present and also, by implication, that 
they accent the importance of agonistic pluralism in a 
heteronomic situation, that is, of seeking to ensure that 
an argument broadly acceptable to a majority emanates from 
the clash of values thrown up by topical events. 
Dumont is a sociologist and an anthropologist concerned 
primarily with the social nature of mankind and with the 
belief that society per se is the product of the 
interaction of individuals. He contends that, in a secular 
society of free individuals, the concept of human rights, 
the surety for which emanates from the ultimate reality of 
non-negotiable social values and rules of behaviour will 
tend to ensure that the relationship between aspirations 
of individual liberty and concepts of social equality is 
optimized. 
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Kriegel distinguishes between concepts of morality (ethics) 
and of political rights and argues for the autonomy of 
both. The rules of behaviour for groups (communal rights, 
the rights of a state, the rights of a people) do not 
automatically mesh with the rights of individuals (ethics). 
She argues that neither the total cloaking of rights in an 
ethical covering so that a code of rights becomes a sort 
of civic religion, nor the effective juridification of 
ethics to ensure human rights, is acceptable. By 
implication, the relationship between rights and ethics 
may be described as being agonistic. 
The republican ethic, she continues, may be categorized 
philosophically as being the meeting place of human rights 
and individual liberties; a concept of the rule of law 
based on the sovereignty of the people and a consequent 
separation of powers is at the heart of this ethic. 
Modern republican political right, she concludes, has four 
principal elements: the rights of the state, human rights, 
the rights of peoples and national rights. The values 
associated with this tetrad will rarely be commensurable 
and are more likely to be pluralist; there can never be an 
infallible or unchallengeable statement of these rights. 
Rather, an acceptance and recognition means a continuing 
agonistic cycle of seeking improvement through a positive 
conflict of ideas, as there has been throughout the history 
of occidental mankind. 
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Ferry and Renaut ask a question of some moment: do human 
rights and democratic values together make up a consensus 
or a dissensus? (1) What is really understood by the 
concept of democratic values in present-day France, they 
ask? Precisely what rights should be considered as being 
an integral part of the democratic idea? They argue that 
there is a fundamental equivocation in French ideas of 
democracy, the result of an ambiguity dating from 1848: the 
liberal stream cannot readily accept a massed popular voice 
whereas the socialist stream has difficulty in considering 
rights as representing intrinsic values. This dichotomy 
manifests itself in considerations of what Ferry and Renaut 
call "droits-libertAs" and "droits-crAances" (2). 
They argue that the poli tical extension of the 
individualism and subjectivity which is the hallmark of 
contemporary society can only be incorporated in codified 
human rights, and ask three salient questions. First, given 
that human rights per se cannot be regarded as a discrete 
policy, what legal status should a declaration of human 
rights have? Second, how should these rights be defined, 
given the dichotomy between "droits-crAances" and "droits-
libertAs"? 
1. FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de l'homme A l'idAe 
republicaine", op. ci t. p. 13; see also 
p. 326 supra 
2. -- idem. -- p. 26; see also p. 329 
supra. This concept recalls Berlin's 
positive and negative liberty. 
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Third, what should the scope of such a codified declaration 
be, given the raft of often-conflicting and emotive ideas 
linked to juridical humanism, ethical codes and 
historicism? 
The concept of man-made human rights, which Ferry and 
Renaut term "juridical humanism", contains a potential 
anti-humanist challenge: such "rights" may be subverted and 
become "radical anti-humanism" by what passes for a 
democratic process in a short-term, emotively-charged, mass 
popular reaction. 
As philosophers concerned with the history and evolution 
of ideas, Ferry and Renaut seek to establish the relevance 
of the thought of Rousseau to the present day: "[ ..• ] que 
reste-t-il du rousseauisme apres sa critique liberale?" (1) 
The starting point of their response is the acceptance of 
the concept of the sovereignty of the people. However, this 
leads to a double dichotomy: first, the conflict between 
"droits-libertes" and "droits-creances" and, second, the 
division between society and the state. These two concepts 
were simply not conceived of by Rousseau. However, they 
contend (2), this does not relegate la volonte genera le 
into a "musee des archaYsmes". 
FERRY and RENAUT -- "Des droits de 1 'homme a l' idee 
republicaine", OPe cit. p. 85; see also 
p. 322 supra 
idem. -- p. 86; see also p. 333 
supra 
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On the contrary, it becomes the regulating idea of modern 
political philosophy, an idea built around two poles, 
referred to by Ferry and Renaut as being "constantien" and 
"kantien", and constituting in totality the plurality of 
modern political theories. 
This concept of plurality, Ferry and Renaut argue, has 
become an inherent part of the contemporary French 
republican ideal, or, as they prefer to call it, "la raison 
republicaine" (1). This "raison" affirms a strongly 
moralizing spirit and concept of a higher good built around 
the concept of human rights in the essential republican 
ethic. The republican idea permits an acceptable 
reconciliation between the erstwhile extremes of the 
antinomic "poli tique de la raison" (the ultimate 
maximization of social justice) and "politique de 
l'entendement" (pragmatic liberal thought). The republican 
ideal is anti-historicist; if it were not so, it could not 
embody the concept of human rights. 
Beyond considerations of human rights there has to be a 
reflection upon the authority which would be the guarantor 
of these rights, no matter how defined and codified. Ferry 
and Renaut emphasize what is undoubtedly a truism: the role 
of the state ("l'Etat") has an historic significance and 
importance in France. 
1. FERRY and RENAUT "Des droits de l'homme a l'idee 
republicaine" , op. ci t. p. 166; see 
also p. 347 supra 
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Manent emphasizes the modern (his emphasis) state and 
argues that the very fact that there is a perceived need 
to think about the liberal and democratic principles 
sustaining the modern state suggests that the perfect form 
of the state is yet to be found. 
Yet, he continues, only the modern state can uphold human 
rights. Manent underlines the dynamic nature of the modern 
state and argues that it is continually recreating itself 
through the democratic process and through a deeper and 
ever-present insoluble conflict between nature and law. 
Kriegel also recognizes the essential conflict between 
nature and law which is at the heart of the practice of 
contemporary liberal democracy and hence of ensuring that 
a defined and accepted codification of human rights is 
upheld and defended. She traces the evolution of the modern 
state through the history of political theory. This history 
has three elements: a doctrine of power, that is, 
sovereignty; a doctrine of individual rights; and the 
political morality of law. 
The sovereignty of a specific state, she argues, is a 
matter of independence vis-a-vis other sovereign powers, 
of internal coherence and of the acknowledged supremacy 
of the law. 
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This means that the state is limited by law; the law 
upholds human rights, which may be sub-divided between 
human liberty and civil liberty. Kriegel recalls Kant's 
search for a link between morality and law and argues that 
morality is a system of obligations which imposes duties 
and ideals. She links a specific morality of law to 
national identity and contends that the idea of "la 
Republique" in France may be regarded as an expression of 
a national moral identity. 
For Kriegel, the definition of an acceptable link between 
individual autonomy and social justice must emanate from 
specific statements of law and of the differing but 
utimately complimentary statements of the rights of the 
state, of individuals, of citizens and of peoples. 
Rosanvallon sees this definition coming out of a clear 
understanding of the functions and power of "1'Etat" and 
being a question of improving the quality of democratic 
representation to ensure that the concept of popular 
sovereignty is effective. He writes about "le malaise dans 
la representation" (1) and refers to "[l]e peuple 
introuvable" (2). 
1 . ROSANVALLON "Malaise dans la reprisentation" in 
FURET, JULLIARD, and ROSANVALLON -- La 
Republique du centre, Ope cit. 
idem -- Le peuple introuvable, OPe 
cit. 
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Rosanvallon points out a contradiction, even an absurdity, 
in the current practice of politics: individuals are wary 
of the intervention of "1'Etat" in their day-to-day lives, 
but at the same time look to "1'Etat" for protection, as 
a source of subsidy and as the upholder of the law. 
In addition, there is a specific problem in France 
resulting from the legacy of the Revolution, he argues: in 
spite of the fact that (pace Furet) the Revolution "est 
terminee", the relationship between civil society and the 
political system still tends to be one of conflict, a 
conflict arising from what he calls the myths of consensus 
and of transparence. For example, he believes that the 
consensus of the various periods of alternance and 
cohabitation is a false consensus in that it has created 
a significant number of exclus, men and women shut out of 
the functioning of the society / "Etat" relationship and 
hence being denied social justice. He defines what he calls 
"trois equivoques de la culture pOlitique franyaise" (1): 
a permanent tendency to confuse liberalism and democracy, 
a critical ambiguity at the heart of the 
institutionalization of politics and a difficulty in 
conceptualizing political legitimacy. In essence, all three 
in one way or another touch on the role of "L'Etat" in the 
French political system and the associated reality of an 
acknowledged elitism. 
1. ROSANVALLON "Malaise dans la representation", Ope 
cit. pp. 175-176; see also p. 251 supra 
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In this context, Rosanvallon worries about the ever-
growing importance of public opinion polls, which, he 
contends, are tending to weaken the normal representational 
process. The opinion of the people, he argues, tends to be 
moulded by omnipresent popular media and sounded by regular 
opinion polls. This creates opportunities for manipulation 
arising from a possible commonality of interest between the 
ownership of popular media and that of polling 
organizations. 
Rosanvallon argues that, in modern democracy, "the people" 
have become "introuvable ll , a mere collectivity of cyphers 
whose only equality is before the law. Awareness of this 
fact can easily be brushed off as yet another banal example 
of the difference between the ideal and the real, he 
continues, and expresses a degree of pessimism about this 
conclusion: "La difficulte est devant nous, irreductible". 
(1) • 
1. -- idem. Le peuple introuvable, OPe cit. p. 
306; see also p. 259 supra 
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Gauchet expresses a different point of view, a view which 
opposes Rosanvallon' s pessimism. He does not see this 
fragmentation into extreme individualism as other than a 
natural progression of modernity, a final affirmation of 
the division between civil society and" I' Etat". He signals 
a paradox: the apparatus of the modern state represents the 
most all-embracing expression of political power in the 
history of occidental societies, but it is not its Qlin 
power it is expressing; rather is the power of the 
sovereign people. 
It is an impersonal, agnostic power, generally indifferent 
to the minutia of the lives of individuals, a power which 
is, in general, capable of being challenged on that most 
public of media, universal television. He argues that this 
ultimate manifestation of the democratic principle has 
evolved in a way which is, in essence, contrary to all the 
judgements, prejudices and values of the republican 
legatees of the Revolution. 
Today's civil society is a modern and contemporary 
expression of la volonte generale, Gauchet contends, not 
in a way which Rousseau and the architects of the thought 
of the Revolution would recognize, but one which reflects 
present-day realities. 
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He writes (1): 
"Tel est le sens des transformations du mecanisme 
representatif qui se deroulent sous nos yeux: elles 
achevent de mettre en evidence l'extension qu'il 
convient d'accorder a la notion de representation et 
la centralite de son accept ion scenographique au sein 
du fonctionnement democratique. Essentiellement 
representative, la democratie l'est en ceci que, loin 
de se reduire a l'exercice en acte de la souverainte 
du peuple, elle exige inseparablement la mise en scene 
insti tutionnelle de cette souverainte dans sa 
veritable nature. Elle est en quete d'une disposition 
collective de soi, mais une disposition qui n'existe 
qu' a la condition de se signifier elle-meme et a 
laquelle il n'est pas moins indispensable de se 
figurer que de s'effectuer. 
"C'est la justement la dimension que la politique de 
la Revolution franc;:aise a par excellence manquee." 
Gauchet contends that a people is not sovereign simply 
because a text, for example a constitution, tells it that 
that it is. The sovereignty of the people has to be 
expressed in the day-to-day reality of politics and in the 
certainty that individual men and women really can (and 
have a right to) have their voices heard. Both television 
and public opinion polls are an integral part of this. 
Gauchet draws attention to the removal of arcane features 
from "1 'Etat" and the political process consequent upon 
media attention; the ordinary French man and woman in 
France has never been better-informed on current affairs 
and issues. 
1. GAUCHET La Revolution des pouvoirs, Ope cit. p. 
48; see also p. 300 supra 
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Gauchet believes that this openness of contemporary French 
society is the best assurance of a continuing upholding of 
human rights. He maintains (as do Kriegel, Rosanvallon, 
Ferry and Renaut) that statements of human rights can never 
equate to a specific and effective policy. 
Ferry and Renaut worry further; they share neither Manent's 
nor Gauchet's confidence in the ultimate effectiveness of 
the global market place as a social regulator and express 
a concern that the dynamics of this market may erode the 
effectiveness of democratic governments in ensuring that 
human rights are respected. Although they do not say so 
specifically, it would seem that they are concerned about 
the possibility of social Darwinism in a global competi ti ve 
economy. 
Further, they contend that, although the implicit 
acceptance of value pluralism in the present-day practice 
of politics in France permits an optimization of the 
relationship between concepts of liberal democracy and 
social justice, extreme claims of a racist or 
fundamentalist nature by individuals and sub-groups for 
specific rights create a risk of subverting the 
contemporary concept of republican liberal democracy. 
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In summary, I argue that the broad intellectual recognition 
that (pace Furet) "la Revolution est terminee" is a caesura 
in the continuum of some two centuries' monist political 
principles built around Rousseauean precepts drawn from Du 
contrat social and leavened by the thought of Marx. A 
common popular reading of these principles suggested that 
they promised the certainty of perfection tomorrow in the 
form of a maximization of social justice and hence the only 
valid political thinking was that which patently 
contributed towards completing the Revolution. 
In such an intellectual environment, an environment which 
persisted well into the decade of the 1970s, there was no 
place for incommensurable ideas and conflicting values. 
The concept of political pluralism was derided and the 
expression of contrary views was strongly discouraged, as 
Raymond Aron found. 
The contrast with the present-day situation is marked. 
Poli tical tolerance, a recognition that the values of 
democracy may be incommensurable, an acceptance of the 
concept of an agreement to differ and an acceptance of 
productive conflict, long-established practices considered 
unremarkable in American and British democratic practice, 
have, taken together, presented a certain novelty in 
France. 
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The result is a body of thought which, at one and the same 
time, highlights French concerns about the implications of 
extreme expressions of individualism in a mUlti-ethnic 
national environment for humanist thought and the 
consequent practice of human rights. This makes a 
significant contribution to wider occidental political 
thinking about the individual and modernity. Given the 
discussion in the body of the thesis, I do now argue that 
the work of these seven scholars contributes a new and 
coherent philosophical current. 
It is intended that my study of the work of the seven 
scholars should make an original contribution to the 
understanding of contemporary French political thinking. 
I hope that it will also serve as a starting point for 
scholars in the future. 
----------000----------
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